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PARASHAT MATOT - MASEI

By Rav David Silverberg

            Parashat Matot begins with the laws of nedarim, vows a person can take whereby he takes it upon himself to refrain from deriving benefit from a certain item.  The Torah writes about a person who utters such a vow, "He may not violate his word; he must abide by whatever leaves his mouth" (30:3).

            The Sifrei Zuta seeks to explain the seeming redundancy in this verse:

If somebody said, "This house is forbidden for me to enter," or "This loaf is forbidden for me to taste," perhaps he may pay the value of benefiting from the house and enter, or the value of the loaf and eat it?  The verse therefore says, "he must abide by whatever leaves his mouth."

According to the Sifrei Zuta, it seems, the second phrase – "he must abide by whatever leaves his mouth" – serves to preclude the possibility of "redeeming" the forbidden item by paying the amount at which benefit from that item is valued.  One might have considered allowing the individual to partake of the forbidden loaf, for example, by having him pay its value to hekdesh; the extra phrase emphasizes that one must abide by his vow regardless of any payment made to the Temple treasury.

            However, Rav Meir Simcha Ha-kohen of Dvinsk, in his Meshekh Chokhma, advances a different interpretation of this passage in the Sifrei Zuta.  In his view, there would be no need for the Sifrei Zuta to infer from the verse that one cannot render the forbidden item permissible by paying money.  Once the Torah warns, "He may not violate his word," this already indicates that the vow remains binding regardless of any monetary payments.

According to the Meshekh Chokhma's reading, the Sifrei Zuta refers to an entirely different issue, a question raised by the Ran, in his commentary to Masekhet Nedarim (35).  The Gemara there establishes the rule known as yeish me'ila be-konamot, which means that the forbidden object in cases of nedarim are subject to the laws of me'ila – the prohibition against deriving benefit from the property of hekdesh.  One who derives forbidden benefit from hekdesh must pay the estimated value of that benefit to the Temple treasury (plus a penalty of one-fifth the value).  Yeish me'ila be-konamot means that one who violates a neder, by deriving benefit from the item he had forbidden upon himself, is considered to have derived benefit from the property of hekdesh and must therefore pay to hekdesh the value of the benefit he derived.  The Ran raises the question of how far this comparison between nedarim and hekdesh extends.  In situations of classic me'ila, the sacred item loses its status of halakhic sanctity after it is "defiled" through unlawful personal benefit.  For example, if a chair had been donated to the Temple treasury, one who sits on the chair effectively strips the chair of its inherent status of kedusha.  Would thus apply to nedarim, as well?  Meaning, if a person violates his neder and derives benefit from the forbidden object, does that object now become permissible?  The Ran deliberates on this question without reaching a definitive conclusion.

According to the Meshekh Chokhma, it is this very question that the Sifrei Zuta seeks to answer.  It establishes that even after one has transgressed his vow and paid the required sum to hekdesh, the object remains forbidden to him.  In this vein, the Meshekh Chokhma claims, we should understand the two clauses in this verse: "He may not violate his word; he must abide by whatever leaves his mouth."  This verse means that even after one violates his word and derives benefit from the forbidden item, he must still "abide by whatever leaves his mouth."  As opposed to classic hekdesh, which loses its status as such the moment it is used in a forbidden manner, an item rendered forbidden through a neder retains that status even after it was misused.

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            Parashat Matot tells of the war Benei Yisrael waged against the nation of Midyan to avenge the Midyanites' instigation of the incident of Ba'al Pe'or, which resulted in a divine plague that killed 24,000 men among Benei Yisrael.  We read that the soldiers returned with spoils of war, whereupon Elazar, the kohen gadol, instructed them with regard to what we often call kashering – the procedure whereby a utensil that had been used with forbidden foods may become permissible for use by a Jew (31:21-24).

            The Ramban (31:23) famously raises the question of why these laws had not been conveyed when Benei Yisrael returned from the first war waged after Matan Torah – the war against Sichon and Og.  (Actually, Benei Yisrael had previously fought a war against Arad – Bamidbar 21:1-3, but there they destroyed all the enemies' property and did not take any spoils of war.)  After that war, too, Benei Yisrael seized the enemies' property, and thus seemingly should have been required to "kasher" the food utensils to render them permissible for use.  The Ramban answers that the battle against Sichon and Og – who were originally from Canaan – constituted the first phase of kibush ha-aretz – the conquest of Canaan, during which the Canaanites' was permissible for consumption.  Therefore, the utensils did not require the process of kashering.

