S.A.L.T. PARASHAT KORACH

By Rav David Silverberg

Motzaei Shabbat

            Korach is introduced at the beginning of the parasha that bears his name as “Korach the son of Yitzhar, the son of Kehat, the son of Levi.”  Rashi, citing the Midrash Tanchuma, famously observes that the Torah’s genealogical sketch ends with Levi, and does not proceed a generation further, to Yaakov Avinu.  This is in contrast to a verse in Sefer Divrei Ha-yamim I (6:23) which traces the lineage of Korach’s sons, who sang in the Beit Ha-mikdash, until Yaakov.  Rashi comments that just before his death, Yaakov specifically requested to have his name omitted from the context of Korach’s revolt against Moshe.  As he censured the violence of Shimon and Levi, Yaakov declared, “Let not my being be counted in their assembly” (“bi-khalam al teichad kevodi” – Bereishit 49:6).  The Midrash claims that Yaakov prophetically foresaw the uprising led by Korach, a descendant of Levi, and announced that his name should receive no mention in the context of that unfortunate incident.

            Rav Yehuda Amital zt”l noted that these comments of the Midrash might suggest a connection of sorts between Korach’s uprising and Shimon and Levi’s assault on the city of Shekhem.  The straightforward reading of Yaakov’s harsh condemnation of his sons is that he refers to their violent attack on Shekhem after the city’s prince abducted their sister, and after they fooled the inhabitants into undergoing circumcision.  That our Sages detected within this context a veiled reference to Korach likely indicates their desire to draw our attention to a certain association between the two events.

            Rav Amital noted that both incidents involve passionate, irrational behavior driven by emotions rather than reason.  The story of Korach has been viewed throughout the ages as archetypical of “machaloket” – the instigation of controversy and dissent.  People involved in “machaloket” are often driven to irrational, extreme measures driven by passion fueled by their egos.  The Midrash, commenting on this episode (see Rashi to 16:12), found it necessary to issue the seemingly obvious instruction, “Ein machazikin be-machaloket” (“One should not persist in a fight”) because at the heat of the moment, it is counterintuitive.  When the ego is threatened, when a person feels slighted and shortchanged, his instinct is to fight persistently and unrelentingly.  Logic and reason give way to the flood of emotion, leading to extreme and – as in the case of Korach and his followers – even self-defeating behavior.

            Shimon and Levi similarly acted out of unrestrained zeal and passion.  They failed to take into account the ethical and practical considerations of slaughtering the entire male population of a city and looting their possessions.  This was a decision reached out of emotion, not reason.  And Yaakov Avinu announced before his death that such behavior has no place among his descendants.  He wanted to ensure that his legacy would remain distant from the rash behavior exhibited by his sons many years earlier in Shekhem.  Instead, his legacy would be perpetuated through the joyful, spirited singing of the leviyim in the Beit Ha-mikdash.  This setting represents the proper framework and structure for expressing emotion.  Religious fervor and passion has its place, but as long as it is controlled and expressed in the proper context and in the proper way.

            We might add that in both narratives – the story of Shekhem and Korach’s uprising – we find the term, “va-yichar…me’od,” referring to intense feelings of distress and resentment.  This expression is used to describe Yaakov’s sons’ reaction to Dina’s defilement (Bereishit 34:7), and the Torah uses this same phrase in reference to Moshe’s response to the harsh criticism voiced by Datan and Aviram during the episode of Korach (16:15).  Moshe was terribly distraught by his opponents’ shameless accusations, just as Shimon and Levi were infuriated by what was done to Dina.  But Moshe handled the emotionally-charged situation with reason and confidence.  He released his emotions by turning to the Almighty (“Do not accept their offering – I did not charge them even a single donkey; I did not harm a single one of them!”), but remained calm and collected in navigating the sudden crisis.  Moshe’s handling of this situation stands in sharp contrast to the response of Shimon and Levi, who took up arms against a civilian population to avenge the dishonoring of their family.  Whereas Moshe directed his emotions toward prayer to God, Shimon and Levi released their anger through violence and bloodshed.

