S.A.L.T. – PARASHAT VAYISHLACH

By Rav David Silverberg

Motzaei

            The Torah tells in Parashat Vayishlach that after Yaakov’s return to Eretz Yisrael, God instructed him to travel to Beit-El and construct an altar to the Almighty at that site, where he had slept and dreamt his famous dream many years earlier.  Before journeying the designated site, Yaakov instructed his family and servants to relinquish all the “foreign gods” that they had with them in preparation for the pilgrimage to Beit El (35:2).  The Torah relates that Yaakov buried all these articles in the ground (35:4).

            Many commentators explain that the objects that Yaakov ordered his family to remove had been taken with the other spoils of Shekhem.  In the previous chapter, we read of the assault on the city of Shekhem by Shimon and Levi in retaliation for the abduction and defilement of their sister.  The brothers killed the city’s male population and looted their property.  It appears that the seized property included idols, as well, and as the family prepared to make their religious pilgrimage to Beit-El, Yaakov instructed them to hand over these idolatrous articles, and he buried them.

            We find in the commentaries numerous discussions concerning the halakhic background to this event.  Already the Ramban (35:4) raises the question of why it sufficed to simply bury the idols, in light of the Mishna’s explicit instruction (Masekhet Avoda Zara 43b) that idols must be destroyed, a halakha codified in the Shulchan Arukh (Y.D. 146:14).  If an object of idolatrous worship is buried intact, it might later be unearthed, and people may come to use it, in violation of the Torah’s strict prohibition against deriving any sort of benefit from an idol.  Why, then, did Yaakov simply bury the idols of Shekhem, and did not destroy them?

            The Ramban explains that these idols had already lost their formal halakhic status as objects of avoda zara (idolatry).  He writes that Yaakov’s sons did not take these idols until they forced their owners to perform bittul – meaning, an act demonstrating the renunciation of the belief in the object’s godly stature.  The Mishna (Avoda Zara 52b) establishes that if a gentile idolater performs such an act (the Mishna in Avoda Zara 53a lists the acts that qualify as bittul), then the idol is no longer halakhically considered a pagan object, and it is permissible for use.  It stands to reason, the Ramban writes, that Yaakov’s sons did not take these objects from Shekhem until they lost the status of avoda zara through an act of bittul.  Technically speaking, then, these objects were entirely permissible for use, and there was no halakhic requirement whatsoever that mandated destroying them, or even eliminating them prior to the family’s pilgrimage to Beit-El.

            Why, then, did Yaakov demand that his family members bring him these idols so he could bury them?

            The Ramban writes, “Yaakov commanded that they be removed for the sake of the purity of the sacred, so that they would be worthy of serving God and offering a sacrifice before Him.”  While the Ramban’s precise intent is somewhat unclear, he likely refers to the explanation given by Seforno: “Even though those who worshipped them had already renounced them…and they were therefore permissible for benefit, nevertheless, remove them now from your midst when we go to Beit-El, so that all thoughts of idolatry will be far removed from your hearts.”  Before traveling to serve God at Beit-El, Yaakov wanted his family to mentally distance themselves as far as possible from the world of idolatry, and, to that end, he instructed them to eliminate all the religious articles seized from Shekhem, even though they were not forbidden from the perspective of strict Halakha.

            Seforno’s comments demonstrate that not everything which is halakhically permissible is religiously advisable.  In his efforts to purge his family from the influences of idolatry, Yaakov found it necessary to extend beyond the strict requirements of Halakha and dispose of the technically-permissible articles seized from Shekhem.  When deciding upon policies and appropriate modes of conduct, technical halakhic permissibility is not the only factor to consider.  There are occasions when the need to resist hostile foreign influences warrant barring even that which is technically allowed.

