S.A.L.T. – PARASHAT MATOT

By Rav David Silverberg

Motzaei Shabbat

            We read in Parashat Matot of the battle waged by Benei Yisrael against Midyan to avenge that nation’s role in the incident of Ba’al Pe’or, as they lured the Israelite men to commit the grave sins of idolatry and immorality.  When the warriors returned to the camp, we are told, Moshe noticed that they had brought the Midyanite women with them along with the spoils of war.  The Torah relates that Moshe grew angry at the officers – “Va-yiktzof Moshe al pekudei he-chayil” (31:14) – and reprimanded them for bringing back the women of Midyan, who were the cause of the Ba’al Pe’or tragedy in the first place.

Rashi (to 31:21) cites the comment of Chazal in the Sifrei criticizing Moshe for his angry response.  Chazal famously assert, “Lefi she-ba Moshe li-khlal ka’as ba li-khlal ta’ut,” meaning, that the emotion of anger that Moshe experienced affected his cognitive abilities.  When it came time to instruct the people with regard to the procedure for “kashering” the utensils brought from Midyan, the knowledge suddenly escaped him.  For this reason, Chazal teach, it was Elazar – Moshe’s nephew and the kohen gadol – who conveyed this information, instead of Moshe.

            The Sifrei’s remarkable comments are instructive on several levels.  Firstly, they perhaps alert us to the practical adverse effects of anger, besides just its ethical abhorrence.  Strong emotions such as anger have the ability to cloud a person’s thought processes and even affect his faculties of retrieval and recall.  People under stress often have difficulty concentrating and focusing on what they need to do, and Chazal warn that anger, in particular, diminishes from one’s cognitive powers.

            Even more strikingly, perhaps, Chazal here point to the fact that anger is unjustified even when one legitimately decries religious offenses.  Moshe is not criticized for pointing out the officers’ mistake; this was, without question, his responsibility as leader.  But Chazal criticize Moshe for reacting angrily.  The need to speak out against wrong policy decisions – such as the officers’ decision to bring back the Midyanite women – does not justify anger.  Even when we must voice opposition to wrongful conduct and ideas, we are not allowed to do so angrily.  Valid opposition must be voiced respectfully and courteously, and not with vitriol and rage.  Moshe was certainly not expected or entitled to remain silent in the face of the grave mistake made by the officers, but neither was he to speak to them angrily.  Our reactions and responses to religious wrongs must be carefully measured and calculated.  Even when opposition is in order, anger and rage are not a valid way to express it.

Sunday

            Parashat Matot begins with the subject of nedarim, the obligation to keep one’s vows.  Chazal, in several places and in different formulations, discouraged accepting upon oneself voluntary obligations and restrictions.  In one famous passage in the Gemara (Nedarim 22a), the Sages compare making a neder to constructing a bama – a personal altar for offering sacrifices, which became forbidden once the Beit Ha-mikdash was built.

            One explanation of this analogy, which the Ran suggests in his commentary to Masekhet Nedarim, is that one who builds a bama tries the draw closer to God by constructing his own framework of religious worship.  Knowing that God commanded the offering of sacrifices in the Mikdash, this individual figures he’ll “go the extra mile” and build his own mini “Mikdash” and offer sacrifices.  Similarly, a person who takes vows seeks to mimic the Torah’s system of restrictions and obligations.  And just as the Torah forbids constructing bamot, and instead requires us to follow its prescribed format for offering sacrifices, vows are likewise discouraged, as we should be focusing our attention on properly observing the Torah’s restrictions, rather than adding new ones.

            Rav Yehuda Amital zt”l (http://www.etzion.org.il/vbm/archive/5-sichot/42matot.php) suggested an additional formulation of this comparison between nedarim and bamot: 

One who builds a bama seeks to be different from others, to serve God in his own way.  Whereas everyone is offering sacrifices in the Beit Ha-mikdash, he will offer sacrifices in his home and express what is unique about him.  The person who takes a vow also wants to create his own path in avodat Hashem.  He does not find satisfaction in the prohibitions that have already been imposed on everybody.  In order to express his unique spiritual charge, to volunteer something of his to the Almighty, he creates a new prohibition that is unique to him.  But the Torah says that this is not the proper way.  A person should not separate from the public framework and chart new, independent paths in avodat Hashem. Certainly, there is great significance to serving Hashem in the manner appropriate for him…and not imitating others, but he can find his special path within the Torah, and not outside it.