            We must learn from Moshe’s response that difficult situations do not necessarily warrant extreme reactions, and they should be handled with thought and reason, and not with raw emotion.

Sunday

            The Talmud Yerushalmi (Pei’a 1:1) establishes that one is permitted to speak lashon ha-ra (negative speech) against “ba’alei machaloket” – people who instigate a fight.  The Magen Avraham (156:2) cites this ruling as halakha, but the Chafetz Chayim, in the work for which he received that name (Hilkhot Lashon Ha-ra – Be’er Mayim Chayim 8:6), noted that the Rif, Rambam and Rosh make no mention of this ruling.  It is likely, the Chafetz Chayim writes, that these Rishonim viewed the Talmud Yerushalmi’s ruling as subject to debate, and felt that the Talmud Bavli did not accept this position.

            As a possible basis for this contention, the Chafetz Chayim points to the Gemara’s comment in Masekhet Mo’ed Katan (16a) concerning the special status of a sheli’ach beit din – the individual assigned by a beit din to summon a defendant to court.  The Gemara notes the incident recorded in Parashat Korach, where Moshe summons Datan and Aviram – two leading figures in Korach’s revolt – and they angrily rebuff his invitation.  The Torah (16:13) records their furious response to Moshe, in which they accuse him of leading the nation “from a land of flowing with milk honey to kill us in the wilderness,” and of unjustly asserting his authority over them.  The Gemara observes that the messenger reported back to Moshe not only Datan and Aviram’s refusal to come speak with him, but also their harsh accusations against him.  On this basis, the Gemara establishes that the prohibition of lashon ha-ra does not apply in a situation of a defendant who berates the court’s representative who comes to summon him.  The representative is allowed to report to the court the defendant’s behavior – besides just his refusal to appear in court – as the Torah prohibition of lashon ha-ra does not apply in such a situation.

            The Chafetz Chayim notes that the Gemara’s inference seems irreconcilable with the aforementioned ruling of the Talmud Yerushalmi.  If, as the Yerushalmi asserts, there is no prohibition against speaking lashon ha-ra against instigators of controversy, then the incident of Datan and Aviram provides no proof regarding the issue of a sheli’ach beit din.  Datan and Aviram undoubtedly fell under the category of “ba’alei machaloket,” and it is therefore likely that for this reason Moshe’s representative was allowed to report to him about their brazen remarks.  According to the Yerushalmi’s ruling, lashon ha-ra was allowed against Datan and Aviram because of their status of “ba’alei machaloket,” and we thus cannot reach any conclusions regarding other situations of a defendant rebuffing a court representative.  The fact that the Bavli does reach such a conclusion, the Chafetz Chayim notes, might suggest that it did not accept the Yerushalmi’s ruling concerning “ba’alei machaloket.”  And it thus might be for this reason that the Rishonim mentioned above did not accept the Yerushalmi’s ruling.

            The Chafetz Chayim then proceeds to propose an approach whereby the Yerushalmi’s ruling may be reconciled with the Gemara’s comment in the Talmud Bavli.  The reason why the Yerushalmi allows speaking lashon ha-ra about instigators of controversy, the Chafetz Chayim explains (based on earlier sources), is that such speech could lead to the end of the controversy.  People who hear of the instigator’s mischief might intervene to end the argument, and he himself might decide to back down upon learning that his shenanigans are being made public.  As such, this halakha only applies to sharing negative information with a third party.  Sharing such information about a person to his opponent is not allowed, as this would serve only to fuel the flames of resentment and hostility.  The Yerushalmi allows speaking lashon ha-ra about somebody instigating a fight only to a person who is otherwise uninvolved in the affair, as this could potentially lead to the end of the machaloket.  As such, Moshe’s representative would not have been allowed to report about Datan and Aviram’s misconduct to Moshe, if not for his status as a sheli’ach beit din.  Since Moshe was Datan and Aviram’s opponent, sharing negative information with him would have been forbidden.  Thus, even assuming the Yerushalmi’s ruling, the Bavli was correct in establishing on the basis of this episode that a sheli’ach beit din may report about the mischief of a recalcitrant defendant.

