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The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit
Midrash
Surf A Little Torah Yeshivat Har Etzion
PARASHAT PINCHAS
By Rav David Silverberg
Parashat Pinchas tells of the formal designation of Yehoshua as Moshe's
successor. God instructs Moshe, "Go
take Yehoshua, the son of Nun
and place your hands upon him. Have him stand in the presence of Elazar
the kohen and in the presence of the entire nation, and command him in
their presence" (27:18-19).
The commentaries offer varying interpretations of the final instruction
mentioned in this verse "and command him in their presence" ("ve-tzivita
oto le-eineihem"). Rashi
writes, "Command him regarding Israel: 'Know that they are
burdensome, that they are obstinate [you are appointed] on condition that you
accept this upon yourself'."
According to Rashi, Moshe was to inform Yehoshua of the difficulty
entailed in leading Benei Yisrael, and Yehoshua had to willingly accept
the challenge as a natural part of the position.
The Ramban notes the obvious difficulty with this explanation, namely,
that it seems hardly plausible that God would have Moshe make these disparaging
remarks about Benei Yisrael in their presence. God here emphasizes that Moshe must
"command" Yehoshua le-eineihem, in the nation's presence, and it would
surprise us if at this public ceremony Moshe was to tell Yehoshua of what kind
of difficult people he must now lead.
The Ramban therefore suggests a different approach, claiming that to the
contrary, Moshe was to publicly describe to Yehoshua his responsibilities as
leader, how he must exert himself on their behalf in several different
areas. This was intended, the
Ramban explains, to ensure that Yehoshua would earn the people's trust and
support, as they see with their own eyes how Yehoshua heard about and accepted
the responsibilities of leadership.
The Ramban then suggests what is perhaps the simplest interpretation of
the verse, namely, that the word ve-tzivita here means not "command," but
rather "appointment." He cites
several verses elsewhere in Tanakh where the verb tz.v.h. denotes
an appointment to a certain position (Shemuel I 13:14, Shemuel II 7:11, Nechemya
5:14). Thus, God here tells Moshe
very simply to formally name Yehoshua as his successor. Seforno follows this approach, as
well.
Surprisingly, the classic works on Rashi's commentary to the Torah make
no attempt at defending Rashi's interpretation against the Ramban's
challenge. We find such an attempt
in one of the lesser-known works, Be'er Ba-sadeh, a book written by Rav
Meir Binyamin Menachem Danon and originally published in Jerusalem, 5606
(1846). (Rav Danon was a student of
Rabbi David Pardo, author of one of the more familiar works on Rashi's
commentary, Maskil Le-David.)
The Be'er Ba-sadeh suggests that in Rashi's view, Moshe's command
to Yehoshua was not made in the presence of the nation. He claims that Rashi read the word
le-eineihem in this verse as le-inyaneihem, or "regarding their
affairs." God instructs Moshe not,
"command him in their presence," but rather, "command them regarding their
affairs."
The Be'er Ba-sadeh provides no basis or evidence for this reading
of the word eineihem.
However, Rav Yaakov Kopel Schwartz of New York, in his work Yekev Efrayim
(on the Ramban's Torah commentary), suggests this same theory (without
citing the Be'er Ba-sadeh) and draws proof from a verse in Sefer Shemuel
II (16:12). King David, responding
to the verbal attack hurled upon him by Shimi Ben Geira, says to his servants,
"Ulai yireh Hashem be-eini" literally, "Perhaps the Lord will look upon
my eye." Rashi explains that David
refers here to the tears of his eyes.
The Radak, however, claims that eini should be read as
inyani, "may affairs," or "what I'm going through." The Rambam advances this interpretation
of that verse, as well, in his Guide for the Perplexed (3:2), where he
translates eini as "my condition."
Quite
possibly, then, Rashi understood le-eineihem (literally, "to their eyes")
in our verse in Parashat Pinchas to mean "regarding their affairs," and not "in
their presence." It is thus
possible that Moshe's warning to Yehoshua concerning the nature of Benei
Yisrael was said privately, and not in public.
******
In the opening verses of Parashat Pinchas, God informs Moshe of the
reward He granted to Pinchas for avenging the Almighty's honor by slaying Zimri
the tribal leader of Shimon and Kozbi the Midyanite princess with whom
Zimri had publicly engaged in relations.
