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The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit
Midrash
Gemara Bava Kama 5765 Yeshivat Har Etzion
SHIUR #10: Rav Chiya's List of Nezikim
Based on shiurim by Rav Moshe Taragin
Last week's shiur demonstrated some of the broader
ramifications of R. Oshaya's larger set of avot nezikin. We gauged the
implications for shomrim in general and for a sokher (a renter) in particular.
This week's shiur will employ the same tactic for R. Chiya's list. The latter
list balloons to twenty-four, including the likes of ganav, to'en ta'anat ganav
and eidim zomemin.
Ganav
Though R. Oshaya had embraced shomrim and included them within
the world of nezikin, he did not include a gazlan (thief). Does R. Chiya's
inclusion indicate a different fundamental understanding of gazlan - one which
would mandate its classification as an av nezek?
Does gezeila (robbery) represent a completely different track,
or can its chiyuv (obligation) be compared to that of a mazik? This issue might
be influenced by our view on how a gazlan's debt is generated. It should be
noted that if the stolen object is intact, it is returned to the victim. Payment
for gezeila occurs only if the object is damaged or lost. Does the thief
compensate for the loss he inflicted upon the victim, or does he render payment
for the illegal ACT of theft which happened to cause that loss? Does he pay for
the ma'aseh gezeila (stealing another's item for personal use) or the resulting
loss inflicted? This question has many ramifications and is fully explicated in
the seventh perek of Bava Kama. One interesting test case would be a
thief who has no intention of retaining the item for personal use. The
Yerushalmi at the beginning of the sixth perek of Bava Kama suggests that a
gazlan who will shortly dispose of the item without benefiting, might not be
defined as a classic halakhic gazlan. This position would imply that the ACT of
gezeila generates the obligation and in this instance no ACT of robbery was
performed (if one defines theft as intention to steal for personal use). If,
however, the victim's loss triggers a compensatory debt for the gazlan, we would
care little as to the future intentions of the gazlan - after all, the victim
has lost his item.
This question could potentially determine the degree of
symmetry between gazlan and mazik. If a thief pays for the loss incurred by his
victim, gazlan would greatly resemble mazik. If a gazlan pays for his unique act
of stealing, it would share less correspondence. R. Chiya, by listing gazlan
alongside mazik, might have been suggesting a closer parallel between the two.
R. Chayim deduced from the Rambam that gazlan payments are
based upon mazik-like concepts. In Hilkhot Geneiva 1:8, the Rambam excludes an
owner from the thefts of his servants since they have a will of their own and
cannot be watched (this particular exemption was elaborated upon in shiur #6).
This servant exemption was developed by the mishna in Yadayim regarding DAMAGES
caused by servants. This was also the context in which the gemara in Bava Kama
cited this clause. By extending this rule to ganav, the Rambam seems to equate
him with a mazik. If the two obligations were not structurally similar, this
comparison would fail.
Tosafot express a similar sentiment at the beginning of the
seventh perek (62b s.v. Yotzu – the second one). The gemara draws on a special
pasuk to exclude contracts from the laws of geneiva. If someone steals a
contract, he is not subject to the normal consequences of geneiva. Tosafot
question the need for exemption. After all, if one DAMAGES a contract he does
not pay, since he did not directly cause a loss ("garmi"). The actual debt
expressed in the contract is abstract and was only affected indirectly by the
PHYSICAL damage to the contract. If DAMAGING a contract is excluded from mazik
payments, certainly contracts should be excluded from ganav payments too. This
question, as well, assumes an overlap between ganav and mazik.
To'en Ta'anat Ganav
The gemara subsequently questions R. Oshaya's omission of
ganav. In response, the gemara claims: "R. Oshaya alluded to ganav by listing
shomrim." Rashi explains that by stating shomrim, R. Oshaya referred to all
possible shomer ramifications - including the case of "to'en ta'anat ganav." If
a shomer does not return the article, and instead falsely swears that it was
stolen, but subsequently is caught, he pays kefel (double the original amount),
as a classic gazlan would. This case, known as to'en ta'anat ganav, is developed
by the gemara in the beginning of the seventh perek of Bava Kama. R. Oshaya
considered to'en ta'anat ganav (a halakha he had implied by listing shomrim) to
be ample reference to the world of ganav. He saw no reason to reiterate ganav
proper.