            Rav Chayim Dov Eisenstein, in his Peninim Mi-bei Midresha, notes that this theory was suggested by others, as well, including Rav Yosef Shaul Nathanson (in his Sho’el U-meishiv and Divrei Shaul), and the Ben Ish Chai (in his Ben Yehoyada to Masekhet Mo’ed Katan).  Others, however, disagreed with this analysis.  As Rav Eisenstein notes, the Netziv, in his Ha’amek She’eila (28), held that lashon ha-ra is allowed in the case of “ba’alei machaloket” simply because of their status as resha’im (wicked people).  Halakha deems instigating a fight such a severe and grievous sin that it is permitted to speak lashon ha-ra about people who commit this offense, regardless of whether the lashon ha-ra will help end the controversy.

Monday

            We read in Parashat Korach of the revolt mounted against Moshe’s authority by Korach and his followers.  They approach Moshe and Aharon to voice their objection to their authority, charging, “Rav lakhem” (16:3), meaning, “You have taken too much,” accusing them of going too far in asserting their authority over the rest of the nation.  In his response to the challenge, Moshe invites the group to bring incense offerings together with Aharon the following day, and God’s response to the offerings would determine who was truly chosen for the post of kohen gadol, which they felt should not be reserved for Aharon.  Moshe then adds the words, “Rav lakhem benei Levi” – “It is too much for you, men of Levi” (16:7), seemingly echoing the accusation with which they had introduced their protest.  He proceeds to tell the group that, as leviyim, they had already received a great privilege of serving in the Mishkan, and there was thus no need for them to campaign for rights to the priesthood.

            The Gemara in Masekhet Sota (13b), surprisingly, appears to criticize Moshe for uttering these words – “rav lakhem.”  Citing Rabbi Levi, the Gemara notes that later, when Moshe prayed to God for permission to enter Eretz Yisrael, God rejected his plea with the words “rav lakh” (Devarim 3:26) – bringing to mind Moshe’s reaction to Korach and his followers. The Gemara writes, “With ‘rav’ he [Moshe] informed [Korach and his followers], and with ‘rav’ he was informed.”  While the Gemara’s precise intent in using the word “inform” (“biser”) is somewhat unclear, it certainly appears to criticize Moshe for saying “rav lakhem,” going so far as to associate God’s denying his request with his comments to Korach and his followers.

            Why did the Gemara find fault in Moshe’s statement, “rav lakhem”?

            Ibn Ezra explains this statement as Moshe’s introduction to his remarks in the next verse, noting the privileged status that the levite rebels had already been granted.  “Rav lakhem” means “You have already achieved stature,” that they have no reason to seek even greater privileges and challenging Aharon’s exclusive right to the high priesthood.  (Other commentaries explain “rav lakhem” differently – see Rashi and Seforno.)  We might extend this interpretation further to explain why Moshe adopted the same phrase that the challengers had used in voicing their protest.  Moshe was telling the group, “You say to us ‘Rav lakhem’?  What about yourselves!  If we took too much honor and power, then you, who were chosen to serve in the Mishkan, also took too much honor and prestige!”  Essentially, Moshe here throws the rebels’ accusation right back at them, noting that if he and Aharon are guilty of “rav lakhem,” then so are all the leviyim.

            The Gemara perhaps found this retort of Moshe slightly antagonistic and cynical.  While his point was certainly valid, he should not have taunted the group by poking fun at their accusation of “rav lakhem.”  Moshe, the greatest of all prophets and leaders, should have kept his response strictly substantive, without resorting to rhetorical warfare and shooting back at his opponents.  Certainly, Moshe’s overall response to and handling of Korach’s revolt is exemplary, as he remained poised and even tried making peace with Datan and Aviram after they antagonized him.  Indeed, as mentioned earlier this week, the Sages infer from Moshe’s conduct during this incident guidelines for handling dissent and controversy.  But the Sages nevertheless detected within the words “rav lakhem” a tinge – however slight – of unnecessary hostility and derision.  Moshe could have made his point without “rav lakhem,” without mocking the rebels.