            One who builds a bama or takes vows implicitly separates and withdraws from Kelal Yisrael.  He endeavors to chart a new, unique, independent course of religious service.  The Torah urges us to all observe the same Torah, with each person finding his or her area of “expertise” and “specialization” in which to excel.  We are to serve Hashem together as a nation, rather than breaking off into our own individual “bamot.”

            This notion arises later in the parasha, as well, from the story of the tribes of Reuven and Gad, who requested permission to establish their permanent settlement on the east bank of the Jordan River.  According to one Midrashic source (Mishnat Rabbi Eliezer, cited in Torah Sheleima to 32:5), Reuven and Gad were idealistically motivated to separate from the other tribes and reside across the river, and yet their request was deemed improper:

Rabbi Yehuda says: Machaloket [dissension] is grave – even for the sake of making a fence around mitzvot.  We indeed find that the people of Gad and Reuven said to Moshe, “Let this land be given to us…” – and why did they choose it?  Because they had abundant cattle and sought to distance themselves from theft.  But because they originally separated from Israel, they were exiled first… And if those who separated from their peers in order to distance themselves from theft were punished in this fashion, all the more so will those who separate from their peers out of hatred and contention [be punished].

Reuven and Gad sought to separate as a measure of piety, to ensure to avoid theft.  Nevertheless, Chazal criticize this initiative, teaching that withdrawing from the kelal is unjustified even for altruistic motives.  We are not to withdraw from the rest of Am Yisrael to live a “holier” existence.  We should strive for holiness and spirituality within the context of communal life, and within the context of the standard halakhic system, rather than seeking to express our independence through withdrawal and personal innovation.

Monday

            Yesterday, we cited a comment in the Midrash (Mishnat Rabbi Eliezer, in Torah Sheleima to 32:5) concerning the request made by the tribes of Reuven and Gad to permanently settle in the region east of the Jordan River.  Chazal in this passage attribute noble, altruistic motives to Reuven and Gad in submitting this request, yet condemn their decision to separate from the rest of the nation:

Rabbi Yehuda says: Machaloket [dissension] is grave – even for the sake of making a fence around mitzvot.  We indeed find that the people of Gad and Reuven said to Moshe, “Let this land be given to us…” – and why did they choose it?  Because they had abundant cattle and sought to distance themselves from theft.  But because they originally separated from Israel, they were exiled first… And if those who separated from their peers in order to distance themselves from theft were punished in this fashion, all the more so will those who separate from their peers out of hatred and contention [be punished].

            Communal life is fraught with complications.  When large groups of people settle together in one region, complex, and often unpleasant, issues will inevitably arise that will need resolution.  Reuven and Gad thought it would be preferable to avoid these complications from the outset by taking advantage of the large, fertile, verdant swaths of territory that Benei Yisrael had recently seized east of the Jordan River.  Chazal here instruct that in order to avoid “theft,” the problems and complexities that inevitably surface in communal life, the solution is not “machaloket,” separating from one another.  Am Yisrael is to live together and do the best we can to maintain peaceful relations.  The answer is hard work to create a harmonious existence, not avoiding the challenge altogether.

            Certainly, we are not to carelessly put ourselves in situations of spiritual challenge.  When Yosef realized he was losing the battle against temptation, he heroically escaped from Potifar’s home to avoid sin, even though he must have anticipated what the consequences would be.  Situations that could lead us to compromise our values and standards should be avoided.  But Chazal’s comments regarding Reuven and Gad demonstrate that sometimes we need to accept and confront religious challenges, rather than avoid them.  Embarking on any great enterprise will, by necessity, be fraught with all kinds of challenges.  We should not avoid marriage because of the complications it entails, and neither would begetting children be discouraged because of the many difficult issues involved in childrearing.  Communities and institutions must be built, and new business enterprises must be launched, despite the fact that they could potentially lead to strife and controversy.  Just as Reuven and Gad were expected to join the other tribes in Eretz Yisrael and put in the effort required to make it work, similarly, we must be prepared to accept the challenges entailed in building Am Yisrael, and commit ourselves to overcome them through patience, diligence and hard work.