This response, in defense of R. Oshaya, is based on a very
glaring assumption. R. Oshaya is effectively aligning to'en ta'anat ganav with
classic ganav. They each pay kefel because they are considered thieves – one
actual and one "legal" - using the law to commit a theft. Hence, by alluding to
to'en ta'anat ganav, R. Oshaya had little reason to restate ganav. Consequently,
R. Chiya (by listing both to'en ta'anat ganav AS WELL AS ganav) might have
DISASSOCIATED to'en ta'anat ganav from ganav proper. He might view the kefel
payments of a shomer as a separate track – a severe betrayal of the shomer-owner
agreement which nets a double payment as penalty. Logically, severing to'en
ta'anat ganav from ganav would impel him to list each separately.
This question – whether to'en ta'anat ganav is a virtual ganav
or whether his obligation stems from his breach of faith with the owner -
obviously has broader implications. For example, the gemara in Bava Kama (62b,
106b) cites a debate about whether a toe'n ta'anat ganav would also pay four or
five times the debt if, subsequent to his oath, he sold the animal or performed
shechita (as is the case with a classic ganav). If we convert a to'en ta'anat
ganav into a ganav, he would share his payment tables. Just as a ganav, who
subsequently sells the animal, pays these penalties, so would a to'en ta'anat
ganav. If we disengage a to'en ta'anat ganav from ganav and view him as a
treasonous shomer, we would have no license to automatically impose ganav
payments upon him.
This structural question might in turn be a product of a larger
and logically prior question - which pasuk serves as the source for to'en
ta'anat ganav? The gemara in Bava Kama (62b) cites two possible opinions -
either we infer this category from an extra phrase in the pasuk stipulating the
laws of GANAV, or we derive it independently from a different pasuk. Clearly, if
we derive to'en ta'anat ganav from the same pasuk as ganav, we would be inclined
to view him as a derivative form of ganav.
This might have been the disagreement between R. Oshaya and R.
Chiya. By listing ganav and not relying upon his allusion to to'en ta'anat
ganav, R. Chiya might have been indicating the independence of to'en ta'anat
ganav from ganav. R. Oshaya for his part, by condensing ganav into to'en ta'anat
ganav, might have been signaling a unity between them.
Onshin mamon min ha-din
Can we independently create nezikin payments through exegesis?
R. Chiya listed eidim zomemin as one of his twenty-four avot.
This classification is dubious, since the payment conditions of eidim zomemin
are somewhat incongruous to nezikin. Normally, a mazik pays for the damages he
inflicted. If he attempted to damage, but failed, he is excused from payment.
Eidim zomemin behave differently: If the eidim planned a conspiracy, but were
caught before succeeding, they must remit the exact sum they conspired to
extort. If, however, they succeeded and the victim was penalized unfairly (as a
result of their testimony), they are excused from payment. This halakha stems
from a gezeirat ha-katuv (biblical decree) "'ka'asher zamam' - ve-lo ka'asher
asa" - 'as they had planned' but not as they executed. R. Chiya's willingness to
consider eidim zomemin as an av nezek is very problematic based upon this
difference. How can eidim zomemin, which so blatantly defies conventional mazik
patterns, be considered a mazik?
This question is posed by Tosafot (4b) s.v. Ve-eidim. Tosafot
answer that although in general, eidim zomemin are exempt from payments once
their plot succeeds, monetary matters are not included in this exemption. In
other words, if eidim zomemin succeed in coercing money from the victim and are
detected, they must still pay the victim. Tosafot claim that this "extension" in
monetary cases can be derived independently through a kal va-chomer: If an
attempted plot mandates punishment, certainly a successful one should. In
general, punishments cannot be independently generated through human logic, or
by applying the thirteen exegetic tools (of which kal va-chomer is one). The
gemara in Makkot (5b) states this quite clearly. Tosafot claim, however, that in
cases of monetary payments, punishments can in fact be independently produced.