            The Sages perhaps teach us that even in response to unwarranted criticism and ridicule, we should speak in a dignified, refined manner.  Our words should remain respectful, even when confronting baseless accusations and scorn.

Tuesday

            The final section of Parashat Korach lists the matenot kehuna, the gifts that Benei Yisrael are required to give to the kohanim to support them.  We find in this list three gifts that are given to the kohanim from private sacrifices:

1)    The meat of the chatat and asham offerings, and the flour of the mincha offerings (18:9).

2)    Certain portions of shelamim sacrifices (18:11; see Rashi).  The most common of these is the chazeh (chest) and shok (thigh) of standard private shelamim offerings.

3)    The meat of a bekhor – a firstborn animal (18:18).

In the fifth chapter of Masekhet Zevachim (“Eizehu Mekoman”), which we read (or should read…) each morning during the korbanot section of the prayer service, the Mishnayot outline the basic guidelines for the offering and consumption of the various sacrifices.  With regard to the sacrifices mentioned above, we find different rules governing the kohanim’s consumption of the sacrificial meat.  The meat of the chatat and asham has the status of kodesh kodashim, and is therefore subject to stricter limitations.  One limitation is that it may be given only to “zikhrei kehuna” – “male kohanim.”  This means that a kohen cannot feed the meat of a chatat and asham to his family or to his servants.  (This applies as well to the mincha, though the Mishnayot here do not mention the mincha; they speak only of animal sacrifices.)

By contrast, the chazeh and shok of shelamim offerings, and the other portions given to the kohanim from special kinds of shelamim sacrifices, may be eaten not only by the kohanim themselves, but also by their wives, children and servants.  With regard to the meat of the bekhor, the Mishna simply states that it is eaten by the “kohanim,” without any further specification.  The straightforward implication is that the meat of a bekhor may be eaten only by a kohen himself, and not by his family and servants, and this is the view of the Ra’avad (in his critique of Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Nedarim 1:12, and cited by the Rashba and Meiri to Nedarim 12).  The Rambam (Hilkhot Ma’aseh Ha-korbanot 10:5 and Hilkhot Bikkurim 1:10), however, rules that a bekhor may be fed to a kohen’s family members.

Support for the Rambam’s view may perhaps be drawn from the section here in Parashat Korach, where the Torah assigns the meat of the bekhor to the kohen and emphasizes that it is like the chazeh and shok of shelamim sacrifices.  This comparison would seem to indicate that the bekhor has the same status as the chazeh and shok, and thus just as those portions may be fed to the kohen’s family members and servants, the same is true of the bekhor.  The Ra’avad, apparently, understood this comparison as referring only to the time-frame within which the sacrificial meat must be eaten.  The Torah indicates that the bekhor may be eaten within two days, like the meat of the shelamim, and in contrast to the meat of the chatat and asham which may be eaten only the day of its offering and the following night.  Regarding the issue of who may partake of the sacrificial meat, however, according to the Ra’avad, the bekhor resembles the chatat and asham, which are permissible only for the kohen, and not the kohen’s portion of shelamim sacrifices, which he may feed to his households.

Wednesday

            The Gemara in Masekhet Nedarim (39b) relates how the celestial beings threatened to “go on strike” during Korach’s revolt.  The sun and the moon, the Gemara tells, came before the Almighty to demand that He intervene to stop the revolt: “Master of the world!  If You do justice for the son of Amram, we will shine, but if not, then we will not shine!”  They demanded that God step in to defeat Moshe’s opponents, threatening that they would otherwise withhold their light from the earth.

            God reacted angrily to this threat: “At that moment, He cast arrows and spears at them.  He said to them, ‘Each and every day, [people] bow to you, and yet you shine.  For My honor you make no protest, but for the honor of a human being you make a protest?”  The Almighty berated the sun and the moon for reacting only to the assault on Moshe, but not to the daily assaults on God’s honor.  They viewed Korach’s revolt as a reason to discontinue their role, without ever considering doing the same in response to the rampant idolatry.