Tuesday

            We read in Parashat Matot of the successful battle that Benei Yisrael waged against Midyan, and the spoils brought back to the Israelite camp.  At God’s command, the spoils were divided into two even halves, one which was distributed among the combatants, and the other which was distributed among the rest of the people.  God then ordered that a percentage be given from each half to the Mishkan.  The soldiers donated 1/500^th of their share of the spoils, whereas the rest of the nation donated a much higher percentage – 1/50^th of their share.

            The Rambam, in the introduction to his Sefer Ha-mitzvot (shoresh 3), cites and objects to the view of the Behag, who included this mandatory donation in his listing of the 613 Biblical commands.  Even though the command to make these donations was issued specifically regarding the spoils of Midyan, the Behag felt that it should be counted among the 613 mitzvot.  The Rambam questions this listing, noting that when Chazal speak of 613 Biblical commands, they refer to commands that apply for all time, to the exclusion of commands that were relevant only at one specific instance.

            The Ramban, in his critique of the Rambam’s Sefer Ha-mitzvot, suggests a possible explanation for the Behag’s view, proposing that the Behag may have viewed this command as establishing a permanent protocol for spoils of war.  Possibly, the Ramban writes, the Torah here introduces an eternally-binding requirement to donate a percentage of spoils of war to the Mikdash.

            The Tashbatz, in his Zohar Ha-raki’a (cited by the Megilat Ester), challenges the Ramban’s claim in light of a discussion in the Gemara, in Masekhet Menachot (77b).  The Gemara there discusses the korban toda offering, which consists of forty loaves of bread.  Four loaves are offered to the officiating kohen, while the rest are eaten by the individual bringing the sacrifice.  The Gemara discusses the source for this requirement to offer specifically 10% of the loaves, and raises the question of why this requirement does not follow the model of the donation given from the spoils of Midyan.  Perhaps, the Gemara proposes, we should determine the required percentage of the toda from the required percentage of the donation from the spoils of Midyan.  The Gemara immediately dismisses this possibility, noting that we do not establish halakhot relevant to an eternally-binding obligation from an obligation that applied only once.

            Thus, the Tashbatz observes, the Gemara explicitly treats the donation from the spoils of Midyan as a special, one-time obligation that does not apply for all time.  This seems to directly contradict the Ramban’s claim in defense of the Behag that this donation established an eternal obligation to donate a percentage of spoils seized during warfare.

            The Noda Bi-yehuda (Mahadura Tanina – Y.D. 201) suggests a possible explanation of the Ramban’s view by distinguishing between the two different donations made from the spoils of Midyan.  As mentioned earlier, God commanded the combatants to donate 1/500^th of their share, and the rest of Benei Yisrael were required to give 1/50^th of their portion.  The Noda Bi-yehuda claims that the Behag, who regarded the donation from spoils as an eternally-binding mitzva, refers only to the spoils taken by the soldiers.  After all, generally speaking, the soldiers were able to keep all the spoils; the arrangement after the war with Midyan marked an exception, calling for the equal division of the seized property between the soldiers and the rest of the nation.  (King David would later enact a provision calling for such an arrangement – Shemuel I 30:24-25 – but according to Torah law, the soldiers are generally entitled to all the property.)  As such, the Behag’s position must refer only to a mandatory donation by soldiers, and not by the rest of the people.  The Noda Bi-yehuda further asserts that when the Gemara proposes inferring the required percentage for the toda offering from the spoils of Midyan, it refers specifically to the 1/50^th given from the nation’s portion.  Indeed, Rashi, in his commentary to the Gemara, writes explicitly that the Gemara’s proposal was to require offering 1/50^th of the bread of the toda to the kohen, not 1/500^th.  The Gemara raised the possibility of drawing a parallel between the 1/50^th donation given by the nation and the toda offering, and it then responded that the former was a one-time requirement that cannot serve as a precedent for the eternal requirement of the korban toda.  Thus, the Gemara’s discussion does not touch upon the 1/500^th donation given by the soldiers, which the Behag felt is mandatory for all time.

            Why did the Gemara consider deriving the required percentage of the toda offering specifically from the nation’s portion of the spoils of Midyan?  Why did the Gemara not consider applying to the korban toda the 1/500^th percentage donated by the soldiers?