God begins by describing Pinchas as "the son of Elazar, the son of Aharon
the kohen
" (25:11). At
first glance, it seems unnecessary for God to trace Pinchas' lineage when
speaking to Moshe, Pinchas' great-uncle, who certainly knew who Pinchas
was. And besides, the Torah had
already introduced Pinchas as Elazar's son, and as Aharon's grandson, during the
narrative of his zealous act (25:7).
Rashi,
citing the Gemara in Masekhet Sanhedrin (82b), famously comments that God
emphasized Pinchas' paternal lineage in response to the widespread condemnation
of his zealotry. The people, Rashi
writes, said about Pinchas, "Look at this son of a puti whose maternal
grandfather fattened calves for idolatry and who now kills a prince of
Israel!" This insult refers to Pinchas' mother,
who was a daughter of Yitro, a former idolater. The people claimed that Pinchas'
violence resulted from his maternal genes, it was a product of his family
history of paganism. God therefore
emphasized that Pinchas was the son of Elazar and the grandson of Aharon, and he
committed this act out of the love and concern for people that characterized his
illustrious paternal grandfather.
The question arises, why would the people point to the idolatrous history
of Pinchas' family as the origin of his violent behavior? Why would pagan roots result in a
tendency towards bloodshed and violence?
Rav Nosson Slifkin, in his work Second Focus (Parashat Pinchas),
suggests that feelings of religious zealotry often stem from one's personal
struggle with the issue to which he now reacts. In Rabbi Slifkin's words, "Sometimes,
one might have violent feelings towards sin because one is still exorcizing a
personal demon." When a person is
fighting his own, internal battle against a certain negative tendency, an
encounter with that very tendency will naturally strike a very sensitive chord
within him, which could trigger very strong reactions. Although this heightened sensitivity is
natural and even necessary as part of the complex process of self-improvement,
one must ensure not to fight his battles against himself at the expense of other
people. A person's reaction to
other people's failures and shortcomings must not be disproportionately extreme
just because he is currently engaged in a fierce struggle to avoid those very
shortcomings.
Although the particular act committed by Zimri involved a sexual offense,
the general affair of Ba'al Pe'or revolved mainly around pagan worship.
(Chazal describe that the women were sent to seduce Benei Yisrael
for the purpose of luring them to idol worship.) The people thus accused Pinchas of
reacting violently to this affair because of his own, personal struggles against
pagan tendencies, because of his difficulty coming to terms with his idolatrous
past. God therefore dispelled such
notions by tracing his paternal lineage to Aharon, who never "fattened calves
for idolatry," affirming that Pinchas' rage resulted from his genuine concern to
protect God's honor, and not from his own internal struggles.
******
Parashat Pinchas tells the story of benot Tzelofchad, the five
daughters of Tzelofchad who petitioned Moshe for a portion in Eretz
Yisrael in their father's name.
Tzelofchad had not begotten any sons, and his daughters thus feared that
no portion in the Land of Israel would be allotted in his name. They therefore asked that Moshe award
them Tzelofchad's share, to perpetuate his name and legacy.
The Gemara in Masekhet Bava Batra (119b) tells that the benot
Tzelofchad advanced a halakhic argument to support their claim. When they entered the study hall, they
found Moshe expounding on the laws of yibum the mitzva for a man
to marry his brother's widow if the brother had died childless. This obligation takes effect only if the
man died without any children; if he had even a single son or a single daughter,
the mitzva does not apply.
Tzelofchad's daughters argued on the basis of the laws of yibum
that daughters have the same legal status as sons with respect to a man's
inheritance, and they should therefore be entitled to their father's share. And if, they contended, daughters do not
enjoy equal legal status, then the law of yibum should take effect in
their case, and one of Tzelofchad's brothers should be required to marry his
widow, so that their son would inherit Tzelofchad's share. (Incidentally, this proves that the
daughters' concern was not for their own profitable gain, or for their
"equality," but rather strictly the perpetuation of their father's legacy
through a share in his name in Eretz Yisrael. They would have been satisfied not to
receive Tzelofchad's share, if their mother could marry an uncle and bear a son
to receive that portion.)
The Gemara introduces this discussion by complimenting the five women for
their wisdom, remarking, "le-fi sha'a diberu" literally, "they spoke
appropriately for the moment." The
Rashbam explains that their wisdom was manifest in their seizing the moment to
advance their argument upon hearing Moshe's discourse on the laws of
yibum. They insightfully
deduced from the halakha they heard Moshe teach that daughters should
rightfully inherit their father's estate.
