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The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit
Midrash
Pirkei Avot - The Wisdom of the Fathers
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This shiur is dedicated to the memory of Rabbi Aaron Wise z"l
(whose yahrzeit is Tamuz 21), by the Wise and Etshalom families. Yehi Zikhro
Barukh.
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Shiur #13: Anshei Knesset
Ha-gedola
By Rav Moshe Taragin
The very first mishna of the first chapter both describes the
transmission of the masora (tradition) while listing the moralisms which
the anshei knesset ha-gedola taught. This judicial-legislative body of
'great assembly' was composed of 120 and operated into the early stages of the
second mikdash (temple). It included such renowned prophets as Daniel,
Chanania, Mishael, Azaryah, Ezra and Mordechai. They were responsible for a wide
body of rabbinic legislation as well as instituting a formal and universalized
liturgy. Their remarks represent some of the earliest recorded post-prophetic
statements.
The tribute of 'great assembly' which was affixed to this body
may have been related to the impressive figure of 120 assembled scholars. It may
also have stemmed from their personal stature, including many prophets and
scholars. However, the gemara in Yoma (69b) records an interesting additional
motive for this title. The destruction of the first mikdash marked a
nadir in our national history and a terrible period of suffering and oppression.
However it also raised stiff theological concerns.
To us, born into an exilic world, the notion of a
mikdash destroyed is tragic and history-altering, but comprehensible. To
the people who lived through this gradual corrosion and ultimate collapse, it
was unthinkable. How could God allow His residence to be ransacked?? Witnessing
the foreign armies of Nevuchadnezer rampaging through the mikdash raised
serious theological questions.
In particular, people had difficulty grasping the traits of God
which describe His might and His transcendence. In fact two prophets had
particular difficulty in this regard. Troubled by the prospect of looters
running amok within the mikdash, Yirmiyahu could no longer utter the
praise of 'norah' (awesome) which addresses God's transcendence.
Likewise, Daniel witnessing the enslavement of close to 100,000 Jews could no
longer pronounce God's might ('gevura').
In response, the anshei knesset ha-gedola (at some later
stage – perhaps in their effort to standardize liturgy and include these
phrases) defended these Divine traits despite the perplexing turn of events. It
was a sign of Hashem's 'strength' that He allows man freedom of choice, and in
the case of Nevuchadnezer, freedom to commit unspeakable crimes. Hashem must
suppress His own omnipotence to assure a fair and thorough freedom of choice. If
anything, this restraint is a more robust sign of 'strength.'
Alternatively, His transcendence is on display by our own
continued survival despite our scant population and our scattered and
defenseless position. By restoring these crucial Divine aspects to popular
imagination and liturgical ceremony, the anshei knesset ha-gedola merited the
title of the 'great assembly.' In many ways this body was the first to fashion a
concerted response to the mystery of Jewish History and the riddle of extended
Diaspora.
They counseled us in three areas: to be prudent in judgment, to
instruct many students, and to construct barriers to protect against Torah
violation.
1. Be deliberate in judgment
This ideal is directed, in a strict sense, to individuals who
actually render legal rulings. To our modern sensitivities, having all but lost
halakhic judicial authority, this activity seems highly 'specialized.' Very few
of us will ever sit on a panel of 'dayanim' (judges) and render the type
of verdicts which will be enforceable. Indeed, Rabbis may be consulted to render
a halakhic ruling and this ruling may be likened to a rabbinic suggestion or
recommendation. Certainly this exercise itself, though lacking formal halakhic
authority, undoubtedly demands careful deliberation and sustained reflection.
Though most rishonim do adhere to the literal and somewhat parochial
translation, it appears that the anshei knesset ha-gedola may have
included a secondary meaning.
Avot d'Rebbe Natan associates this dictum with an intriguing
historiographical drama. Initially, three of Shlomo Ha-melekh's compositions
caused a slight uproar and were threatened with banishment. Mishlei, Shir
Ha-shirim and Kohelet each caused some disconcertment to some readers and a
movement to ban these books developed. As the gemara in Shabbat (30b) records,
Kohelet offended many through its numerous contradictions. Indeed, at various
points, Shlomo both condemns and extols laxity (sechok); he denounces joy
(simcha) while later upholding it. Upon further reflection Shlomo's
message was better appreciated, his riddles decoded, and his composition
ultimately canonized by the anshei knesset ha-gedola (see Bava Batra
14b).
Similar contradictions were subsequently noted in Mishlei (it
should be noted that the chronology of the authorship of his three books is
disputed). A similar suggestion – to ban Mishlei - surfaced. However,
having already benefited from their earlier reconsideration, the opponents of
Mishlei resolved its own contradictions and ratified this book as well.
