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The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit
Midrash
Surf A Little Torah
PARASHAT CHAYEI SARA By Rav David Silverberg The opening section of Parashat Chayei-Sara tells of Avraham's request of Efron, a member of the Chiti tribe, that he sell him the Machpela cave, where Avraham wished to bury his wife, Sara. Efron initially offers the field to Avraham free of charge, but Avraham insists upon paying for the territory in full. Some writers have dealt with the question of whether Avraham's initial request that Efron sell the field violated the tenth of the Ten Commandments lo tachmod ("you shall not covet"). The Rambam (Hilkhot Gezeila Va-aveida 1:9) defines this prohibition as follows: Whoever desires his fellow's servant, maidservant, house or utensils, or an item he could possibly purchase from him, and he imposes upon him and nags him until he purchases it from him, then even though he paid him a large sum of money, he violates a prohibition, as it says, "Lo tachmod." The
Rambam's view runs in opposition to the position taken by Tosefot (Sanhedrin
25b) that if one ultimately pays for the desired item, he has not violated lo
tachmod. But according to the
Rambam, that the request itself violates lo tachmod, did Avraham
violate this prohibition by approaching Efron and asking that he sell him the
Instinctively, we might respond that Avraham was not in violation of lo tachmod because he did not have to "nag" or pressure Efron into selling him the land. The Rambam very clearly defines lo tachmod in terms of applying pressure to procure the owner's consent to the transaction. If, however, one simply expresses his wish to purchase the item, and the owner agrees, or the owner refuses and the interested buyer then drops the issue, the prohibition has not been violated. Now Efron readily agreed to transfer the property, and was in fact prepared to give it to Avraham gratis. Seemingly, then, Avraham's request involved no violation of lo tachmod. Nevertheless, as noted by Rav Moshe Fried of Brazil, in his Ateret Shalom (5764), one might still question Avraham's conduct in light of the position taken by Rabbenu Yona, in his Sha'arei Teshuva (3:43). Rabbenu Yona claims that an ish nikhbad, a prominent person, may not even request of someone that he sell him an item, if it can be assumed that the owner would not deny the request given the interested party's noble stature. This is permissible, Rabbenu Yona writes, only if it can be ascertained that the owner will sell it wholeheartedly, without any misgivings. Now both the Ramban and Seforno (23:8) write that Efron was a wealthy and distinguished man, for whom selling a portion of his family estate would constitute an infringement upon his family's honor. For this reason, they write, Avraham requested that the Benei Cheit mediate on his behalf, rather than confronting Efron directly. Accordingly, Avraham, to whom Benei Cheit refer as a Nesi Elokim a "Prince of God" should have been forbidden from initiating the idea of the sale, even though he did not have to pressure Efron to consent. Of course, this question touches upon the more general issue of whether we are to assume that the patriarchs observed the Torah. The Gemara in Masekhet Yoma (28b) famously asserts that Avraham observed the entire Torah, even though it was revealed only many years later. The Maharal of Prague devotes a lengthy essay to this issue in his work Gur Aryeh (Bereishit 46:10), and boldly asserts that the patriarchs voluntarily observed all the mitzvot asei ("positive commandments"), but not necessarily the mitzvot lo ta'aseh ("negative commandments"). He explains that mitzvot acts are inherently meaningful, and thus one earns reward for performing them even if he is not commanded to do so. When it comes to prohibitions, however, there is no reason to deny oneself that which God has not forbidden for him. Accordingly, one might suggest that Avraham was not bound by the prohibition of lo tachmod, and for this reason he was permitted to pursue the purchase of Efron's land. In truth, however, as Rav Fried notes, this argument cannot be sustained. For one thing, the Maharal himself, in the aforementioned passage, indicates the Avraham was exceptional in comparison to Yitzchak and Yaakov, in that he observed both the mitzvot asei and the mitzvot lo ta'aseh. Secondly, the Sefer Ha-chinukh (416) establishes that the prohibition of lo tachmod applies even to gentiles, since it is integrally connected to the prohibition against theft, which constitutes one of the seven Noachide laws. Therefore, Avraham would, indeed, be bound by this prohibition. Similarly, the Rashbam (Bereishit 26:5) lists a number of intuitive mitzvot that Avraham faithfully observed, and includes the prohibition of lo tachmod in this list. Thus, Avraham did, indeed, observe this law, and the question then arises as to how he was permitted to initiate the transaction of Machpela. (Again, this question presumes the Rambam's position, applying lo tachmod even when one pays in full, and the view of Rabbenu Yona, that a prominent person transgresses lo tachmod even by simply initiating the transaction). Tomorrow we will iy"H present several answers to this question cited by Rav Fried. *******