A different explanation of this comment "le-fi sha'a diberu"
is suggested in the work Yemin Yosef (cited in Rav Yisrael Be'eri's
Kevoda Shel Torah, Israel, 5730). One view in Chazal, that of Rabbi
Akiva (Masekhet Shabbat 96b), identifies Tzelofchad as the mekoshesh
eitzim, the Shabbat violator who was executed in the wilderness (Bamidbar
15). Now Rav Sherira Gaon, cited by
the Tur (E.H. 157), held that the mitzva of yibum does not
apply to the childless widow of a mumar an apostate. Halakha generally includes
intentional Shabbat violators under the category of mumar, and it was
therefore possible that yibum would not apply in any event in the case of
Tzelofchad. If so, then
Tzelofchad's daughters' argument is inherently flawed. Moshe could conceivably
argue that in truth daughters do not share the same status as sons, and indeed,
in principle, Tzelochad's wife was entitled to yibum. Nevertheless, Tzelofchad's status as a
Shabbat violator rendered yibum inapplicable, and therefore his daughters
could not demand that their uncle marry their mother to guarantee Tzelofchad's
share in Eretz Yisrael.
But Tzelofchad's daughters preempted this argument, in a manner which the
Gemara describes with the phrase "le-fi sha'a diberu." The Yemin Yosef surmises that the
reason why Moshe suddenly began teaching the laws of yibum had to do with
the recent death of 24,000 men during the tragic incident of Ba'al Pe'or,
when God delivered a plague in response to the nation's religious and sexual
involvement with Moavite women.
This devastating plague likely resulted in scores of childless widows,
and Moshe was called upon to determine whether the yibum obligation fell
upon the brother of each plague victim.
When the five women noticed Moshe addressing the laws of yibum as
they apply to the widows of the plague victims, they immediately realized that
he worked under the assumption that yibum takes effect even after the
death of an idolater such as those who worshipped Ba'al Pe'or. They therefore seized the opportunity to
advance their halakhic reasoning, now that Moshe could not counter on the basis
of Tzelofchad's status as a mumar, given that he applied the yibum
obligation even in the case of the widows of idolaters.
It should be noted that indeed, Halakha does not follow Rav
Sherira Gaon's view, and the mitzva of yibum takes effect even
after the death of an apostate (Shulchan Arukh E.H. 157:5).
******
We read in Parashat Pinchas of the ceremony conducted to formally confer
upon Yehoshua the status of Moshe's successor. Halakha derives from these verses in Parashat
Pinchas several guidelines concerning the appointment of a Jewish king. The Rambam, in Hilkhot Melakhim (1:3),
extracts from this event that the appointment of a king requires the approval of
a prophet and seventy zekeinim
("elders," presumably referring to scholars with the formal semikha
ordination). The Rambam claims that
Yehoshua was appointed "king" with the approval of a prophet Moshe and the
seventy members of his Beit Din, thus establishing the precedent for all
future royal appointments.
Several writers noted the apparent contradiction between the Rambam's
comments in Hilkhot Melakhim, and his ruling in Hilkhot Sanhedrin (5:1), where
he requires the approval of seventy-one elders for the appointment of a
king. Whereas in Hilkhot Melakhim
he speaks of a body of seventy elders approving a royal appointment, in Hilkhot
Sanhedrin he required that this be done by seventy-one elders.
Rav Yehuda Gershuni, in his Mishpat Ha-melukha (Jerusalem, 5710), suggests
that the seventy-one elders mentioned in Hilkhot Sanhedrin include the prophet,
whose participation is also required, as the Rambam mentioned in Hilkhot
Melakhim. There is thus no
contradiction at all: in Hilkhot Melakhim, the Rambam specifies the requirement
of a prophet and seventy other elders, and in Hilkhot Sanhedrin he refers to
them all as "seventy-one elders."
On this basis, Rav Gershuni reaches an important conclusion regarding the
role served by the prophet in this process. Namely, the prophet here functioned not
as a prophet, but rather as an "elder."
The process of appointing a king required not God's approval through the
medium of prophecy, but rather the approval of seventy-one elders, one of whom
had to be a prophet. In this way
Rav Gershuni seeks to resolve a question raised by the Ramban, in his commentary
to Parashat Shoftim, regarding the verse in that parasha forbidding the
appointment of a gentile as king (Devarim 17:15). Seemingly, if a king cannot be appointed
without prophetic confirmation, why would the Torah find it necessary to issue
guidelines as to who the nation may or may not appoint as king? Since in any event it is God who
through a prophet chooses the suitable candidate, why must the Torah establish
the required credentials?