            Much has been written about the Ramban's analysis; today we will deal with the related question concerning the law of tevilat keilim, the requirement to immerse utensils that one acquires from a gentile.  This halakha has nothing to do with the food with which the utensils had been used.  Even if the gentile had used the utensil with only kosher food, it must nevertheless undergo immersion after it is acquired by a Jew.  The Gemara (Avoda Zara 75b) derives this obligation from a verse in Elazar's discourse to the soldiers after their return from Midyan ("akh be-mei nida yitchata" – 31:23), indicating that it is only at this point when the obligation was introduced to Benei Yisrael.  And although many Rishonim held that this obligation is in fact Rabbinic in origin, and the Gemara did not actually extract the obligation from this verse, others took the Gemara's comments at face value and approached this halakha as a Torah obligation.  (See Beit Yosef, Y.D. 120.)  According to these opinions, one might wonder why this obligation was not introduced after the battle against Sichon and Og.  The Ramban's theory, that the food of these nations was not forbidden, does not resolve the question concerning tevilat keilim, which, as we mentioned, is required regardless of with which kind of food the utensil had been used.  (In our S.A.L.T. series to this parasha last year, we cited and discussed several approaches taken to answer this question.)

            Rav Simcha Bunim Sofer (grandson of the Chatam Sofer), in his work of responsa Shevet Sofer (Y.D. 67), suggests a novel, though perhaps questionable, approach in answering this question.  The Torah here presents the guidelines also with regard to the laws of tum'a and tahara, the required process for the purification of the soldiers who had come in contact with corpses, and the purification of the spoils of war (31:19-20).  The Ramban addressed the question of why these laws were not taught after the battle against Sichon and Og, and he answers that since the entire nation was involved in that battle, they applied the rule known as tum'a hutra be-tzibur (literally, "tum'a is permitted for the public").  In its more familiar application, tum'a hutra be-tzibur allows offering public sacrifices even in a state of tum'a if there is no possibility of doing so in a state of tahara, such as if all the kohanim became tamei.  The Ramban surprisingly extends this principle to the aftermath of the battles against Sichon and Og, which involved all of Benei Yisrael and thus absolved them of the restrictions related to tum'a.

            The Shevet Sofer boldly suggests applying the Ramban's principle to the obligation of tevilat keilim.  The Yerushalmi (Avoda Zara 5:15) describes tevilat keilim as serving to extricate the utensil from the status of tum'a it had obtained by virtue of its having been under gentile ownership.  Seemingly, then, we could perhaps apply the rule of tum'a hutra be-tzibur even to the obligation of tevilat keilim, and thereby explain why this mitzva was not introduced after Benei Yisrael's war with Sichon and Og.

            Of course, one can argue with this line of reasoning on several fronts.  For one thing, the halakhic parity the Shevet Sofer draws between formal, halakhic tum'a and the status of a utensil under gentile ownership is hardly compelling.  It seems fairly obvious that the Yerushalmi did not refer to an actual state of tum'a that descends upon a utensil until it comes under Jewish possession.  Moreover, the Ramban's theory, that the laws of tum'a and tahara did not apply after the battles with Sichon and Og because of the rule of tum'a hutra be-tzibur, is itself fraught with halakhic difficulties, and several writers struggled to explain his intent.  For one thing, as noted by Rav Yosef Shaul Nathanson in his Divrei Shaul (and as we briefly mentioned earlier), the rule of tum'a hutra be-tzibur applies specifically to the realm of the Temple rituals, which may be performed in a state of impurity when they would otherwise have to be suspended.  It thus seems difficult to understand how the Ramban sought to enlist this principle to explain the inapplicability of the laws of tum'a and tahara after the war with Sichon and Og.  Indeed, the Radbaz (responsa, 5:4205) raised the possibility that the Ramban did not refer to the actual provision of tum'a hutra be-tzibur, but rather enlisted that rule as a model that was followed after the battle with Sichon and Og.  The Ramban meant to explain that an extraordinary provision (hora'at sha'a) was enacted to suspend the laws of tum'a and tahara given the difficulty Benei Yisrael would have faced had they all been required to undergo the process of purification. 