If the Torah obligated attempted eidim zomemin to repay their would-be victims,
then certainly ACTUAL VICTIMS must be compensated. Tosafot effectively
discriminate between corporal punishments, which cannot be administered unless
the Torah clearly stipulates, and monetary claims which can be deduced.
Tosafot have clear support for this position from two
additional sugyot. First of all, the confidence with which the gemara in its
initial stages searches for toladot nezikin despite the absence of any pesukim
clearly mandating these extensions, suggests an ability to independently
establish nezikin payments for actions not clearly stipulated by the Torah. In
our first shiur, we mentioned the dissenting opinion of the Mekhilta that at
least toladot keren require a specific textual mandate. Similarly, we cited the
Mahari Katz who questioned that latitude to develop toladot without pesukim.
However, our gemara appears to be indifferent to the need for a pasuk and most
Rishonim do not raise the Mahari Katz's concern. The first few pages of Bava
Kama – including the mishna which explored the possibility of deriving actual
avot from each other - all indicate a willingness to independently establish
nezikin payment through standard exegetical devices.
The gemara in BK (49b) also asserts this license. When
describing a person who digs a bor, the Torah writes: "If one opens a [dug] pit
or digs a new pit ..." The gemara questions this repetition: "If opening an old
pit establishes liability, surely digging a new one should?!" At this stage, the
gemara should have replied: "Since we cannot independently derive monetary
payments, the Torah was compelled to itemize each and every logically distinct
scenario of bor." Indeed, this is the reply provided by the Mekhilta. Logically,
we can derive a "digger" from an "opener." But we do not enjoy this liberty
(based on Makkot 5b) and require an exact and precise list of liabilities. Our
gemara, however, does NOT provide this response, opting instead for a different
law suggested by this redundancy. This gemara, as well, indicates that, in
theory, we can derive a digger from an opener because we can logically establish
monetary debts. How do we explain the gemara's readiness to derive mamon payment
from logic?
This question might be answered by a better understanding of
the rule that we may not derive corporal punishments based upon our own logic.
Are we concerned with human error? If this is the basis of the limitation, we
might experience this constraint in cases of mamon as well. On the other hand,
the Riva (quoted in the same Tosafot above) points out that monetary errors can
be subsequently rectified, if an error in judgement was made, whereas corporal
punishment cannot.
Alternatively, it could be that we just do not have the
authority to impose unlicensed punishments upon other human beings. If the Torah
authorizes these punishments, we act as mere agents in their execution. However,
if the Torah does not explicitly commission a penalty in a certain case, despite
the fact that we sense a warrant, we cannot administer. If this were the basis
of the limitation, we might possess greater latitude in monetary penalties. We
might not be authorized to impose bodily punishment but have greater license to
establish logically compelling monetary payments. [See the excerpt of the Lekach
Tov, posted at the website http://www.vbm-torah.org/sources/bk2.htm
for an elaboration of this issue.]
Next week's shiur (#11) will IY"H address the topic of hezek
she-eino nikar (non-physical forms of damage). Some claim that these damages are
identical to physical damages and similar payment is rendered. The dissenting
opinion maintains that hezek she-eino nikar lav shmei hezek (legal damages are
not considered actual damages) and no liability exists on a d'oraita level. The
Rabanan however established a liability. Next week's shiur will focus on
understanding the nature of that Rabbinic institution.
1) Background information:
Gemara BK, until the colon on 5a
Gittin (52b) mishna, gemara (53a) "u-leman deyalif kenasah...
ve-omer patur"
2) Did the Rabanan recreate the definition of hezek, defining
non-physical damages as Rabbinic damages?
BK 117a - "umina teimra... nami chasheshu"
Gittin (44b) "amar abaye naktinan..." until colon
Ra'avad BK 98a s.v. be-kastera: "tamah ani... chayav;"
"ve-efshar deraba... shechi'ach"
3)Ra'avad BK (5a) s.v. metameh. How might our definitions of
hezek she-eino nikar affect the meitav rule according to R. Chiya?
4)Rambam Chovel U-mazik 7:1-3
5)Tosafot BK (5a) s.v. ve-katani
Shita Mekubetzet BK (5a) s.v. ih hezek (in the name of the
Mahari Katz) |