Yesterday, we discussed the opening section of Parashat Chayei-Sara,
which tells of Avraham's request to purchase the 1) One maintains, as the Rambam does, that one violates lo tachmod even if he ultimately pays full price for the desired item or property; 2) One accepts the position of Rabbenu Yona, that when it comes to a prominent person, lo tachmod forbids even making an initial request that an owner sell him the property, if the owner would not deny the request given the person's prominent stature. Rav Moshe Fried, in his Ateret Shalom, cites two explanations recorded in the name of the Imrei Emet (famous Rebbe of Ger, son of the Sefat Emet) to justify Avraham's request, even within the aforementioned assumptions. Firstly, Rashi (23:4), citing Bereishit Rabba, writes that Avraham was legally entitled to the property in light of the Almighty's having promised him all the land of Canaan. It was only as a measure of piety that he approached Efron and offered to pay him the full price for the property. Certainly, then, lo tachmod would not apply, since Avraham here "coveted" not somebody else's possession, but rather property that, technically speaking, already belonged to him. The Imrei Emet suggested a second explanation based on an intriguing passage in the Zohar (2, 93b), which states that lo tachmod does not apply to Torah. Meaning, one may "covet" the Torah knowledge of another and seek his willingness to share it with him. This principle might be expanded to include all mitzva articles, such that one would be permitted to request that his friend sell him items such as matza for Pesach, oil for Chanukah, and so on. The Zohar notes that in introducing the prohibition of lo tachmod, the Torah (Shemot 20:14) speaks mainly of mundane possessions, such as homes, servants, cattle and so on, perhaps indicating that mitzva items are not subject to this law. However, other poskim disagree with this assumption, and apply lo tachmod to mitzva articles (Divrei Yatziv, C.M. 65; Be-tzel Ha-chokhma, 3:43). Rav Fried cites a third, fairly straightforward solution in the name of Rav Chayim Kanievsky, who noted that the Minchat Chinukh (38:8) limits lo tachmod to desiring the possessions of fellow Jews. The Torah speaks of lo tachmod in terms of property owned by rei'ekha "your fellow" a term understood by Chazal in several contexts as referring specifically to members of Benei Yisrael. Therefore, Avraham's longing to purchase the field of Efron, a member of the Chiti tribe, did not violate lo tachmod. It should be noted, however, that the Minchat Chinukh's position is not universally accepted. The Peri Megadim (O.C., Mishbetzot Zahav 604:1), for example, raises the issue of whether lo tachmod applies to the property of gentiles and leaves the issue unresolved. What more, the Sefer Ha-chinukh, as we cited yesterday, maintains that gentiles themselves are bound by the prohibition of lo tachmod, given its inherent connection to the prohibition of theft, which obviously applies to all mankind. Likewise, yesterday we mentioned that the Rashbam (Bereishit 26:5) lists several mitzvot ha-nikarot intuitive mitzvot that Avraham observed, and includes lo tachmod in this group. This strongly suggests that the Rashbam perceived lo tachmod as an intuitively logical ethical measure, which would, presumably, be binding on all mankind. According to this position of the Chinukh and the Rashbam, it would seem, the prohibition of lo tachmod as it pertains to Jews would include property owned by any person, Jew and gentile alike. If gentiles are themselves forbidden from "coveting" property, then it stands to reason that a Jew may not "covet" theirs, either. *******
Parashat Chayei-Sara tells of the selection of a wife for Avraham's son,
Yitzchak, a task that Avraham assigns to his servant (generally identified as
Eliezer, though the Torah in this parasha never mentions his name). We read that Avraham quite emphatically
instructs his servant to choose a girl specifically from his relatives, in Aram
Naharayim, rather than from among the local Canaanite population. The servant than asks Avraham for
instructions what to do if a suitable girl refuses to come to
Rashi, commenting on the latter verse, cites a famous Midrashic passage
that notes the unusual spelling of the word ulai ("perhaps") in that
verse, as alef-lamed-yud, without the letter vav after the
alef, as we would normally expect.