            According to this reading of the Ramban, this answer certainly cannot be applied to the issue of tevilat keilim.

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            Parashat Masei introduces the laws of the arei miklat, the "cities of refuge" which granted asylum to inadvertent murderers, protecting them from vengeful relatives of the victim.  The Rambam, in Hilkhot Rotzei'ah (8:1), as well as in Sefer Ha-mitzvot (asei 182), writes that the law of arei miklat does not apply outside the Land of Israel.  Only in Eretz Yisrael does the Torah require that cities be designated as places of refuge for inadvertent killers.

            Many writers have noted that the Rambam's ruling appears to run in opposition to an explicit comment of the Sifrei in this parasha (to 35:13), which infers from an otherwise superfluous term in the verse (tihiyena) that the cities of refuge operate even in chutz la-aretz.  The Kesef Mishneh suggests that the Sifrei refers not to establishing cities of refuge outside Eretz Yisrael, but rather to the fact that the services of an ir miklat are rendered even to those outside the Land.  The Sifrei seeks to clarify that regardless of where the inadvertent killer resides, he is welcomed and offered protection in the arei miklat.  Several other writers offer this interpretation of the Sifrei, as well, including the Netziv, in his commentary to the Sifrei, and the Malbim.

            The Kesef Mishneh then suggests a second explanation, namely, that when the Sifrei mentions the term "chutz la-aretz," it actually refers to the region of Eiver Ha-yarden, the East Bank of the Jordan River which was colonized by Reuven, Gad and half of Menashe.  This explanation, however, seems, at least at first glance, very difficult to sustain.  In this section the Torah explicitly mentions that Benei Yisrael were to designate three arei miklat in Eiver Ha-yarden and another three west of the Jordan River (35:14).  It seems implausible that the Sifrei would have to deduce this halakha – the application of arei miklat in Eiver Ha-yarden – through the process of derash (halakhic exegesis), based on a superfluous word in the text, when the Torah makes this point explicitly.

            Rav Avraham Yitzchak Sorotzkin, in his work Rinat Yitzchak, suggests a novel reading of the Kesef Mishneh, claiming that he perhaps referred to the status of Eiver Ha-yarden after the Jews were exiled from Eretz Yisrael.  With regard to some halakhot, the halakhic status of kedushat ha-aretz (the sanctity of the Land of Israel) applies to all areas settled by Benei Yisrael during Yehoshua's time, even those areas that remained undeveloped when the Jews returned and built the Second Commonwealth.  Although the laws of terumot and ma'aserot do not apply (on the level of Torah law) to the parts of Eretz Yisrael that were not settled during the Second Commonwealth (Rambam, Hilkhot Terumot 1:5), these areas are endowed with kedushat ha-aretz with respect to some other laws.  For example, in Hilkhot Sanhedrin (4:6), the Rambam rules that these areas have the status of Eretz Yisrael with respect to the ability to confer semikha (formal ordination dating to the time of Moshe), which, according to the Rambam, can be done only in the Land of Israel.  But Rav Sorotzkin suggested that Eiver Ha-yarden, which to begin with was secondary to Eretz Yisrael proper, lost its status of kedushat ha-aretz altogether once the communities living there were exiled.  Even though other areas retained their kedushat ha-aretz with respect to some halakhot – such as semikha – even after the exile, Eiver Ha-yarden lost this status completely.

Therefore, the Sifrei, as the Kesef Mishneh understood it, clarified that the law of ir miklat marks an exception to this rule.  Although for all other halakhot this region lost its halakhic sanctity after the exile, the law of ir miklat nevertheless applies.  When the Sifrei comments that the arei miklat operate even in "chutz la-aretz," it means that they operate even in Eiver Ha-yarden after the Babylonian exile, when it lost its halakhic status as Eretz Yisrael with respect to all other halakhot.

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            The final verses of Parashat Matot briefly describe the settlement of the Eiver Ha-yarden region (the area east of the Jordan River) by the tribes of Reuven, Gad and Menashe.  The Torah introduces a man named "Yair the son of Menashe" – meaning, from the tribe of Menashe – who captured the towns in the area of the Gilad and renamed them "Chavot Yair."

