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GEMARA GITTIN 5772
By Rav Moshe Taragin
Shiur #20: The Requirement of
Lishma in a Get's Composition
The first mishna of the third chapter of Gittin lists various types of
gittin which were not written "lishma," reminding us that unlike
regular documents, a get must be drafted with the specific intent to divorce a particular
woman from her husband. The next two
shiurim will address this unique requirement.
Several gemarot throughout the second and third chapters discuss this
halakha and these shiurim will attempt to incorporate these scattered
discussions.
The mishna on Gittin 26a is the most direct expression of the need to
compose a get
lishma.
The mishna writes that someone who writes
get forms (standardized forms to be
filled in with particular details upon request) must omit the space in which the
names of the principals, the date and location of the
get will later be filled in.
A sofer may not prepare the entire
get in advance, including names of
potential divorcees, since filling in these names ahead of time cannot possibly
be performed lishma - on behalf of two
specific individuals planning to divorce.
Instead, he must leave these areas blank to be subsequently filled in
"lishma" upon particular request.
The source for this requirement is discussed by the gemara on 24b,
commenting on the mishna on 24a which gives several additional examples of
gittin which were not composed
lishma.
As the Torah (Devarim 24:1, 3) mandates "Ve-khatav lah sefer keritut"
— "He must write for her a bill of divorce," the Gemara first suggests that
lishma may be derived from the phrase "sefer keritut," a clause which apparently disqualifies documents which
are not prepared for the purpose of divorce.
For example, a document drafted by apprentices practicing their skills
cannot be defined as a "sefer keritut" since it was not prepared to effect a divorce. However, the Gemara realizes that
even documents prepared for GENERAL divorce but not prepared for the PARTICULAR
individuals who ultimately employ it would be disqualified - EVEN though such a
document would qualify as a "sefer
keritut." Evidently, the laws of
lishma are derived from an alternate
source, the phrase "Ve-khatav la" - the word "la" requiring a more
specific level of designation. Not
only must the document be prepared as a bill of divorce (rather than a practice
document which happens to contain the appropriate text), but it must also be
composed specifically on behalf of the parties who will ultimately divorce.
This gemara, in considering two different sources for the halakha of
lishma, actually suggests two
different perspectives upon the halakha; indeed the second source is preferable
to the first because the general term "keritut"
is replaced by the more specific term "lah." This linguistic change corresponds to
a thematic change: the get must be
prepared not only for general keritut,
but, more importantly, for the specific parties relevant. However, there is a second difference
between the two terms - one which does not necessarily catch the Gemara's
attention at this stage but which could theoretically be a crucial factor in
determining the nature of lishma. The first clause,
"sefer keritut," describes lishma as a facet of the actual document.
Halakha recognizes certain objects which must be infused with legal
status at the point of manufacture.
For example, a sefer Torah cannot be kasher unless the person preparing
the parchment and writing the text intended to prepare a
sefer Torah
lishma. This consciousness
is crucial toward fashioning a halakhically valid
sefer Torah. A
get can be seen in a similar manner. By mandating
"sefer keritut", the Torah demands
that a get be endowed with a certain
status and not merely be text affixed to its background medium. Just as a
sefer Torah or tefillin
must attain this status in order to be valid, so must a
get be created
lishma.
Said otherwise, the Torah mandates an abstract status which must be
infused within the get at the point of
composition.
The second phrase invoked by this gemara portrays a very different
function for the intention of lishma. By deriving
lishma from the phrase "Ve-khatav
lah," the Gemara might be indicating that it views
lishma as a consciousness which must
accompany the composition in order to render the ACT of writing halakhically
valid. Unlike other situations, in
which the Torah merely requires an act of writing (regarding) Shabbat violation,
for example,) in the situation of get,
the Torah demands an act of writing accompanied by the intent to utilize this
bill in the ultimate divorce.
Without lishma, the ACT of writing
itself is invalid and the requirement of "Ve-khatav lah" has not been
met.
To summarize, the syntax of the gemara on 24b suggests two very different
roles for the lishma requirement. We might
claim that the cheftza (object) of a
get is composed not only of ink and
medium, but of an abstract IDENTITY which must be imposed by the person creating
the get. Alternatively, we might perceive the
lishma requirement as a qualifier of
the ma'aseh ketiva - the act of writing.