Though the gemara in Shabbat does not record the initial
reservation surrounding Shir Ha-shirim, Avot d'Rebbe Natan does report a similar
experience with this composition and its canonization. Interestingly, this
version reports that the initial reservations surrounded the provocative nature
of several statements contained in these three works. These declarations, if
misunderstood, or if improperly balanced with other ideals, could lead to a
dissolute or degenerate lifestyle. Facing this prospect, some sought to
literally bury these works and suppress Shlomo's compositions. Further
reflection allowed these works to be reconsidered and their anomalies resolved.
Ultimately these ideas have significantly contributed to religious consciousness
throughout the ages!!!
Ironically, or perhaps not so, according to the gemara in Bava
Batra (14b) it was the anshei knesset ha-gedola – the very same body
which urged deliberate consideration - which was ultimately responsible for
canonizing these works within Tanakh. Evidently, by issuing this recommendation
towards careful reflection and deliberation, the anshei knesset ha-gedola
had more than just legal prudence in mind. Apparently, this value encourages
cool deliberation about our judgments in general. The affair surrounding the
incorporation of Shlomo's works highlights the peril of rash or hasty evaluation
- particularly when such impetuousness is driven by seeming religious zeal.
Religious experience aims toward passionate commitment and the substitution of
rational thought with ecstatic experience. Unencumbered by sterile logic,
fervent worship is motivated by ardor and irrational devotion. However, zeal can
sometimes transform into fanaticism. Religion's true aim is not to displace
logic with enthusiasm, but to animate religion with a foundation of passion, and
galvanize ration for the sake of devotion.
How often our religious energy becomes errant as we assume that
the quicker our rejection, the firmer our denial, and the harsher our judgment,
the more zealous our commitment. The controversy surrounding Shlomo's works
highlights this danger.
In fact, the very dictum of 'hevu metunim ba-din' (be
deliberate in judgment) is derived from an intriguing textual juxtaposition
located at the bridge between Parashat Yitro and Parashat Mishpatim. The final
verse of Yitro demands the construction of a ramp upon the altar to prevent
Kohanim from running or leaping toward its apex. Stairs would facilitate
'step-skipping' while a ramp demands gradual ascent. The very next verse - with
which Mishpatim begins - alludes to the formation of a sanhedrin (chief
rabbinical court). Based upon this adjacency, the gemara in Sanhedrin (7b) - as
well as our mishna in Avot - cautions judges against hasty or impulsive ruling.
Just as we are not allowed to rush headlong toward the altar, a rabbinical
court is not allowed to issue swift verdicts.
Essentially – running toward the altar becomes a metaphor, or
even a paradigm, for impetuousness. The Torah appreciated that when religious
zeal flares (when a person runs toward the altar) discretion is sometimes
clouded and jurisprudence is obscured. It campaigns against this danger by
warning about prudence in judgment, and in general opinion or assessment.
2. Moderation of Anger
Avot d'rebbe Natan offers a different expansion of the
principle of 'hevu metunim ba-din.' Instead of encouraging discretion it
addresses the manner in which we manage our anger. The term 'matun' can
refer to calm or composed and not just deliberate. The mishna in Avot d'Rebbe
Natan cites the famous example of Moshe Rabenu who, furious at the armies
returning from the war with Midyan, forgot several laws surrounding the
purification of Gentile owned vessels. Unable to report and enforce these laws,
he was temporarily relieved by Eliezer who conveyed this set of laws.
At first glance this account highlights the immoral nature of
rage. Even our greatest leader was penalized for momentary anger. In fact, one
version of the episode of the 'waters of meriva' has Moshe being punished
and banned from entering Israel because of expressing anger at the mutinous
assembly by referring to them as 'rebels.' This version differs with
conventional wisdom that Moshe was punished for hitting, instead of speaking to,
the rock.
In addition, the story of Moshe's brief non-retention of Torah
knowledge underscores a fascinating aspect of Torah study. Presumably, Moshe's
forgetting was not a punishment as much as a result. Torah knowledge is not
merely an intellectual enterprise but is abetted by devotional energy and an
acute sense of Torah as the Divine word. The greater the consciousness of God,
the more thorough the retention of Torah. As Moshe was constantly preoccupied
with God, his knowledge was surpassing. At this stage his anger slightly
displaced God's presence in his consciousness.
Chazal claim 'whoever is quick to temper is equivalent to
one who worships idols.' (Tikunei Zohar 56 (89b)) Assuredly, anger in no way
partakes of the idolatrous world of ceremony or pagan ritual. Rather,
Chazal likened it to paganism since an angry person experiences temporary
lunacy in which conventional limits no longer restrain his conduct. Prepared to
take any action, the angry person possesses no limits. This unrestrained
attitude certainly ignores the presence of God. In this neglect anger is similar
to idolatry.
Consequently, in his state of even minimal anger, Moshe no
longer sustained his typical level of interaction with God; had he maintained
that level he would not have expressed temper. The 'slight' displacement of
God's presence resulted in 'slight' loss of Torah knowledge.
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