|
PARASHAT
HASHAVUA
PARASHAT
MISHPATIM
God, the Angel, and
the Jews
By Rav Ezra
Bick
Generally speaking, when we come across a reference to angels in the
Torah, we do not necessarily have to engage in an extensive "pshat"
investigation. In most cases, the
intention of the verse is to basically refer to God, perhaps with the added
import that it is a relatively indirect action of God. The word "malakh" means "agent" and
angels are heavenly agents for God, closely associated with Him. So, for instance, when an angel calls
out to Hagar in the wilderness and tells her to return to Sarai (Bereishit
15,7-12), we understand it to refer to the voice of God. This impression is strengthened by the
fact that the angel, in that case, uses first person singular case when he is
clearly referring to an action of God.
"He said to her: I shall greatly increase your seed; it shall not be
numbered for multitude" (7,10). The
same thing takes place with the angel who stops Avraham from slaughtering
Yitzchak ("… for now I know that you are fearful of God, for you did not
withhold your son, your only one, from ME" Bereishit 22,12), and in other
places. This does not mean that
"malakh" is just another name for God, which is clearly not true. My point is only that there is a close
association of the angel with God, and the main point of the verse is to tell us
that God has acted. Only after one
understands that could an additional question be raised as to why in this
particular case the action is attributed to an angel rather than to God
directly.
In our parasha,
however, we have a case where the immediate pshat of the reference to an angel
is not to associate him with God, but to distinguish him from God. An action takes place with an angel, and
because the angel is NOT God, certain consequences are in place. This forces us to pay much more
attention to the pshat of what the angel is meant to signify, and why an action
of an angel is different than one of God.
Behold, I am sending
an angel before you to guard you on the way, and to bring you to the place that
I have prepared.
Beware of him, and
listen to his voice, and do not disobey him, for he will not pardon your sins,
for My name is in his midst.
But if you will obey
his voice, and do all that I shall speak, then I shall be the enemy of your
enemies and the adversary of your adversaries.
For My angel shall go
before you and bring you to the Emori, the Chitti, the Prizi, the Canaani, the
Chivi, and the Yevusi, and wipe them out.
(Shemot 24,20-23).
Since God is speaking
here, and saying He will send an angel, we cannot simply view the angel as
another way of God expressing Himself.
It seems to be important that this role is being fulfilled by an angel
and not by God, which is why God needs to stress that the people must obey the
angel. The contrast between the
angel and God himself is highlighted in the third verse, "But if you will obey
HIS voice, and do all that -I- shall speak...." The specific point of this
section seems to be, not merely that God is promising to bring them to Canaan,
but that He is choosing a particular method of doing so, through the agency of
an angel. Our task is to understand
what this particular method means and what it entails.
A.
Which
Angel
My argument that in
this section, we must distinguish between God and the angel in order to
understand the basic pshat is based on the syntax. If a story mentions an angel, the basic
pshat is that God has done something.
In our case, where GOD says that He is sending an angel, the verse forces
us to pay attention to two different actors, God on the one hand, and the angel
on the other. Because of this, I am
claiming that there is a difference, apparently, in the leadership of the angel,
and that of God, were He to directly lead the Jews through the desert. This second point is, admittedly,
debatable. There is no clear
statement in our parasha that the leadership of the angel, as opposed to God,
has practical ramifications. On the
contrary, the only explicit reference to a ramification of the angel's
leadership – "do not disobey him, for he shall not pardon your sins" – is
explained because "My name is in his midst." One might be justified in
understanding this as EQUATING the angel with God, rather than distinguishing
between them. The angel bears God's
name, so you should relate to him exactly as you would relate to me. This would lead to the interesting
conclusion that God does not pardon sins.
This conclusion will surely surprise anyone brought up on Jewish
philosophy.
However, the argument
that one must distinguish between God and the angel is based not only on syntax,
but on direct inference as well – if we accept the claim of Rashi that the angel
here is identical with that proposed by God in parashat Ki-Tisa.
After the sin of the
golden calf, God agrees not to destroy the Jews, and tells
Moshe:
Ascend
from here, you and the people whom you have taken out of the land of Egypt, to
the land which I have promised to Avraham, to Yitzchak, and to Yaakov, saying: I
shall give it to your seed.