            The Noda Bi-yehuda answered based on a comment in the Talmud Yerushalmi in Masechet Terumot (4:3).  The Yerushalmi there points to the 1/50^th donation given by Benei Yisrael as the Biblical source for the halakha designating 1/50^th as the proper percentage to give a kohen to fulfill the obligation of teruma.  The Torah describes this percentage with the phrase “echad achuz min ha-chamishim” (31:30), as the Yerushalmi associates the word “achuz” (“percentage”) with the verb a.ch.z., which means “grab.”  The Yerushalmi thus reads the verse to mean, “Anything you ‘grab’ [to donate] in other instances should always be like this.”  According to the Yerushalmi, then, the Torah itself indicates that the 1/50^th percentage donated by Benei Yisrael from the spoils of Midyan sets a precedent for other required donations.  The Noda Bi-yehuda claims that this reading is but an asmakhta – an allusion that the Sages found for a provision they enacted – rather than an actual interpretation of the verse.  Nevertheless, he writes, the possibility of reading the verse in this way is what led the Gemara in Menachot to consider establishing the required percentage of the toda offering on the basis of the 1/50^th donation from the spoils of Midyan.  The Gemara did not propose such a theory randomly.  It rather built upon the Yerushalmi’s reading of the word “achuz” used in the context of the nation’s contribution, according to which the required offering from the toda might also be 1/50^th.  And this is why the Gemara never considered applying to the toda the 1/500^th percentage given by the soldiers.  The entire basis for inferring general halakhot from the donation after the war with Midyan was the Yerushalmi’s reading of the verse in the context of the nation’s contribution, and it was thus only that donation which the Gemara sought to present as a model for the korban toda offering.

Wednesday

            Yesterday, we discussed the theory proposed by the Ramban, in his critique of the Rambam’s Sefer Ha-mitzvot (shoresh 3), concerning the donation from the spoils of Midyan, which the Torah discusses in Parashat Matot.  We read in this parasha that after the battle, the spoils seized from Midyan were divided into two equal halves, one which was distributed among the warriors, and the other which was distributed among the rest of the nation.  God then commanded each group to donate a percentage of its share to the kohanim and leviyim.   As we saw, the Behag listed this mandatory donation as one of the Torah’s 613 Biblical commands.  The Ramban claimed that the Behag viewed this command as establishing a precedent requiring a donation whenever spoils are won during battle, and for this reason he considered it one of the Torah’s 613 mitzvot.

            The Kin’at Sofrim commentary to Sefer Ha-mitzvot challenges this theory by noting the conspicuous absence of any reference to such a donation in Tanakh.  We find in Nevi’im Rishonim and in Sefer Divrei Ha-yamim several accounts of successful wars fought by Benei Yisrael during which they seized spoils from the enemy, and yet in none of these situations do we find a percentage being donated.  According to the Ramban, we should have expected some reference made in these contexts of a donation made from a percentage of the spoils.

            Rav Shemuel Baruch Deutsch, in his work Birkat Kohen, noted that the answer to this question seems to have been provided by the Ramban himself.  In his commentary to Parashat Matot (31:28), the Ramban raises the question of why a donation of spoils was required after the war against Midyan, but not after the previous war fought by Benei Yisrael, against the Emorite kingdom.  In that battle, Benei Yisrael took possession of the land and possessions of the Emorites, and yet we do not find any command for the soldiers or the rest of the nation to donate a percentage of the property to the kohanim and leviyim.  The Ramban explains the distinction on the basis of a theory he developed in the previous passage in his commentary, claiming that the battle against the Emorites had the status of kibbush ha-aretz – the conquest of Eretz Yisrael.  The Emorites are among the seven nations whose lands were promised to Avraham’s descendants, and thus the battle against the Emorites was, essentially, the first stage of the battle to possess the Land of Israel.  The Ramban writes that as the tribe of Levi was denied a portion in Eretz Yisrael, they were not allocated a portion of the spoils seized during the process of kibbush ha-aretz.  As such, they were not given a percentage of the spoils that Benei Yisrael won from the Emorites.  This is in contrast to the battle against Midyan, which was for retaliatory purposes, and not as part of the conquest of Eretz Yisrael.  The kohanim and leviyim were thus awarded a percentage of the spoils taken from Midyan, but not from the spoils of the Emorites.