            Rav Yosef Shaul Nathanson, in his Sho’el U-meishiv (Mahadura Telita’a, vol. 2, 3 and 171), explains the Ramban’s comments differently.  In his view, Yaakov’s decision to eliminate the former idols was indeed driven by halakhic concerns, and not by the overriding interest in distancing his family from pagan influences.  As the Ramban explained, Yaakov’s sons forced the people of Shekhem to renounce their idols.  Rav Nathanson suggests that the Ramban refers here to verbal renunciation, rather than a concrete act.  As such, Yaakov was concerned that some of the Shekhemites may have been insincere in their verbal rejection of the idols’ status, in which case the bittul is ineffective and halakhically meaningless.  He therefore decided to take an extra precaution and eliminate the idols before making the pilgrimage to Beit-El.  But since this was done as a measure of stringency, and was not required according to strict halakhic guidelines, it sufficed to simply bury the articles, and it was not necessary to destroy them.

            Chizkuni offers an entirely different reason for why Yaakov buried the idolatrous objects, despite the fact that they no longer had the status of avoda zara: “So that the service would not appear [as being performed] for the sake of that god.”  Meaning, if the family retained these former idols in their possession, then their sacrifices in Beit-El might have appeared as being offered to the deities of Shekhem.  Yaakov therefore ordered that they be eliminated, so that it would be clear and evident that they were worshipping only the one, true God.

Sunday

            Yesterday, we discussed the Ramban’s comments (to Bereishit 35:4) concerning Yaakov’s instruction to his family to relinquish the idolatrous articles they had seized from the city of Shekhem.  The Ramban writes that Shimon and Levi had forced the people of Shekhem to renounce their idols (“bittul”), and these articles were thus no longer halakhically considered idolatrous objects.  As such, they were, technically, permissible for use, but Yaakov nevertheless found it appropriate to discard them.  However, since they were not technically considered idols, it sufficed to bury these articles in the ground, whereas actual idols must be destroyed.

            Rav Moshe Yehuda Fried (of Sao Paulo, Brazil), in his Ateret Shalom (5764), questions the Ramban’s understanding of this event in light of his comments elsewhere concerning the incident of Shimon and Levi’s bloody ransack of Shekhem to retaliate for their sister’s defilement.  Yaakov strongly condemns his sons for their violent assault (34:30), and even many years later, as he lay on his deathbed, Yaakov reiterates his condemnation, as we read in Parashat Vayechi (49:5-7).  The Ramban (34:13, 49:5) gives several specific reasons for why Yaakov opposed his sons’ violence, including the fact that the people of Shekhem had undergone circumcision for the sake of joining Yaakov’s family.  It was entirely possible that they were sincere in this “conversion” and thus did not deserve to be punished for the crime committed against Dina.  Rav Fried notes that if, indeed, the Shekhemites sincerely converted, this would affect the halakhic status of their idolatrous articles that they had worshipped.  An idol owned by a Jew is not subject to bittul; even if it is renounced, and regardless of who renounces it, the idol retains its status and remains forbidden for use (Rambam, Hilkhot Avodat Kokhavim 8:9, based on Masekhet Avoda Zara 53).  One might wonder, then, how the Ramban could claim that the idols of Shekhem were renounced and thus rendered permissible.  In light of his own comments regarding Yaakov’s condemnation of the assault on the city, according to which Yaakov assumed that the people of Shekhem sincerely converted, their renunciation of the idols would be ineffective.

            Rav Fried answers, quite simply, that if the Shekhemites were indeed sincere in their process of conversion, then it can reasonably be assumed that they formally renounced their idols.  Indeed, the Gemara in Masekhet Avoda Zara (64a) indicates that pagans who convert to Judaism may be assumed to have renounced their deities before conversion.  The Gemara relates that Rabba bar Avuha urged a group of pagans to sell their idols and convert to Judaism, indicating that it was permissible for them to derive benefit from their idols by selling them.  Two explanations are offered in the Gemara for why this was the case.  First, the Gemara suggests that the prohibition of demei avodat kokhavim, which forbids deriving benefit from money received in exchange for an idol, does not apply to gentiles.  But in addition, the Gemara proposes that since the pagans in this case were planning to convert to Judaism (if they heeded Rabba bar Avuha’s call), they presumably renounced the godly status of their idols.  As such, these objects were not considered idols at all, and it was permissible to sell them and derive benefit from the funds.