(The relevant phrase reads, "Ulai lo toveh ha-isha la-lekhet
acharai" "Perhaps the woman will not consent to follow me [to Several writers have addressed the question of why the Torah alludes to the servant's insincerity only in 24:39, when the servant recounts his conversation with Avraham. If the servant indeed had these motives in mind when he posed the question, then why didn't the Torah indicate this to the reader by dropping the vav in the word ulai in the first verse, where it records the actual asking of the question? Why does it present this allusion only later, when the servant retrospectively refers to this question he posed to his master?
Rav Chayim Soloveitchik of Brisk (cited in the work Pirchei Rashi)
answered that the servant in truth had no ulterior motives when he initially
posed this question to Avraham.
Such a question was, after all, entirely legitimate and appropriate. Before embarking on this mission, he had
to receive specific guidelines and instructions for all foreseeable scenarios,
and the possibility of a young girl refusing to relocate to a foreign land to
marry a boy she had never met is clearly a foreseeable situation. Therefore, the servant's question at
this point did not reflect any ulterior motives. But as he spoke with Rivka's family
about the match, recalling his doubts as to whether a girl would agree to
resettle in By contrast, Rav Yechiel Michel Mushkin, in his Mikhlal Yofi, suggests that the servant indeed had these ulterior motives in mind when he initially posed this question to Avraham. The Torah alluded to these motives only later, when the servant spoke to Rivka's family, to indicate that the servant in fact told the family of his hope that his own daughter would marry Yitzchak. In direct contradistinction to Rav Chayim's approach, Rav Mushkin suggests that the servant truly sought to secure the family's consent, and for this very reason described how he had longed for his daughter to be selected as Yitzchak's wife. The Torah therefore presents the subtle allusion in this context, because it was at this point that the servant confessed to the ulterior motives that prompted his question, "Perhaps the woman will not consent to follow me?" Another answer is famously cited in the name of the Rebbe of Kotzk, who remarked that people often are entirely unaware of the personal interests that motivate their speech and actions. Ulterior motives drive us to act in a certain way without our even realizing it. At the time when the servant raised the question to Avraham, he was not consciously aware that he asked this question for selfish reasons. Only later, in retrospect, as he reflected upon his conversation with Avraham, did he realize the true motive behind this question. The lesson of this Midrash, then, according to the Rebbe of Kotzk, is that one must always very carefully examine his every word and deed, to ensure that he acts and speaks as he does purely for the proper reasons, rather than to further his egotistical interests. ********
Yesterday, we discussed the exchange between Avraham his servant, as
recorded in Parashat Chayei-Sara, concerning Avraham's request that the servant
find a bride for Yitzchak from among his family in Aram Naharim. The servant asked Avraham what he should
do if a suitable girl refuses to move to
The Midrash introduces this comment by citing a verse from Hoshea (12:8),
"A merchant has in his possession false weights to cheat the loved one." Playing on the word "canaan" used
in this verse for "merchant," the Midrash explains that the prophet here alludes
to Avraham's Canaanite servant, who sought to cheat Avraham, the "loved one" of
the Almighty. He resorted to
dishonest means to fulfill his wish, by asking how to proceed if the woman
refuses to settle in
Clearly, the Midrash very strongly disapproves of the servant's tactic,
accusing him of using "false weights" dishonest measures to "cheat" his
master. One might wonder why his
attempts to have his daughter chosen as Yitzchak's wife earned such ire on the
part of Chazal. The desire
to become part of Avraham's family is presumably commendable. Avraham, of course, represented and
embodied the values of monotheistic faith and gemilut chasadim (acts of
kindness), and the servant was likely enamored by his master's spiritual
devotion and loving kindness to other people. And as for the underhanded means with
which he attempted to have his wish fulfilled, all he did was ask Avraham for
guidance in a situation where the suitable girl would refuse to move to