            Several commentators, including the Ramban, Ibn Ezra and Chizkuni, identify this Yair as a man mentioned in Sefer Divrei Hayamim I (2:22).  Divrei Hayamim tells of a Yair born to Seguv, a great-grandson of Yehuda who married the daughter of Makhir, a son of Menashe.  The next verse informs us that Yair possessed twenty-three cities in the Gilad region, which are likely the cities that Yair captured, as told here in Parashat Matot.  According to these commentators, when the Torah introduces Yair as "Yair Ben Menashe," it refers to his ancestry from his mother, who, as mentioned, was a granddaughter of Menashe.

            Several writers, however, including the Radak, in his commentary to Divrei Hayamim, noted that the Gemara indicates otherwise.  In Masekhet Bava Batra (111b), the Gemara cites the aforementioned verse in Sefer Divrei Hayamim as a possible source for the halakha that ba'al yoreish et ishto – a husband inherits his wife's estate.  The verse in Divrei Hayamim states, "Seguv begot Yair; he had twenty-three cities in the Gilad region," seemingly suggesting that Yair took possession of these cities independently, not through family inheritance.  The Gemara questions how Yair managed to acquire such vast holdings that his father never possessed, and it responds that Seguv married a woman from a wealthy family in Gilad, and then inherited her assets upon her passing.  Now had the Gemara identified the Yair described in Divrei Hayamim as the warrior of whom we read in Parashat Matot, it would not have questioned how Yair could have acquired so much property that his father never possessed.  The answer would have been clear – that Yair captured these cities, as the Torah tells here in Parashat Matot.  Undoubtedly, then, the Gemara felt that these are two different people, and that "Yair the son of Menashe" who captured cities in Gilad was an actual member of the tribe of Menashe, and did not merely descend from Menashe matrilineally.  Apparently, the Gemara felt that "Yair the son of Menashe" could not be referring to Yair's ancestry from his mother, and can mean only that Yair belonged to Menashe through patrilineal descent.

            It should be noted that Rashi makes no comment on the Torah's introduction of Yair as "Yair son of Menashe," indicating that he accepted the straightforward reading of this phrase, whereby Yair actually belonged to the tribe of Menashe.  He likely followed the view taken by the Gemara, that the Yair described in Parashat Matot as conqueror of the cities of Gilad was not the same Yair introduced in Sefer Divrei Hayamim, who, according to the Gemara's understanding, inherited territory in Gilad from his deceased wife.

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            Yesterday, we discussed a verse towards the end of Parashat Matot (32:41) that introduces a man named Yair, from the tribe of Menashe, who captured cities of the Gilad region which Moshe had apportioned to Menashe.  The Torah tells that Yair named this area after himself, with the name Chavot Ya'ir.  Rashi explains, "Since he had no sons, he called them by his name, as a memorial."  Yair decided to name these cities after himself as a means of perpetuating his legacy, since he had begotten no children through which to be memorialized.

            The Meshekh Chokhma, in his comments to Parashat Pinchas (26:29), draws proof to Rashi's theory – that Yair had no sons – from the conspicuous omission of his name from the Torah's genealogical record of Menashe in Parashat Pinchas.  The Torah there lists the families of the tribe of Menashe, but makes no mention of Yair.  The Meshekh Chokhma suggests that since Yair had no children, there was no "family of Yair" for the Torah to record among the families of Menashe.

            The Ramban, however, disagrees, claiming that Yair did, in fact, have at least one son.  He cites a verse from Sefer Divrei Hayamim I (2:23) which tells that the enemy nations of Geshur and Aram captured Yair's cities as well as the area of the city of Kenat.  The verse concludes, "all these are the children of Makhir, the father of Gilad," indicating that the city of Kenat also belonged to this family's holdings.  Now here in Parashat Matot, immediately following the account of Yair's conquest of the Gilad towns, the Torah tells that a man named Novach captured Kenat and its environs.  It stands to reason, then, the Novach belonged to this family, and the Ramban figures that he was the son of Yair.