            By extension, then, when the Ramban raises the possibility of an eternal mitzva to donate a percentage of spoils taken during warfare, he refers only to wars that are not waged for the purpose of kibbush ha-aretz.  All the wars described in Tanakh that resulted in spoils were waged as part of the process of capturing or defending Eretz Yisrael.  (The exception is David’s victory over Aram, which was situated north of Eretz Yisrael, and we indeed find that David earmarked a portion of the spoils for the construction of the Beit Ha-mikdash, as the Ramban cites from Sefer Divrei Ha-yamim I 18:8.)  Therefore, we do not find donations being made from these spoils, as the mitzva to make such donations applies only in battles that are not part of the process of kibbush ha-aretz.

Thursday

            We read in Parashat Matot of God’s command to wage a retaliatory war against the nation of Midyan.  Moshe relayed the command to the people, and the Torah writes, “A thousand per tribe were given over from the thousands of Israelites” (“Va-yimaseru mei-alfei Yisrael elef la-mateh” – 31:5).  Rashi, citing the Sifrei, notes that the Torah describes the troops as having been “given over” for the purpose of battle, rather than simply “going” to battle.  Chazal understood this nuance as indicating a degree of hesitation among the soldiers, and the need to forcibly conscript them into the military.  The Sages explained that the people realized that Moshe would die after this battle, and they therefore hesitated in the hope of delaying their beloved leader’s death.

            Rav Moshe Sternbuch, in his Ta’am Va-da’at, suggests an additional possible reason why the people may have hesitated before being drafted to fight in this battle.  Namely, they perhaps suspected that they were not worthy of this lofty and sacred endeavor – “to avenge the revenge of the Lord against the Midyanites.”  The soldiers had to be “given over,” and drafted against their will, because they feared they had not yet achieved the spiritual stature necessary to properly execute this command.

            Rav Sternbuch does not elaborate on why this particular campaign evoked such concerns, but we may speculate that the hesitation resulted from the specific nature and purpose of this battle.  Benei Yisrael did not fight this war to seize or defend their homeland, but rather for the purpose of revenge – to avenge the disaster of Ba’al Pe’or that Midyan had orchestrated.  A campaign of this nature demands the purest and sincerest intentions.  Benei Yisrael had to fight genuinely for the sake of “nikmat Hashem” – for the Almighty’s honor, and not for personal aggrandizement or the thrill of a fight.  Specifically in this situation, the people chosen to wage the battle had to be men of sterling character and sincere devotion to God.  And for this reason they hesitated, uncertain whether they indeed met the criteria needed to wage a battle sincerely for God’s honor.

            Unfortunately, we often find that precisely when it comes to campaigns involving a “battle” for God’s honor people are all too willing and enthused to join the effort, without taking a moment to carefully and honestly assess their true motives and intentions.  People who do not ordinarily exhibit zeal and passion for Torah and mitzvot suddenly rush with excitement and energy to wage a battle ostensibly for the sake of God.  The story of the war against Midyan teaches that it is precisely when it comes to “warfare” that we must pause and carefully determine the true source of our passion.  Specifically in undertakings involving a struggle against opposing religious ideologies, we must exercise extreme care to ensure that we act for the sake of “nikmat Hashem” and not for our own personal gratification or to give our frail egos a boost.  If the Israelite soldiers hesitated before embarking on the battle against Midyan, then we, too, must hesitate before embarking on “battles” for the sake of Torah, to ensure that we are driven by pure and sincere motivations.

Friday

            The Torah in Parashat Matot (chapter 32) tells of the agreement made with the tribes of Reuven and Gad allowing them to permanently settle in the region east of the Jordan River on condition that they joined the other tribes in conquering Eretz Yisrael.  The Mishna in Masekhet Kiddushin (61a) famously establishes that all tena’im – conditions applied to legal actions – must follow the format of the terms in this arrangement with Reuven and Gad.  In stipulating the terms, Moshe made a point of explicating both possibilities.  He specifically stated that if Reuven and Gad fulfill their commitment and take part in the battle for Canaan, they would be granted permanent settlement rights east of the river, and if they fail to meet their commitment, they would be denied those rights.  The Mishna establishes that this format must be followed anytime a person or two parties append a condition onto a legal action, such as betrothal.  If a man betroths a woman but hinges the betrothal on a certain condition, the condition must be ignored unless it is formulated in both directions.  If it is not properly formulated, then the betrothal takes effect regardless of whether or not the condition is met.