I shall send an angel
before you, and I shall expel the Canaani, the Emori, the Chitti, the Prizi, the
Chivi, and the Yevusi.
To a land flowing
with milk and honey, FOR I WILL NOT ASCEND IN YOUR MIDST, for you are a
stiff-necked people; lest I devour you on the way. (33,1-3)
Here there can be no question that the angel is an alternative to direct
leadership of God. God explains
that if He accompanies the Jews, they will be destroyed, and therefore He is
sending an angel instead.
Rashi (23,20) states
that the angel in our parasha is the same as in Ki-Tisa, and that our parasha is
a prophecy of the outcome of the sin of the golden calf episode. What is more, Rashi (following Chazal)
understands Moshe's demand, "if Your countenance not go with us, do not take us
up from here" (33,15) to be a rejection of the angel's leadership. Moshe demands that God Himself lead the
Jews to the promised land, and God acquiesces and agrees:
God said
to Moshe: This thing as well, which you have demanded, shall I grant, for you
have found favor in My eyes and I know you by name. (17)
This makes it clear that the leadership of the angel is an inferior form
of leadership, which is why Moshe rejects it. Consequently, in order to explain why
God is telling Moshe in parashat Mishpatim that He will send an angel INSTEAD OF
HIMSELF, before the sin of the golden calf, Rashi states that it was a prophetic
statement, justified only in light of the future events.
This understanding of
our parasha raises obvious difficulties.
One concerns the response of Moshe.
If, after the sin of the golden calf, when it was justified, Moshe
nonetheless objected to God's plan to send an angel, why was he silent now, when
it appears to be totally unjustified? A second question relates to the content
of the prophecy itself. If, in the
end, God had indeed sent the angel in His place, it might make sense for the
verse to here indicate that, since in fact it would be true. But in view of Rashi's assertion that
God eventually relents and personally escorts the Jews to the land of Canaan,
why would He state here that an angel will lead them? This is not a prophecy of
what WILL happen, but only of what should have happened, in light of as-yet
nonexistent events. What is the
purpose of such a statement now? Or, to ask a somewhat different question, how
was Moshe supposed to understand God's promise to send an
angel?
An even more
difficult question concerns the contradiction between the two parshiot. In our parasha, God states that the
angel will NOT forgive the sins of the people. In Ki-Tisa, God states that He is
sending an angel because the angel will not react to the sins of the
"stiff-necked people" the way God Himself would, by "devouring" them. Is the angel more or less forgiving than
God? How can this be the same angel? (See Ramban, for a discussion of these
questions).
The Ran (Derashot
HaRan 4) adds another, theological, question. The entire parasha we are discussing
seems to be telling the Jews that God is sending an angel in His place, and that
we should relate to the angel as THOUGH HE WERE GOD. "Beware of him and listen to his voice,
and do not disobey him." And, even more shockingly, "for he will not pardon your
sins." This sounds, says the Ran, "as though we have been delivered nearly to
accepting him as a god, intermediate between God and us… but we should not
receive any command or prohibition from anyone other than God alone." This
question of the Ran will be especially troubling after last week's shiur, where
I claimed that God Himself emphasizes the lesson of the giving of the Torah at
Sinai as showing that there can be no intermediaries between God and
Israel. Why does our parasha seem
to be stating the opposite?
B.
Natural and
Supernatural Providence
The Ran, as part of
his answer to these questions, explains the metaphysical meaning of "angels" in
the Torah. He explains that when
God's actions in the world are in proportion to the causes in the world, this is
described as being done by an angel, meaning by an agent who acts in accordance
with rules. For instance, this
would be true of any act of Divine Providence that took place within the laws of
nature. For that reason, the Rambam
states that the laws of nature are "angels," meaning agents of God's will. The same holds true of moral rules as
well. The basic moral rule is
reward and punishment; in other words, justice. By this rule, a man gets what he
deserves. If a man gets only what
he deserves, whether reward for virtue or punishment for sin, he is under the
providence of an "angel." In other words, "angel" means the providence of rules,
where the law of cause and effect holds.
The effect cannot be greater than the causes. The angel does not diminish God's
responsibility for the effect, but merely signifies that the effect is according
to the rules of nature or of Divine Providence.