            Accordingly, Rav Fried writes, if the people Shekhem indeed converted to Judaism, as Yaakov suspected, then they presumably renounced their idols, and these articles were therefore permissible for use.

(See Rav Avraham Yitzchak Sorotzkin’s Rinat Yitzchak, where he takes a different approach to this issue.)

Monday

            In our last two editions of S.A.L.T., we addressed the halakhic background to the event recorded in Parashat Vayishlach (35:4) where Yaakov collected the “foreign gods” from his family and servants, and buried them in the ground.  Many of the classical commentators explain that these were articles of pagan worship that Yaakov’s sons collected from the city of Shekhem after Shimon and Levi attacked the city and killed its inhabitants.  The Ramban claims that the people of Shekhem had already renounced these deities, and therefore the objects were, technically speaking, permissible for use according to Halakha.  However, Yaakov nevertheless felt it appropriate to eliminate these former objects of pagan worship as the family prepared to make a religious pilgrimage to Bet-El.

            Rav Meir Dan Platzky, in his Keli Chemda, raises the question of whether or not the Ramban’s comments assume that Yaakov and his family had the halakhic status of Jews, as opposed to benei Noach (gentiles) – a question that occupied several scholars and has generated an entire literature.  (Rav Yehuda Rosannes, author of the Mishneh Le-melekh, composed a full sefer on this topic, entitled Parashat Derakhim.)  In his treatment of this episode, the Ramban clearly works off the premise that Yaakov observed the prohibition of deriving benefit from objects of pagan worship.  Seemingly, his observance of this law demonstrates that he was bound by (or at least voluntarily chose to abide by) the Torah’s laws that apply to Am Yisrael.  As the Keli Chemda notes, although the prohibition against worshipping idols is not unique to the Jewish nation, and it applies to all people, it seems clear that only Jews are bound by the prohibition against deriving benefit from objects of idolatry.  Thus, if Yaakov observed this prohibition, he apparently had the halakhic status of a Jew, and was not considered a ben Noach.

            However, the Keli Chemda raises the possibility that this prohibition of deriving benefit may, in fact, apply even to gentiles.  He cites a theory advanced by the Tzelach (Pesachim 48a) broadening the scope of this prohibition.  The verse generally viewed as the source of the law prohibiting benefit from idols is the admonition in Sefer Devarim (7:26), “ve-lo tavi to’eiva el beitekha” (“you shall not bring an abominable item into your home”).  The Tzelach noted that the verse forbids even bringing an idol into one’s home, meaning, having such an article in one’s possession (similar, in a certain sense, to the prohibition of chametz on Pesach).  The prohibition thus refers not only to deriving practical benefit from an idol, but also to simply having it in one’s possession.

            The Keli Chemda writes that the Tzelach’s theory allows us to consider the possibility of expanding this prohibition to include all people, Jew and gentile alike.  The Rambam (Hilkhot Melakhim 9:2) indicates that non-Jews are included not only in the prohibition against worshipping idols, but also in the secondary prohibitions aimed at safeguarding against pagan worship, such as the law forbidding making certain images, even for decorative purposes.  If, indeed, the Torah forbids even keeping an idol in one’s possession, we may assume that, at least according to the Rambam’s ruling, this prohibition would apply even to gentiles, as even they are included in the secondary prohibitions that serve to safeguard against idolatry.  In this case, Yaakov would have been required to eliminate the idols seized from Shekhem (if the inhabitants had not renounced them) even if he did not have the status of a Jew.

            The Keli Chemda ultimately rejects this possibility, primarily because he does not accept the Tzelach’s theory.  He notes that from the Rambam’s definition of the prohibition of ve-lo tavi to’eiva (in Sefer Ha-mitzvot, lo ta’aseh 25), and elsewhere, it appears that this prohibition refers specifically to deriving benefit from an object of idol worship.  It does not forbid simply possessing an idol.  In the view of the Keli Chemda, there is no basis for applying this prohibition to gentiles, as it does not constitute an expansion of, or safeguard for, the prohibition of worshipping idols per se.  Therefore, he concludes, it indeed appears that the Ramban worked off the assumption that Yaakov had the status of a Jew and was thus bound by all the Torah’s laws.