            The Rambam, in Hilkhot Ishut (6:14), cites and rejects a view that limits the scope of this rule.  According to this view, the rule of mishpetei ha-tena’im – the need to formulate conditions in the format used by Moshe in the case of Reuven and Gad – applies only to the situations of gittin and kiddushin (divorce and betrothal).  When it comes to financial transactions, however, a condition that is applied to a deal is binding even if it was not formulated according to the mishpetei ha-tena’im.  Thus, for example, if a buyer and seller stipulate that the transfer of the home will take effect only if the seller’s plans for relocation succeed, but it does not state the reverse – that the transfer will not take effect if the plans for relocation fall through – the condition is nevertheless binding.  The transaction is subject to this condition even though it was not formulated according to the mishpetei ha-tena’im, because this requirement applies only in the contexts of gittin and kiddushin.

            The Rambam rejects this theory for the simple reason that the source of the mishpetei ha-tena’im is a case of allocation of property – the awarding of the Trans-Jordanian region to Reuven and Gad.  As mentioned, the Mishna inferred the requirement of mishpetei ha-tena’im from Moshe’s formulation in stipulating the conditions of the tribes’ permanent settlement in that region.  This would seem to prove that the mishpetei ha-tena’im apply even to financial contexts, and not just to gittin and kiddushin.

            Rav Moshe Sternbuch, in his Ta’am Va-da’at, suggests a possible explanation for the view cited by the Rambam by analyzing the general halakhic mechanism of tena’im.  Tosefot, in a well-known passage (Ketubot 56a s.v. harei zo), establish that the story of Reuven and Gad is the Biblical source for the entire concept of tena’im – appending conditions to a legal action.  Were it not for this precedent, Tosefot comment, a verbal stipulation cannot have any effect on an action.  When a man betroths a woman, that act should, fundamentally, effectuate kiddushin regardless of any verbal conditions that they make at the time.  The concept of tena’im which is derived from the story of Reuven and Gad is what empowers the spoken word to limit the effects of a legal action.

            Rav Sternbuch posits that in light of Tosefot’s remarks, we can perhaps understand the distinction drawn by the authorities cited by the Rambam.  Tosefot’s analysis of mishpetei ha-tena’im applies only to legal actions that are executed primarily through a physical act – such has handing a get to one’s wife, or handing a bride an object of value for betrothal.  Although the parties’ knowledge and willful consent are certainly required, the effect of divorce or betrothal fundamentally results from the act that is performed.  In the case of monetary transactions, by contrast, the transfer of property is effectuated through da’at – the desire of the parties to sell/purchase the merchandise or property.  The actions are required for the purpose of concretizing and expressing the will of the parties, and that will is what effectuates the transaction.  As such, Rav Sternbuch explains, when it comes to financial transactions, tena’im would be binding even without the precedent of Reuven and Gad.  This precedent is necessary only to empower verbal stipulations to restrict a legal action.  But in the case of a financial transaction, the transfer occurs as a result of the willful intent, not the action, and thus it is self-evident that a condition applied to the transaction, which expresses the intent of the parties, is binding.  Therefore, since the legal power of tena’im in financial transaction does not depend upon the precedent of Reuven and Gad, it is not subject to the specifications of that precedent.  The authorities cited by the Rambam thus ruled that when it comes to financial transactions, the mishpetei ha-tena’im are not necessary, and a condition is binding no matter how it is formulated.

            On this basis, Rav Sternbuch suggests a refutation to the Rambam’s proof against this view.  The allocation of territory to Reuven and Gad was effectuated through Moshe’s declaration to this effect, which was stated mi-pi ha-Gevura, in the name of the Almighty.  Whereas ordinary property transfers are fundamentally effectuated through da’at, the willful consent of the two parties, this assignment of property was done through the direct command of God.  In this respect, it resembles the cases of gittin and kiddushin, in that it should not, in principle, be undone by a verbal stipulation.  Therefore, though it may seem ironic and counterintuitive, the assignment of property to Reuven and Gad establishes a precedent specifically for the situations of gittin and kiddushin, but not for situations of financial transactions.  The fact that the transfer in this circumstance was done through the word of God makes it akin to gittin and kiddushin – legal statuses effectuated through action – and not to financial transactions, which are effectuated fundamentally through da’at.