The answer, Rav Gershuni claimed, is that royal appointments did not, in
fact, require prophet confirmation.
They indeed required the participation of a prophet, but not in the
capacity of conveyor of the divine word.
(Rav Gershon Arieli, in his work Torat Ha-melekh, dismisses this
theory, and claims that a prophet is required in addition to, and not as part
of, the body of zekeinim. He
resolves the contradiction on the basis of earlier texts of Mishneh Torah, in which even in Hilkhot Melakhim the
Rambam speaks of seventy-one rather than seventy zekeinim confirming royal
appointments.)
******
We read in Parashat Pinchas of the petition submitted by the five
daughters of Tzelofchad to receive a portion in his name in Eretz
Yisrael. The Torah tells that
when presenting their claim to Moshe, the five women emphasized that their
father had not been "among the group that assembled against the Lord, in the
group of Korach, for he died due to his own sin
" (27:3). Why is this fact that Tzelofchad had
not participated in Korach's revolt against Moshe pertinent to their petition
to receive a share in his name?
The most obvious explanation, as mentioned by the Ramban and others,
emerges from the Gemara's comment in Masekhet Bava Batra (118b) that Korach's
followers were denied a share in Eretz Yisrael, even as a posthumous
estate. Tzelofchad's daughters thus
had to clarify that their father was not among those denied a share in the
Land of
Israel, and instead died as
punishment for a different transgression.
He should therefore earn a posthumous share of Eretz Yisrael
through his daughters.
Rashi, however, seems to explain differently, emphasizing the point that
Tzelofchad was punished for committing a personal transgression, without causing
any others to sin. Korach's
followers not only protested Moshe's authority, but campaigned among the people
for support for their cause, thereby leading many others to sin, as well. Rashi appears to assume that those who
sinned and caused others to sin forfeited their share in the Land of Israel. It seems likely that Rashi actually
refers to the Gemara's approach, that Korach's followers lost their share in
Eretz Yisrael, and here he provides an explanation for why this is so
because they not only sinned, but brought others to sin, as well.
The Ramban suggests a different explanation, claiming that Tzelofchad's
daughters suspected that Moshe would be less inclined to grant their request had
their father been a follower of Korach due to the personal insult and
aggravation he suffered during that incident. The Ramban writes, "They thought that
Moshe Rabbenu despised Korach's following more so than all sinners who perished
in the wilderness, because they rose against him and denied all his
actions." They therefore figured
that Moshe would show them no sensitivity if he would suspect that Tzelofchad
had followed Korach.
The Meshekh Chokhma suggests a halakhic explanation for
Tzelofchad's daughters' emphasis on the fact that their father had not joined
Korach. According to
Halakha, when a person is executed for betraying the Jewish king, all his
property goes to the royal treasury, and is not passed to his inheritors. Presumably, the Meshekh Chokhma
surmises, Korach and his followers, who challenged Moshe's authority, fall under
this category, and all their possessions went to the nation's treasury. Tzelofchad's daughters thus inform Moshe
that their father had not participated in Korach's revolt, and they should
therefore be granted the right to inherit his property, including his share in
Eretz Yisrael.
******
Yesterday, we discussed the incident recorded in Parashat Pinchas of the
five daughters of Tzelofchad, who petitioned Moshe to allow them to inherit
their deceased fathers' portion in Eretz Yisrael. As we discussed, in describing their
situation to Moshe they emphasize that their father had not died as part of the
punishment that befell Korach and his followers for challenging Moshe's
authority, and we mentioned several approaches taken to explain this
emphasis.
Rav Elazar Shapiro of Munkatch (the Minchat Elazar), in his work
Divrei Torah (3:15), tells a story he heard about Rav Yosef Babad,
legendary author of the Minchat Chinukh, that points to a possible
halakhic conclusion that can be reached in light of yesterday's discussion. Shortly after Rav Babad assumed the
rabbinical post in the city of Tarnopol, one of the community members came to
greet and congratulate him. This
man mentioned that he had been instrumental in advocating Rav Babad's candidacy
for the post, and battled against the opposition to his appointment. Shortly thereafter, this man appeared
before the rabbi as a litigant in a legal conflict he had with another member of
the community. The Minchat
Chinukh reportedly refused to serve on the Beit Din to try the case,
claiming that he would then be guilty of shochad devarim accepting a
"verbal bribe." Since the man had
informed him of his efforts in securing his selection as rabbi, the rabbi might
harbor a degree of bias in his favor, which could undermine his ability to try
the case with pure impartiality.