Tuesday

            The Torah in Parashat Vayishlach tells of the pilgrimage made by Yaakov and his family to Beit-El, in preparation for which, as we’ve discussed in our last several editions of S.A.L.T., Yaakov instructed his family to get rid of their “foreign gods” (35:2).  The commentators explain this as a reference to the spoils of the city of Shekhem, which included objects of pagan worship.  As the family prepared to journey to Beit-El and offer sacrifices to God, Yaakov instructed them to eliminate these idolatrous articles, and he buried them in the ground (35:4).

            Our discussions over the last several days have focused mainly on the comments of the Ramban regarding this episode.  He claimed that Yaakov’s family seized these idolatrous articles only after bittul, meaning, after the idolaters of Shekhem formally renounced their belief in these idols.  This explains why Yaakov merely buried the idols, whereas Halakha requires destroying – and not merely concealing – objects of idolatry (Masekhet Avoda Zara 43b).  Since the spoils of Shekhem were not, strictly speaking, considered idols, as they had been renounced, they did not require physical destruction.

            Other commentators, however, suggest different reasons for why it sufficed for Yaakov to bury these articles.  Meaning, according to these commentators, we may even assume that the idols indeed had the formal halakhic status of idolatrous objects, and yet Yaakov was nevertheless justified in simply burying them.

            Several commentators point to pragmatic concerns that warranted burying the idols instead of destroying them.  Rabbenu Bechayei (after citing the Ramban’s approach) notes that after Yaakov’s sons’ assault on Shekhem, the family faced the grave danger of retaliation on the part of the surrounding communities.  (Indeed, this was the reason for Yaakov’s condemnation of the attack – 34:30).  They simply did not have the time to destroy all the metal and stone objects, and they certainly did not an opportunity to bring them to the sea and throw them away.  Practically speaking, then, under the circumstances, the only option was to quickly bury these articles and leave.

            A different theory is proposed by the Maharshal, in his Yeri’ot Shelomo, who claimed that Yaakov intentionally kept the idols intact as proof to the fact that the people of Shekhem violated their agreement with him.  When the leaders of Shekhem approached Yaakov to ask permission for the prince to marry Dina, Yaakov’s sons offered the family’s consent on condition that the Shekhemites undergo circumcision.  Presumably, the Maharshal contended, this also included the rejection of idolatry and embracing the beliefs of Yaakov’s family.  The idols discovered in Shekhem after this agreement was made constituted compelling evidence to the fact that the people of Shekhem did not fulfill their side of the pact.  Yaakov thus wanted to have these idols available so he could defend his sons’ actions to the surrounding nations.  He therefore buried them intact, such that they could be retrieved should it become necessary to plead his family’s case.  (This theory also appears in Moshav Zekeinim and in Peirush Ha-Tur.)

            Rav Moshe Yehuda Fried, in his work Ateret Shalom, suggests a different explanation, in light of Tosafot’s comments in Masekhet Yevamot (104a).  Tosafot there claim that an object of idolatry belonging to a Jew does not require destruction, and such an article may be buried in the ground intact.  According to their view, only idols belonging to gentiles require destruction.  This is, indeed, the straightforward reading of the Gemara’s comment in Masekhet Avoda Zara (52a), “an idol of a Jew requires geniza [burial]” (see Rashi).  This is also the implication of the Rambam’s formulation in Hilkhot Avodat Kokhavim (8:9; though the Kesef Mishneh remains uncertain as to what the Rambam actually meant).  The Chatam Sofer (chiddushim to Masekhet Avoda Zara 32b) claimed that Tosafot’s ruling applies even to an idol that had belonged to a gentile and then came under the ownership of a Jew.  The Jew may, according to Tosafot, simply bury the idol in the ground, and does not have to destroy it.  The Torat Chayim commentary (Avoda Zara 52a) disagrees, and claims that in such a case, the idol must be destroyed, even according to Tosafot’s view, because their view applies only to idols that had always belonged to a Jew.