            This dispute between Rashi and the Ramban very likely hinges on the question we addressed yesterday regarding the identity of Yair who captured the cities of Gilad.  The Ramban, as we saw, held that the Yair introduced in Parashat Matot is the same person discussed in Sefer Divrei Hayamim, who owned twenty-three cities in the Gilad region that were eventually seized by Geshur and Aram.  Thus, if Kenat – which was captured by Novach – is described in Divrei Hayamim as part of the holdings of Yair's family, we must conclude that Novach belonged to Yair's family, and was very likely his son.  Rashi, however, as we noted yesterday, appears to have adopted the position implicit in the Gemara (Masekhet Bava Batra 111b) that Parashat Matot and Divrei Hayamim speak of two different men named Yair.  Hence, the fact that the city of Kenat is associated with the Yair of Divrei Hayamim says nothing about a family relationship between Novach – conqueror of Kenat – and the Yair of Parashat Matot.

            By the same token, the debate between Rashi and the Ramban concerning the identity of the Yair of Parashat Matot affects the Meshekh Chokhma's attempt to draw proof to the theory that Yair had no sons.  Recall that the Meshekh Chokhma suggested proving this theory from the omission of Yair's name from the Torah's listing of the families of Menashe.  According to the Ramban, however, this omission is of no significance whatsoever.  He identifies the Yair of Parashat Matot as the Yair introduced in Divrei Hayamim, who, as mentioned yesterday, actually belonged to the tribe of Yehuda.  He married a girl from Menashe, but was himself a member of Yehuda.  Thus, there is no reason for him to be listed among the families of Menashe.  (One might then ask why his name does not appear in the list of families of Yehuda.  The answer, it would seem, is that only Yehuda's grandsons were afforded status as heads of families, as clearly indicated in Parashat Pinchas – 26:19-22 – and Yair was a great-great-grandson of Yehuda, so he naturally would not be listed as the founder of a family in this tribe.)

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            In our last two editions of S.A.L.T. we discussed the verse towards the end of Parashat Matot (32:41) which introduces a man named Yair from the tribe of Menashe, who captured towns in the Trans-Jordanian region of Gilad.  The Torah tells that he named this area after himself – "Chavot Yair" – and Rashi explained that since he had no children, he chose to perpetuate his legacy through the name of these cities.  The Ramban, by contrast, as we saw, claimed that Novach, whom the Torah introduces in the next verse, was Yair's son.  According to the Ramban, Yair had a son, and he nonetheless found it necessary to memorialize his name by naming the conquered area "Chavot Yair."

            The work Yosef Hillel (cited in Rav David Mandelbaum's Pardes Yosef Ha-chadash) questions Rashi's position from the Gemara's discussion in Masekhet Sanhedrin (44a).  The Gemara addresses the narrative in Sefer Yehoshua (chapter 7) of Benei Yisrael's disastrous battle against Ha-ai, which resulted in the death of "approximately [literally, 'like'] thirty-six men" (Yehoshua 7:5).  The Gemara records a debate between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Nechemya as to whether this verse should be taken literally.  According to Rabbi Nechemya, Benei Yisrael actually lost only one man – Yair from the tribe of Menashe - to whom the verse refers as "like thirty-six men" because, in Rabbi Nechemya's words, "he was equivalent to the majority of the Sanhedrin."  Yair was the most distinguished scholar of the Sanhedrin, and deemed equivalent to thirty-six Sanhedrin members – the majority of the 71-member body.  His death is therefore recorded as the death of "like thirty-six men."

            The Yosef Hillel contends that if Yair was named to the Sanhedrin, it stands to reason that he had at least one child.  The Gemara earlier in Masekhet Sanhedrin (36b) states explicitly that a person without children should not be named to the Sanhedrin; seemingly, then, it is difficult to understand how Rashi could claim that Yair had no children.

            Rashi perhaps held that the provision requiring children as a prerequisite for membership in the Sanhedrin was enacted only later, and did not apply during Benei Yisrael's sojourn in the wilderness, when Yair was named to the Sanhedrin.  Alternatively, Rashi might claim that Yair indeed had children when he was appointed to the Sanhedrin, but those children subsequently died, and he therefore named the conquered area after himself to perpetuate his legacy.