            Chazal here remind us that the earth continues to turn despite the injustices and crimes that unfortunately take place.  Certainly, we are bidden to work toward improving the world and solving the many problems that beset mankind.  Chazal certainly do not advocate indifference and resignation in the face of the “Korach’s” who pose grave danger to the Jewish people.  At the same time, however, we must remember that the sun rises on the eastern horizon every morning even during the dark periods of history, and even in times of severe crisis.  And we are bidden to learn from the sun’s example, and think very carefully before resorting to drastic, revolutionary measures when disturbing events take place.

There is a tendency to sensationalize the spiritual problems facing the Jewish people or the world, which results in extreme reaction – like the reaction of the sun and the moon to Korach’s revolt.  In the Gemara’s account, God bids us not to blow negative situations out of proportion.  While we must certainly never ignore problems, we mustn’t lose perspective, or our bearings.  Just as God ordered the sun and the moon to continue doing their jobs despite the assault on Moshe’s leadership, similarly, we must be able to continue our routines and continue tending to our day-to-day responsibilities despite the serious problems that we face.  Many things happen in the world that, for good reason, offend our religious sensibilities.  But as God reminded the sun and the moon, He endures many “offenses” and yet makes sure that the world continues running.  He wants us to continue our routines, to continue making our contributions to the world, even as we work to find effective solutions to the problems that rightfully disturb us.  We, like the sun and the moon, must continue to “shine,” to do our share to “illuminate” the earth, despite the “Korach’s” that abound.

Thursday

            The Midrash Tanchuma, as Rashi famously cites in his comments to the first verse of Parashat Korach, suggests a connection between the final section of Parashat Shelach and the opening section of Parashat Korach.  Parashat Shelach concludes with the mitzva of tzitzit, and the Midrash tells that Korach used this mitzva as part of his challenge against Moshe’s authority.  Korach had his followers wear garments dyed in tekhelet, and he asked Moshe whether these garments require tzitzit with a tekhelet thread.  Moshe replied that they certainly do, and Korach began ridiculing Moshe.  He claimed it was absurd that a single tekhelet thread suffices for a white garment, and yet a tekhelet-colored garment requires a tekhelet thread.

            Korach’s intent in this argument is clear.  His contention against Moshe and Aharon was that “the entire congregation – they are all sacred,” and they therefore had no need for the leadership of Moshe and Aharon.  Benei Yisrael, they argued, were like a tekhelet-colored garment which should not require an additional tekhelet thread, as they are capable of serving God on their own without authority figures ruling over them.

            Rav_Yehuda_Henkin noted an additional aspect of the mitzva of tzitzit that perhaps relates to Korach’s argument against Moshe.  The Torah writes that the presence of fringes on the corners of our garments serves to remind us of all the mitzvot, thus ensuring our compliance with God’s commands (15:39-40).  Korach may have argued that if the Torah itself provides us with a way to ensure that we “stay in line,” that we remember our responsibilities to God, then religious leadership is superfluous.  “The entire congregation – they are all sacred” – every member of Benei Yisrael is capable of guarding and guiding himself, as demonstrated by the mitzva of tzitzit.  As such, Korach argued, “Why do you raise yourselves over the congregation of the Lord” – why do they need spiritual leaders like Moshe and Aharon?

            Korach’s mistake, Rav Henkin suggested, relates to the section that appears in the Torah just prior to the section of tzitzit, namely, the story of the mekoshesh eitzim (15:32-36).  A man was discovered violating Shabbat, and God ordered that he be executed.  The brief account of the mekoshesh eitzim reflects the importance of a legal authority to enforce the Torah’s laws.  This account is followed by the mitzva of tzitzit to instruct that enforcement is not sufficient, that people need educational reminders of their obligations.  Together, the story of the mekoshesh eitzim and the section of tzitzit reflect the delicate balance between enforcement and what we might call “self-enforcement,” between a punitive system to hold violators accountable and the personal responsibility that must be taken by individuals to adhere to God’s laws.

            Korach was correct in his understanding of the mitzva of tzitzit, that people are able and required to watch themselves, to guard themselves against wrongdoing and ensure their own compliance with the Torah.  But this does not undermine the need for authority figures, for leaders to guide and, when necessary, admonish and even punish violators.  Torah society requires individuals to take personal responsibility for their spiritual success, but also that leaders be assigned to ensure that this happens.  While it is true that “the entire congregation – they are all sacred,” this “sacred congregation” still needs leaders to guide them along the road to spiritual greatness.