            According to the Chatam Sofer’s understanding of Tosafot’s view, we can easily understand why Yaakov buried the idols of Shekhem.  Since they now belonged to Jews, they did not require destruction, and it sufficed to simply bury them.

Wednesday

            We read toward the beginning of Parashat Vayishlach of Yaakov’s response to the news that his brother, Esav, was approaching with four hundred men, which Yaakov understood to mean that Esav was preparing to wage war against him and his family.  In preparation for this encounter, Yaakov, among other things, divided his family and possessions into two separate camps, figuring that “if Esav comes upon one camp and attacks it, the remaining camp will be spared” (32:9).

            The Midrash (Bereishit Rabba 76:3) makes the following ambiguous comment regarding this verse: “‘if Esav comes upon one camp and attacks it’ – this refers to our brethren in the south [Eretz Yisrael]; ‘the remaining camp will be spared’ – this refers to our brethren in the Diaspora.”  The Ramban, in his commentary to this verse, explains that Chazal here view Yaakov’s strategy as symbolic of the future experiences of his descendants.  Like Yaakov’s family, Am Yisrael will be “divided” into different “camps,” so that if our enemies attack and persecute one group, the others will be spared and continue the unbroken chain of Jewish tradition.  The Ramban writes:

The descendants of Esav will not enact decrees against us to eradicate our memory, but will rather cause some of us harm in some of their lands.  One of their kings will enact decrees against our property or bodies, while another king deals compassionately in his area and saves the refugees.

The Midrash notes the symbolic significance of Yaakov’s tactic for future generations, reflecting the fact that even when a segment of the Jewish people will suffer persecution, other segments will enjoy freedom, such that the entirety of the nation will never face the risk of extinction.  The Sages viewed Yaakov’s two camps as symbolic of the Jews in Eretz Yisrael and those in the exile, and noted that even when one group suffers persecution at the hands of “Esav,” the other will survive.

            The Ramban does not, however, cite the subsequent passage of the Midrash, which is perhaps even more obscure and requires explanation: “Rabbi Hoshaya said: Even though they were spared as a remnant, they would fast on our behalf on Monday and Thursday.”  To whom does Rabbi Hoshaya here refer, and why is it noteworthy that the group who was “spared” fasted on behalf of the other group?

            Rav Yehuda Leib Ginsburg, in his Yalkut Yehuda, explained that Chazal here observe how the Jewish people enjoy the benefits of this arrangement without suffering from its potential disadvantages.  Am Yisrael’s condition in exile as a nation dispersed among different lands certainly helps ensure the survival of the other “camps” when one “camp” comes under attack, but also threatens to undermine the nation’s sense of unity.  A dispersed nation, one might have legitimately assumed, is, by definition, a divided nation.  Our state of dispersion would appear to be ultimately ineffective in ensuring our survival, for even if only individual concentrations of Jews would suffer persecution at any given period, members of the different “camps” will, with time, cease to identify themselves as part of the same nation.

            Rabbi Hoshaya thus observes that to the contrary, “they would fast on our behalf on Monday and Thursday.”  Our dispersed condition has spared us annihilation without shattering the bonds that connect Jews across the globe to one another.  When the Jews of one region are persecuted, the Jews living elsewhere are spared and yet fast and pray on behalf of their embattled brethren.  Even though we are dispersed, we are not divided; even though certain “camps” are “spared,” they fully identify with the plight of the “camp” under attack.  We comprise different “camps,” but we all nevertheless remain the children of Yaakov, committed to each other and dedicated to the wellbeing and success of all other members of our remarkable family.