            It should be noted that Yair's stature as a prominent Torah scholar is consistent with the underlying motive behind the settlement of the tribe of Menashe on the eastern banks of the Jordan River.  The Netziv, in his Ha'amek Davar commentary to Sefer Devarim (3:16), postulates that Moshe ordered a segment of Menashe to settle together with Reuven and Gad in Eiver Ha-yarden (the east bank of the Jordan River) for the purpose of ensuring a strong presence of Torah scholarship in that region.  Eiver Ha-yarden was situated at a distance from the main religious centers of Eretz Yisrael and separated from them by a natural border (the Jordan River).  Moshe understandably feared that Reuven and Gad's isolation from the mainland would result in their gradual spiritual dissociation from Am Yisrael, and he therefore invited families from Menashe, a tribe known for its Torah scholarship (see Shoftim 5:14 – "mini Makhir yaredu mechokekim"), to settle together with Reuven and Gad.  In light of the aforementioned comment in Masekhet Sanhedrin, we might add that Moshe specifically instructed Yair, a prominent member of the Sanhedrin, to seize and settle territory in Eiver Ha-yarden to help cultivate and sustain a strong Torah presence in that region.

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            Parashat Matot tells of the war Benei Yisrael waged against Midyan, one of the two nations that instigated the tragic incident of Ba'al Pe'or, as recorded in the final section of Parashat Balak.  Upon the soldiers' return from their successful campaign, a group of generals approach Moshe and brought a special offering to God from the booty that they had collected.  They introduce this gesture by saying to Moshe, "Your servants took a count of the men of war that were with us, and not a man has been lost" (31:49).

            The Midrash (Shir Ha-shirim Rabba 4:3) suggests a homiletic reading of this verse, according to which the generals reported to Moshe not on the survival of every troop that participated in the war, but rather on their spiritual success during this campaign.  "Not a man has been lost" means that no man was spiritually lost, that all the soldiers maintained the religious standard that God demands on the battlefield.

            Interestingly, the Midrash cites the generals as pointing to one specific ritual as having been meticulously observed by the soldiers: "Not one of them gave precedence to the tefillin shel rosh over the tefillin shel yad."  Halakha requires that one don the tefillin shel yad before laying the tefillin shel rosh; according to the Midrash, the generals proudly attested to their soldiers' strict compliance with this law.

            Rav Yosef Shaul Nathanson, in his Divrei Shaul (mahadura revi'a), explains this Midrash by suggesting a symbolic meaning behind the tefillin shel yad and tefillin shel rosh.  Chazal comment that one must wear the tefillin shel yad on "yad keiha" – one's weaker arm.  The Divrei Shaul suggests that the tefillin shel yad thus symbolizes the "weakness" of the human hand, the notion that our efforts are intrinsically futile and helpless without God's assistance and support.  The tefillin shel rosh, by contrast, is spoken of as a sign of triumph and even supremacy.  Chazal famously comment that the verse in Sefer Devarim (28:10), "All the nations of the land shall see that the Name of the Lord is called upon you and will revere you" refers to the spectacle of a Jew wearing the tefillin shel rosh.  Some sources speak of tefillin shel rosh as a crown worn on the head, a public symbol of grandeur and distinction.

            By placing the tefillin shel yad on one's arm before donning the tefillin shel rosh, a person expresses his recognition of the fact that he is too "weak" to achieve grandeur and distinction independently.  We are to acknowledge the inherent limits of our "arm," of our own efforts.  We are entitled to wear the crown of honor, the emblem of triumph and stature, only after we recognize the "weakness" of our hand, man's innate frailty, that only with the Almighty's assistance are we capable of rising to greatness.

            The generals reported to Moshe that the battle against Midyan was a success because the soldiers wore the tefillin shel yad before the tefillin shel rosh; they understood the message of yad keiha, the weak arm that characterizes human effort in the absence of divine support.  The Jewish people will be privileged to experience the true impact of the tefillin shel rosh, to see the fulfillment of the promise, "All the nations of the land shall see that the Name of the Lord is called upon you and will revere you," once we recognize that this can happen only with the Almighty's assistance, in the absence of which our efforts are but a yad keiha – frail and insufficient.  We hope and pray for the day when we, too, can say, "Lo nifkad mimenu ish," when Am Yisrael defeats its enemies without losing a single soldier or civilian, and the message of the tefillin shel yad and tefillin shel rosh has not been forgotten by any member of our nation.