By contrast, a direct
action of God signifies a PERSONAL response of God to the human condition. Here, there is no necessity for
proportion between cause and effect, as the law of cause and effect does not
bind God. Causes are, in fact,
irrelevant, since God Himself and His will are the only, and the direct,
cause. The action could be
attributed to God's love, or to His anger, but in any event it is attributed to
the personal care of God.
In this way the Ran
explains the apparent contradiction between the two angels we have
examined. If one sins, the rule
says that one will be punished. The
rules do not allow for pardon, since that violates justice. How could one's condition be different
than what one deserves? Pardon for sin, in the eyes of an "angel," is like a
match deciding to burn without friction, "pardoning" one who neglected to strike
it. Hence, "he will not pardon your
sins." On the other hand, the punishment will always "fit the crime," and
therefore will probably not lead to total destruction. But if God is directly leading the Jews,
and they, a stiff-necked people, rebel and not follow His ways, the possibility
that "I devour you on the way" exists.
Personal attention is a wonderful – but potentially exceedingly dangerous
– thing.
But, it is important
to remember, there is no necessary contradiction between the two. God can transfer the providence over the
Jews to natural and proportional cause without abandoning them. The two can exist at the same time. If there is no fear of "lest I devour
you on the way," God has no reason to remove His personal attention from the
Jews, even while subjecting them to a set of rules whereby the results are
dependent on the preparation of the proportional causes.
C.
From Egypt to Eretz
Yisrael
We can now understand
the message in our parasha. The
exodus from Egypt was totally "non-angelic." As Chazal put it (in the famous
passage found in the Pesach Haggada), "I, and not an angel; I, and not a seraph;
I, and not a messenger." The miracles were neither in proportion to the
spiritual state of the Jews, nor did they work through the forces of
nature. But the goal of the exodus
is to reach the Land of Israel, to settle in it, work the land, be responsible
for developing it, and in general to lead a natural life under God's providence
according to the Torah. God, in our
parasha, is not threatening to leave the Jews, but to relate, on a day-to-day
basis, according to the rules of the Torah itself. This change is inherent in the giving of
the Torah, a set of rules, and the entering into a covenant between the Jews and
God, a contract which defines behavior.
Moshe has no objection to this "angel;" on the contrary, it is the
fulfillment of the Torah he is helping to bring and a necessary condition of
life in the promised land, his goal.
This is emphasized in
the verses themselves.
"Behold, I am sending
an angel before you to guard you on the way, and to bring you to the PLACE THAT
I HAVE PREPARED." The purpose of the angel, the agent, is to bring you to the
place that God HAS PREPARED. A
place prepared is one where the conditions of life are present and you have to
utilize them, not a place where God will immediately provide what you need. If God is personally reacting, there is
no need for any preparation whatsoever.
The quid pro quo of
the "angelic" relationship is made explicit in the third verse. "But if you will obey his voice, and do
all that I shall speak, then I shall be the enemy of your enemies and the
adversary of your adversaries." If you will obey the Torah, there is no limit to
what will result. One does not have
to fear that the results will be less momentous than the victory over
Egypt. The verses continue to
describe how total will be the victory in Canaan, and how wonderful can be the
life in Eretz Yisrael.
There will
be no miscarriage or barren in your land, the number of your days I will
fulfill.
I shall send My
terror before you, and kill all the people to whom you shall
come….
I shall send hornets
before you, and they will drive out the Chivi, the Canaani, and the Chitti from
before you.
(23,26-28)
All of these verses describe agents – My terror, the hornets – which will
produce a result which to us appears miraculous. Even miracles are "angelic," if they are
deserved. Angelic providence, then,
is not a negative form of providence; on the contrary, it is the goal of living
a life according to Torah in a world with laws and rules. This is the first thing God explains
after giving the "rules," the mishpatim, which follow the decalogue itself.
The sin of the golden calf changed this, mandating not only angelic
providence but the removal of direct personal providence which might have
overridden the first at a time of great sin, especially a sin like the calf
which was a personal rejection of God.
God proposes therefore not only to send an angel, but to remove Himself
from direct contact with the people.
This Moshe rejects, for without the personal presence of God, he feels,
there is no point in going to Eretz Yisrael and living under angelic
providence. To this claim of Moshe
God accedes.
|