Thursday

            The Torah in Parashat Vayishlach describes the elaborate gifts that Yaakov sent to his brother, Esav, in advance of their reunion, in an attempt to earn his favor and eliminate the feelings of hostility.  Yaakov instructed the messengers to tell Esav that they are representing “avdekha Yaakov” (“your servant, Yaakov” – 32:18), a phrase that repeats itself several times in this narrative, throughout which Yaakov refers to himself as Esav’s “servant.”

            The Yalkut Shimoni records a curious exchange between God and Yaakov regarding Yaakov’s reference to himself as his brother’s “servant”:

The Almighty said to him, “Yaakov, you have profaned that which is sacred!”

He said to Him, “Master of the world, I am flattering the evil person so that he will not kill me!”

On this basis it was said that one may flatter wicked people in this world for the sake of peaceful relations.

Oddly enough, the Yalkut concludes by siding with Yaakov in his “argument” with God.  After God criticized Yaakov for “profaning that which is sacred” by describing himself as a servant of a wicked person – as opposed to the servant of the Almighty – Yaakov defended himself by explaining that these words were necessary as part of his attempts to save his life.  The Yalkut establishes a practical protocol on the basis of Yaakov’s response – “On this basis it was said that one may flatter wicked people in this world for the sake of peaceful relations” – clearly indicating that Yaakov acted correctly.  The obvious question arises as to why God initially objected to Yaakov’s handling of the situation, if he acted properly.

            The likely answer is that God did not actually speak to Yaakov to criticize the way he spoke to Esav.  Rather, this exchange took place in Yaakov’s mind.  His conscience was uncomfortable with the way he spoke about himself.  Knowing full well that he was not Esav’s servant, Yaakov felt uneasy about lying in order to win his brother’s favor, and he asked himself how he could speak this way.  He then responded, to himself, that this was an unfortunate necessity as part of his efforts to save himself and his family.

            The Yalkut seeks to convey the message that even when dire circumstances warrant speaking untruthfully, one cannot do so comfortably, or naturally.  There must be a degree of hesitation, a blow of the conscience’s whistle, before employing such tactics.  Honesty is such an integral part of the Torah personality that even when a person is required, under duress, to speak falsely, it must not come naturally.  Our instincts and ingrained tendencies must always steer us in the direction of impeccable honesty.  It is only after “negotiating” with the inner voice of conscience that one may follow the other direction in those rare occasions when circumstances require doing so.

Friday

            Yesterday, we cited the comments of the Yalkut Shimoni concerning Yaakov’s reference to himself as Esav’s “servant” as he attempted to mollify his vengeful brother and assuage his hostile feelings:

The Almighty said to him, “Yaakov, you have profaned that which is sacred [Asita et ha-kodesh chol]!”

He said to Him, “Master of the world, I am flattering the evil person so that he will not kill me!”

On this basis it was said that one may flatter wicked people in this world for the sake of peaceful relations.

It emerges from the Yalkut’s remarks that Yaakov was justified in calling himself Esav’s “servant” in light of the particular circumstances.  Ordinarily, however, such words would be wholly inappropriate, as it entails “profaning that which is sacred.”

            How might we understand this phrase, and what is the specific reason for why Yaakov would have ordinarily been wrong for speaking this way about himself?

            Among the common definitions of the term “kadosh” (“holy”) is “designated.”  The verb “le-hakdish,” for example, refers to the designation of an animal as a sacrifice, and a groom performs “kiddushin,” whereby he designates the bride as permissible exclusively for him.  Every individual is “kadosh” in the sense that we are all designated for the service of God.  We have come into the world to serve our Creator, and we thus have the status of “hekdesh,” like property consecrated for a spiritual purpose.

            The Yalkut teaches that if we look upon ourselves as “servants of Esav,” we are guilty of “profaning that which is sacred.”  If we direct our loyalties toward the vanities of the world, instead of toward God and His Torah, then we are “profaning” ourselves, we are misusing our beings for a lower purpose than that for which they are consecrated.  Once we recognize our “designation,” our status as “hekdesh,” we will naturally be loathe to desecrate ourselves by becoming “servants” of unholy goals and pursuits.