We might suggest two answers to this question. Firstly, it should be noted that the Midrash appears to emphasize not the servant's disloyalty or selfishness, but rather his mirma, his dishonesty. True, as we said, the question he posed to Avraham was inherently legitimate and reasonable. But pursuing one's personal interests under the guise of sincere concern for others is deceitful. Anytime one's speech does not accurately reflect his thoughts, when one speaks in altruistic terms while in actuality pursuing his own desires, he engages in deceit, and for this Avraham's servant was criticized. Alternatively, one might insist that it is indeed the servant's selfish attitude and disloyalty that earned the Midrash's condemnation. Rashi, as we discussed yesterday, cites the Midrash as detecting the servant's insincerity in the spelling of the word ulai ("perhaps") when he asked, "Perhaps the woman will not consent to follow me." The Torah (in 24:39) spells this word without the letter vav, such that it may be read, "eilai," "to me," alluding to the servant's interest in having Yitzchak "for me," as a son-in-law. By focusing on the word eilai alluded to in this verse, the Midrash might be underscoring the servant's self-absorbed attitude towards his assignment. Avraham charges him with the responsibility of ensuring his future and legacy, and at this moment he thinks of eilai, himself, his own, personal concerns and interests. Even if these personal concerns remained hidden deep beneath the surface, and did not practically interfere with his proper execution of his mission, it nevertheless constitutes a breach of his obligations towards his master. When his master issues an order, he must concern himself strictly with the faithful fulfillment of the master's wishes, rather than the pursuit of personal ambitions. If so, then this Midrash perhaps conveys an important lesson regarding our own master-servant relationship with the Almighty. Our attitude to God's commands must be one of unbridled commitment to their fulfillment, without focusing our attention on our own interests and wishes. A true eved Hashem, servant of God, fulfills his Master's wishes not to further his own interests, but purely for the self-sufficient purpose of obeying the Almighty's commands. ******** Parashat Chayei-Sara tells of the mission Avraham assigns to his servant, commonly identified as Eliezer, to choose a wife for Yitzchak from his homeland of Aram Naharayim. Eliezer arrives in Aram Naharayim and declares to God the method by which he will select a wife for Yitzchak: whichever girl he approaches at the well and asks for water, and she responds by offering water to both him and his camels, will be the one chosen for the distinction of marrying Yitzchak. The Gemara in Masekhet Chulin (95b) makes mention of Eliezer's system in the context of the prohibition of nichush following superstitious signs. The Gemara there cites Rav's comment that "any nichush which is not like the nichush of Avraham's servant, Eliezer, and Yonatan, son of Shaul, is not nichush." The story of Yonatan appears in Sefer Shemuel I (chapter 14), which tells that the Israelite prince challenged the Pelishtim to battle, and decided he would retreat if they come after him, and attack if they take their positions and wait for his onslaught. In any event, the Gemara establishes that these two instances of predetermined signs serve as the paradigms for the kind of nichush forbidden by the Torah. Rashi explains that these cases exemplify nichush in that the individual establishing the sign Eliezer or Yonatan decided his course of action based solely on the outcome of the ordained sign. This is in contrast to the situation described in the Gemara, where Rav anticipated good tidings after a transport ferry arrived at the dock just as he had come to cross the river. In that case, he did not make any practical decision based upon this sign, and it was thus permissible for him to afford significance to this event. Many Rishonim address the question of how Eliezer, whom tradition generally perceives as a pious, God-fearing man, could have violated the prohibition of nichush. As Tosefot note, one view in Masekhet Sanhedrin (56b) extends all prohibitions related to kishuf (witchcraft) even to gentiles, and thus Eliezer would be bound by the prohibition against nichush. How, then, could Eliezer violate this prohibition by deciding his course of action based on this "sign"? Tosefot answer that the Tanna in Sanhedrin, according to whom Eliezer was bound by the prohibition of nichush, may have adopted a different understanding of the narrative in Parashat Chayei-Sara. The Torah tells (24:22) that after Rivka gave water to both Eliezer and the camels, Eliezer immediately proceeded to give her jewelry, even before asking about her identity and