Without proper intent, the writing itself has not been properly executed. Earlier shiurim addressed the
potential role which the act of writing might play within the overall
geirushin process. Unlike
classic shtarot, the process of
divorce begins with the actual drafting of the document. From this perspective, it would be
quite logical to demand specific intent at the point of
ketiva in order to cast it as an
integral part of the geirushin.
Several sources throughout Gittin evoke these two very different
perspectives. For example, in the
gemara on 86b, Rav Yirmiya considered demanding a delivery (netina)
lishma according to Rabbi Elazar. What would occur if two identical
gittin were drafted (two couples have
the same names) and sent through the same
shaliach for delivery but were confused upon the journey? Though the writing was clearly
performed lishma, the delivery cannot
possibly be executed with specific intent.
Can the shaliach deliver both
gittin to each woman, thereby ensuring
that each will ultimately receive the get
designed specifically for her; or do we disqualify gittin which cannot be
delivered lishma? By extending the Torah's requirement
of ketiva
lishma to possibly include netina
lishma, Rav Yirmiya is probably
viewing the lishma as an ingredient
necessary to animate the process of geirushin. By isolating
ketiva lishma the Torah is
merely choosing the launch of the process and informing us that the process
cannot be aimless; it must be guided.
Rav Yirmiya extrapolates that all stages of the geirushin
(including netina) must be performed
lishma.
A second source which casts light upon the function of
lishma can be found in an interesting
statement of Tosafot regarding text which is written on top of other text (ktav
al gabbei
ktav). Though the gemara on
19a is fairly adamant in disqualifying 'double text,' a subsequent discussion
(20a) cites several opinions which validate a
get which was not originally drafted
lishma but upon which the sofer
retraced his text with proper intentions of
lishma.
If the act of writing upon extant text is halakhically invalid, why can
lishma be added through
ktav al gabbei ktav? Tosafot (Gittin 19a, s.v. Deyo)
address this issue, and one understanding of their response can be explained as
follows: even though the second act of writing is not halakhically recognized as
writing, it may still serve as a vehicle for the implantation of
lishma. This answer suggests
that lishma is a legal identity which
must be endowed to the document. The
act of writing merely serves as the vehicle to convey this intent and establish
the inner, legal identity of the document.
Even an act which is not halakhically recognized as formal writing is
capable of conveying this status, as long as that act is part of the
manufacturing process.
Ktav al gabbei ktav cannot legitimately be considered a formal act of
writing: if the requirement of lishma
entails some added requirement to the ACT OF WRITING, then it must occur at the
point of the original writing and not the second, invalid writing. However, since
lishma is an attempt to infuse the document with a legal status, it can
occur at any creative stage of the manufacturing process, even after the formal
writing has already concluded.
Yet, another voice about the nature of
lishma emerges from an interesting
discussion regarding the need for names within a
get. As noted in earlier
shiurim, the gemara on 19a assumes that a
get without the proper names of the husband and wife would be invalid. This same rule is echoed by the
aforementioned mishna which demands that the scribe, when preparing
gittin in advance, omit the space
which will ultimately be filled in with the names of the husband and wife. What the gemara does not provide,
however, is a reason or basis for the inclusion of names. The Ramban explains this as a special
requirement of get; Halakha demands that it not only entail a legal document but also
narrate the event occurring (sefirat
devarim - see Ramban ibid., s.v. Ha).
The Or
Zarua however, cites a different opinion in the name of Rabbeinu Chayim. Without the inclusion of names, the
get cannot be considered as written
lishma.
Presumably, he views the lishma factor as establishing a unique spirit within the
get.
As this element is meant to alter the legal texture, this alteration (the
fact that it is specific and not general) must express itself in some palpable
manner. Were
lishma merely some intent necessary to
accompany and validate the act of writing, we might not - based upon
lishma alone - require the appearance
of names.
The next shiur will, iy"H,
address this issue through the lens of an important gemara on 22b, which allows
the get to be written by people who on
the surface do not seem capable of creating
lishma.
Sources for the next
shiur (#21):
Who is Qualified to
Draft a Get
Lishma?
1)
Gittin 22b, Mishna; Gemara (until the mishna, 23a)
2) Tosafot 22b, s.v. Ve-ha.
3) Rashba Chullin 12b, s.v. Man
tana: "Ve-Rabbeinu Ha-Rav…"
4) Chiddushei Rabbeinu Chayim
Ha-levi al Ha-Rambam, Hilkhot Yibbum Ve-chalitza 4:16
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