Shiur #16: Three Vices Which Ruin the Human
Experience
By Rav Moshe Taragin
This shiur is in memory of Dr. William Major z"l.
The twenty-first mishna of the fourth perek cites Rebbi
Eliezer Ha-kappar who warned against three particularly addictive human
interests: jealousy, lust and honor. Though these vices are universally
recognized as harmful, Rebbi Eliezer's warning features an interesting message.
When alerting us to the consequences of these crimes Rebbi Eliezer does not
address them from a purely religious standpoint. By claiming that they 'detach'
you from this world he seems to be assessing them from a 'humanist' standpoint.
Even if they weren't religious flaws they should be avoided because they will
ruin the quality of human experience. Though some commentaries (for example
Rabbenu Yonah both in his commentary to the mishna as well as his commentary to
Berakhot 5a) view the concept of 'detachment from the world' as a
reference to olam haba (the world to come), and, by extension, a
reference to actual 'punishment' for these traits, one cannot help but notice
the practical consequences in this world to which Rebbi Eliezer Ha-kappar
presumably referred.
In addition, as these character flaws are not formally
FORBIDDEN by a particular prohibition, one may even question whether they carry
formalized issur (prohibition) and formal punishment. Indeed, each trait
undoubtedly promotes various actual prohibitions, but, theoretically, the trait
may be sustained while the banned action constrained. It is more likely that
Rebbi Eliezer Ha-kappar intended the INHERENT damage of these morally diseased
traits to the human condition. Rebbi Eliezer's statement further echoes an
'earlier' statement recorded in the name of Rebbi Yehoshua that 'miserliness, an
evil inclination and misanthropy' detach a person from this world. As in our
mishna, Rebbi Yehoshua likely underscores the debilitating nature of these
qualities and not just their moral and religious transgressions.
The Rambam (commentary to Avot) appears to adopt a compromise
position when he claims that indulgence in these traits ruins Torah experience,
which in turn prevents intellectual and moral development. Indeed Rebbi Eliezer
Ha-kappar spoke to the effects upon the intellectual and moral human experience
and not to a punishment in response to transgression. However, the deficit to
the human experience stems from the pollution of Torah values, which in turn
sours and stems human development.
Rashi (according to one version) suggests a more historical
read implying that Rebbi Eliezer refers to the three motives informing the three
parties to original sin. The actual motives for this sin on the part of the
respective parties are a bit enshrouded in mystery - especially as the sin
occurred prior to the advent of the yetzer hara (evil inclination). Yet,
Rebbi Eliezer imputes the motive of jealousy to the snake – consistent with a
midrash which details the snake viewing the angelic service provided Adam
(see Avot d'Rebbe Natan perek 1), envying his position and vowing to
supplant him. (Rashi does not actually mention the snake, but as this story is
taken from the midrash the snake would be the Rashi's likely subject of
this jealousy as he is in the midrash. Additionally, the Vilna Gaon poses
the snake as the example of jealousy further reinforcing the midrashic
view).
Subsequently, Chava desires the actual fruit (which was
appealing in sight and taste) flashing the danger of lust and desire. Adom
Ha-rishon's motive is less apparent from the text but it appears as if Rashi
believes that Rebbi Eliezer is imputing to him the flaw of 'vanity' or 'ego.'
Rashi writes that the honor shown him by the angels in heaven (which itself was
responsible for the snake's envy) caused his departure from the garden of eden.
Interestingly, we have little echo of this flaw's role in Adam's banishment –
neither in the verse itself nor in the midrash. Perhaps the honor
bestowed him by the angels imbued a sense of invulnerability which reduced his
guard against eating the forbidden fruit.
Alternatively, it may have produced an inflated sense of self,
preventing a full admission of guilt which may have staved off expulsion. This
raises an interesting issue: the Torah records, with much detail, Adam's
waffling after being caught by Hakadosh Barukh Hu. First he hides when hearing
God descend and subsequently shifts the blame to his wife, rather than shoulder
the blame and attempt recovery. His response is especially striking in contrast
to his son Kayin's reply to being nabbed. Unlike his father, Kayin DOES engage
in some degree of moral accounting and DOES admit guilt and seek penitence.
Though Kayin is also banished to a life of wandering, he is afforded some
clemency in the form of a 'sign' which would deter his would be assailants.
Would Adam's punishment have been as severe had he similarly accepted
responsibility rather than evading? This is certainly a novel reading but one
which may be supplied by Rashi when he claims that the honor heaped upon Adam
was responsible for his banishment.
In any event, Rashi's historical read may merely reinforce my
earlier assessment. I claimed that Rebbi Eliezer warns against the inherent
damage of these traits and not only a possible Divine retribution. Rashi may
have agreed to this reading when he casts Rebbi Eliezer's statement as a profile
of original sin and its various motives. Effectively we are seeing the peril of
these traits in a pre-fallen world absent of actual evil inclination.
The question of how sin occurred prior to the birth of evil
inclination has been exhaustively explored – by both philosophers and Biblical
exegetes. Rebbi Eliezer - at least according to this version of Rashi – may have
been stressing that these traits are so harmful and also so inherent that they
launched the VERY HISTORY of human sin. Even in a world absent of outright evil
inclination, these vices possess the capability to 'tempt' man and cause his
fall.