background, seemingly indicating that he had already conclusively determined that she is to be Yitzchak's bride. Rashi, commenting on 24:47, notes that Eliezer reverses the sequence of events when he recounts his experiences to Rivka's family. Here he tells that he first inquired as to Rivka's identity, and only then, seeing that she is from Avraham's family and thus worthy of marrying Yitzchak, gave her the jewelry. Rashi explains that he feared they might challenge the veracity of his story if he told them that he immediately gave her the jewelry. In any event, Tosefot suggest, the Tanna in Sanhedrin perhaps understood that even in the actual narrative of this event, Eliezer first asked Rivka to identify herself, and only then gave her jewelry. Although the Biblical narrative describes the events in reverse sequence, Tosefot enlist the famous principle of ein mukdam u-me'uchar ba-Torah, meaning, the Torah's narrative does not necessarily follow chronological sequence. According to this reading, Eliezer did not alter the sequence in his presentation to Rivka's family, and, furthermore, Eliezer did not decide his actions based solely on the prescribed sign. He did not definitively choose Rivka as Yitzchak's bride upon seeing her give water to his camels, but rather waited to first hear about her and her family before reaching this decision. Therefore, Eliezer was not in violation of nichush by following this system, since it was not the exclusive factor that led him to his final decision. Rav Yosef Kapach, in his commentary to the Rambam's Mishneh Torah (Hilkhot Avodat Kokhavim 11:4-5), claims that Tosefot did not have to resort to the principle of ein mukdam u-me'uchar ba-Torah to justify their theory. According to Rav Kapach, a careful reading of the narrative suggests that Eliezer did not give Rivka the jewelry before asking who she was. The verses state, "Then when the camels finished drinking, the man [Eliezer] took a gold nose ring, weighing a beka, and two bracelets on her hands, weighing ten gold units. He said, 'Whose daughter are you...'" (24:22-23). Rav Kapach notes that the Torah does not say that he placed the jewelry on her nose and hands, as Eliezer later recalls, "so I placed the nose ring on her nose and the bracelets on her hands." Rather, at this point he merely "took" the jewelry and measured the bracelets against her hands to ensure that they would fit her size. But he did not actually hand her the jewelry until after she revealed her identity, and he knew that she was suitable as a wife for Yitzchak, as Tosefot contended. ******** Today we will discuss in greater detail the Talmudic passage in Masekhet Chulin (95b) that we addressed yesterday, which makes reference to the story of Eliezer told in Parashat Chayei-Sara. Recall that Eliezer (the traditional identity of Avraham's unnamed servant) decided that he would choose as Yitzchak's wife the girl who, when asked by Eliezer for some water at the well, would offer water to both him and his camels. As we mentioned yesterday, the Gemara addresses this system employed by Eliezer amidst its discussion of nichush the Torah prohibition against using superstitious signs in reaching decisions. Today we will discuss the context of the relevant passage in the Gemara more fully. The Gemara tells that Rav traveled to his son-in-law's house across the river, and as he arrived at the dock to cross, a ferry immediately arrived to transport him, upon which Rav remarked that this "coincidence" foretells happy times. The story then continues that when Rav arrived at his destination, he peered through the window and saw the chefs in his son-in-law's house preparing meat. When he entered, the entire household, including the kitchen staff, came to greet him. Rav criticized the kitchen staff for taking their eyes off the meat, as he maintained that one may not partake of meat that had not been guarded. All the while, he kept a watchful eye on the meat to ensure that it would be suitable for consumption. Nevertheless, the Gemara tells, Rav did not partake of the meat, and the Gemara initially explains that he denied himself meat because he had committed the violation of nichush. But the Gemara then dismisses this explanation, in light of Rav's own remark in a separate context, "Any nichush which is not like the nichush of Avraham's servant, Eliezer, and Yonatan, son of Shaul, is not nichush." As we saw yesterday, Rashi explains this to mean that one violates nichush only if he bases a decision solely on the outcome of his sign. Since Rav did not change his conduct as a result of the ferry's sudden arrival at the dock, he was not in violation of this prohibition. This reading