Friday

            The Torah in Parashat Korach introduces the mitzva of pidyon ha-ben, which requires the father of a firstborn son to symbolically “redeem” the boy thirty days after his birth by paying a certain sum of money to a kohen.  This payment is included in the Torah’s list in this parasha of the “matenot kehuna” – the “gifts” that Benei Yisrael are required to give to a kohen to support him (18:15-16).

The Ketzot Ha-choshen (243:4), citing the Peri Chadash (in his work Mayim Chayim), discusses an interesting case involving a village where only one kohen lived.  Another Jew in the village had a firstborn son, and he approached the kohen to fulfill the mitzva of pidyon ha-ben as the Torah requires.  The kohen, however, for some reason (perhaps personal animus toward the new father), refused to accept the money.  The question arose whether the father could fulfill his obligation through a “compulsory payment,” such as by leaving the money in the kohen’s property, even though the kohen refused to accept it.  If the requirement cannot be satisfied without the kohen’s consent, then this villager would have no choice but to travel to another community to find a kohen in order to give him the pidyon ha-ben money.

            The Peri Chadash ruled that one fulfills the mitzva of pidyon ha-ben even without the kohen’s consent.  The Ketzot cites the Peri Chadash’s comments and notes that this indeed appears to be the intuitive ruling.  After all, a new father’s obligation to pay a kohen resembles a debtor’s obligation to his creditor.  And just as a debtor fulfills his halakhic requirement to repay his debt by transferring the money to the creditor’s possession, regardless of whether the creditor agrees to accept it, similarly, a father fulfills the pidyon ha-ben requirement irrespective of the kohen’s consent.

However, the Ketzot adds, Tosefot, in Masekhet Kiddushin (8a), appears to have taken a different perspective on the pidyon ha-ben requirement.  The Gemara there cites the ruling of the Tosefta (Bekhorot, chapter 6) that if a father wishes to give an object of value to a kohen in lieu of the pidyon ha-ben payment, he must specify the object’s value.  Tosefot comments that this halakha is cited as proof to a ruling of Rav Yosef mentioned earlier in the Gemara (7b), requiring a groom to specify the value of the object given to the bride as kiddushin.  Rav Yosef explained his ruling as based on the concern of “samekha da’atah,” which means that the bride must know the precise value of the object so that she accepts it as kiddushin will complete resolve.  If she does not know the item’s worth, she may have some hesitation about the kiddushin, which undermines its validity.  The fact that Tosefot associate these two halakhot – kiddushin and pidyon ha-ben – clearly indicates that with regard to pidyon ha-ben, too, Halakha requires “semikhut da’at,” that the kohen recognizes the value of the object so he goes through with the pidyon ha-ben with full consent and resolve.  This quite obviously assumes that a kohen’s consent is necessary for the pidyon ha-ben to be effective – no less than a woman’s consent is indispensable for the efficacy of kiddushin.  In direct contrast to the Peri Chadash’s ruling, Tosefot appear to maintain that a kohen must agree to the “transaction” for the pidyon ha-ben to be valid.

This is the position taken by the Minchat Chinukh (392:7), who rejects the Ketzot’s comparison between pidyon ha-ben and the payment of a debt.  A creditor, he notes, is obviously entitled to cancel the debt.  In the case of a loan, for example, once a lender announces his decision to waive the borrower’s debt, the borrower no longer bears any halakhic obligation whatsoever to repay the borrowed sum.  No such provision, the Minchat Chinukh writes, applies to pidyon ha-ben.  If a kohen (or even if all kohanim in the world) would approach a new father and announce mechila (waiving of privileges), the father still bears an obligation to make the pidyon ha-ben payment.  This demonstrates that the pidyon ha-ben obligation requires actually giving money to a kohen, and therefore, according to the Minchat Chinukh, a father cannot fulfill the mitzva by placing money in the kohen’s possession against his will.