The Minchat Chinukh noted at the time that this may very well be
the reason why Moshe did not issue a ruling when he was confronted by
Tzelofchad's daughters, and instead turned to God for a ruling (27:5). They had emphasized the fact that their
father had not participated in Korach's revolt. According to some commentaries,
as we saw yesterday, the women feared that Moshe would deny their request if he
suspected that Tzelofchad had belonged to Korach's uprising. They therefore underscored Tzelofchad's
unwavering loyalty to Moshe, avowing that he remained supportive of Moshe even
during the period of the insurrection led by Korach. For this reason, Moshe disqualified
himself from ruling on this question.
He was concerned that his objectivity may have been clouded by hearing of
Tzelofchad's support of his authority at a most difficult hour. Moshe therefore brought the question to
God, rather than reaching his own conclusion. Similarly, the Minchat Chinukh
remarked, he found it necessary to withdraw from the case that came before him,
given the support he had received from one of the litigants.
The Minchat Elazar noted that Rav Babad's understanding of Moshe's
decision to bring this question to God appears to run in opposition to the
Gemara's famous comment regarding this incident (Sanhedrin 8a). The Gemara includes this case among
several where Moshe forgot an explicit halakha, a punishment visited upon
him for expressing himself arrogantly to newly appointed judges (Devarim
1:17). According to this view, at
least, Moshe did not voluntarily refuse to rule on the issue brought before him
by Tzelofchad's daughters, but simply had no choice but to appeal to God due to
his inability to decide the matter independently.
******
The haftara for the first of three Shabbatot before Tisha B'Av is
taken from the beginning of Sefer Yirmiyahu, and tells of Yirmiyahu's
designation as prophet and the initial prophecy he receives concerning the
destruction of Jerusalem. In his first prophetic vision, Yirmiyahu
beholds a makel shaked, or almond branch (Yirmiyahu 1:11). The underlying meaning of this vision,
God explains, is "ki shoked Ani al devari la-asoto" that the events he
foresees will occur in the near future.
The verb sh.k.d. denotes speed or haste, and indeed the almond
tree is generally the earliest tree to blossom in late winter. Yirmiyahu's vision of a shaked
thus represents the haste with which the calamitous events will unfold.
Why is the speed of these events of such significance that it warrants
its own prophetic vision? One would
have thought that the time-frame of Jerusalem's destruction is a secondary issue,
and would not occupy the central theme of Yirmiyahu's initial prophetic
experience. Why does God first show
Yirmiyahu a vision forewarning the speed of the tragic events that await the
Jewish people?
Professor Nechama Leibowitz, in her Studies to Sefer Bamidbar,
explains that this prophecy served to warn the people not to blindly lull
themselves into a false sense of security by assuming that the tragedies will
occur only in the distant future.
After all, as the second verse of Sefer Yirmiyahu informs us, Yirmiyahu
began his "prophetic career" during the reign of Yoshiyahu, which marked a
period of relative stability and prosperity in the Judean kingdom. We can easily imagine that under such
conditions, people would hardly give thought to a "prophet of doom," who warns
of impending disaster. They would
likely either dismiss the prophecy altogether, or, at most, reassure themselves
that given the current state of stability, any disastrous events that could
occur would certainly take many decades, if not centuries, to unfold. This is particularly so given that it
was Babylonia who, as Yirmiyahu later warns,
would bring about this calamity.
During Yoshiyahu's period, it was Egypt
that began rising to dominance in the region, and in fact it was the Egyptian
who ultimately killed Yoshiyahu.
Therefore, even those who would take the prophet's warning seriously
would likely assume that they had many years before the Babylonian Empire would
lay siege to Jerusalem. They would therefore allow themselves
the leisure of disregarding the prophet's warnings and exhortations, and to
continue conducting themselves as they had until now.
God therefore begins Yirmiyahu's prophecies with a vision of an almond
branch, which represents the dizzying speed at which the Babylonian Empire would
rise to power and seize Jerusalem. The hope was that this vision would
awaken people to the reality that perceived periods of stability and security
can end in an instant, and that today's conditions permanent and unshakeable
as they appear will not necessarily last until tomorrow. |