of the Gemara clearly indicates that the Torah forbids making signs, meaning, determining one's conduct based on developments that have no rational connection to the decision at hand. This is indeed the view of the Rambam, in Hilkhot Avodat Kokhavim (11:4). The Ra'avad, in his critique to Mishneh Torah, disagrees, and permits conducting oneself based on the outcome of self-proclaimed signs, though he does not fully explain how this Gemara accommodates his position. Such an explanation is offered by the Radak, in his commentary to Sefer Shemuel I (14:9), where he explicitly sides with the Ra'avad on this issue and advances an entirely different reading of the Gemara. According to the Radak's reading, the Gemara never considered the possibility that Rav denied himself meat to atone for his nichush-prediction based on the ferry's arrival, for this prediction is clearly permissible. Rather, the Gemara initially thought that Rav perceived the chefs' abandonment of the meat to greet him as a bad omen, indicating that the meal would not be a success. The Gemara then dismisses this notion based on Rav's own statement, "Any nichush which is not like the nichush of Avraham's servant, Eliezer, and Yonatan, son of Shaul, is not nichush." According to the Radak, this means that a "sign" has validity only if one establishes the terms ahead of time, as in the cases of Eliezer and Yonatan. Eliezer approached the situation from the outset knowing that he would decide upon a bride for Yitzchak based on the girl's response to his request, and Yonatan determined ahead of time that he would attack or retreat depending on the enemy's response. However, an event that occurs without any prior determination that it would dictate a given mode of action must not be afforded any significance. On this basis, the Radak explains, the Gemara rejects the notion that Rav denied himself the meat because of some "bad omen" associated with the greeting he received. Since he had not previously determined that this kind of greeting would mandate refraining from the meat, a sign of this sort does not resemble that of Eliezer and Yonatan, and is therefore forbidden. ******** Towards the end of Parashat Chayei-Sara (25:1), we read of Avraham's marriage to a woman named Ketura. Chazal (Bereishit Rabba 61:5; Pirkei De-Rabbi Eliezer, chapter 30), cited by Rashi, identify Ketura as Hagar, Sara's Egyptian maidservant whom Avraham had married many years earlier (16:3) and later sent away together with her son (21:14). Now, Chazal comment, Avraham remarries Hagar. But why does the Torah suddenly name her "Ketura"? Rashi cites two answers from the Midrashim, the first of which (from Pirkei De-Rabbi Eliezer) associates the name "Ketura" with the word ketoret the incense offered in the Beit Ha-mikdash. As Rashi explains, Hagar was so named "because her deeds were beautiful like the ketoret." Why is Hagar compared specifically to the ketoret?
Rav Baruch Yitzchak Yissachar Leventhal, in his Birkat Yitzchak,
suggests that the comparison drawn between Hagar and the ketoret relates
to one ingredient of the ketoret, called mor. According to some opinions (Rambam,
Hilkhot Kelei Ha-mikdash 1:3), the mor was produced from the blood of a
certain non-kosher animal. Already
the Ra'avad (see also the Ramban's commentary to Shemot 30:23) expressed his
astonishment over the prospect of allowing such a substance as part of the
For this reason, Rav Leventhal suggests, Chazal compare Hagar to
the ketoret. Hagar was born
and raised in the corrupt, pagan culture of ancient In a somewhat similar vein, we might explain the connection between Hagar and the ketoret by focusing on a different ingredient of the ketoret the chelbena (generally identified as galbanum). The Gemara (Keritut 6b) comments that independently, chelbena emits a very foul odor; when, however, it is combined with the other ten spices of the ketoret, it develops a very pleasing aroma and enhances the fragrant smell of the ketoret. Chazal derive from the chelbena the principle that every public fast day must include the prayers of not only the righteous, but the wicked, as well. Like the chelbena, their displeasing qualities become in some sense transformed into a "fragrant aroma" through their association with the righteous members of their community and nation. Similarly, perhaps, Hagar was "transformed" through her affiliation with Avraham and Sara. Though born and raised a pagan, over the course of time she absorbed the values and teachings of her masters, such that she, very much like the chelbena, underwent a fundamental change from her "malodorous" origins to the "fragrant" culture and lifestyle of Avraham and Sara. |