S.A.L.T. – PARASHAT BO

By Rav David Silverberg

Motzaei Shabbat

            After the ninth plague, the plague of darkness, Pharaoh summons Moshe and agrees to allow Benei Yisrael to leave Egypt – on condition that they leave their cattle behind in Egypt.  Moshe, however, refuses the offer, saying to the king, “Even you will hand over to us sacrifices and burnt-offerings for us to make for the Lord our God, and our own cattle, too, will go with us – not a single hoof shall remain…” (10:26).

            The Ramban, commenting on this verse, writes that Moshe did not actually intend to use the Egyptians’ animals as sacrifices to the Almighty:

Moshe did not say this as a practical matter, and he did not do this at all.  Rather, these are words of reinforcement, saying that the Hand of God shall strike him and his nation so harshly that he will be prepared to give even sacrifices and burnt-offerings, and everything he has, to spare his life.  And, in truth, when he [Pharaoh] said to them [Moshe and Aharon], “and bless me, too” (12:32), he would have willingly given all his cattle as atonement, but Moshe never even considered offering the sacrifice of the wicked [which is] abominable, for God sought to bring him down, not to atone for him…

According to the Ramban, then, Moshe never intended to solicit animals from Pharaoh to offer as sacrifices.  And even if Pharaoh had offered animals to be sacrificed on his behalf when he finally allowed Benei Yisrael to leave, Moshe would never have accepted them.

            A number of later writers, including Rav Yosef Shaul Nathanson (Divrei Shaul – Mahadura Kama, hashmatot) and Rav Menachem Kasher (Torah Sheleima), noted that from the Gemara it appears that Moshe meant this remark seriously.  The Gemara in Masekhet Avoda Zara (24a) addresses the question of whether it would be permissible to offer as a sacrifice an animal that had been owned by a non-Jew.  Rabbi Eliezer (according to one version of his opinion) was of the view that animals that had been owned by gentiles are disqualified as sacrifices.  (According to one version, Rabbi Eliezer’s view was said only with regard to the para aduma, and not sacrifices.)  The Gemara challenges this opinion on the basis of this verse in Parashat Bo, when Moshe foresees the time when Benei Yisrael would receive animals from the Egyptians to use as sacrifices – clearly indicating that animals received from gentiles are acceptable as sacrifices.  The Gemara dismisses this attempted proof by noting that no proof can be brought from an incident that occurred before Matan Torah, as halakhic guidelines did not necessarily apply.  This entire discussion quite obviously assumes that Moshe sincerely intended to – and perhaps actually did – receive animals from the Egyptians at the time of the Exodus to use as sacrificial offerings.

            Indeed, Ibn Ezra (in Peirush Ha-katzar) cites those who claim that Benei Yisrael were given animals by the Egyptians as sacrifices at the time of yetzi’at Mitzrayim.  And several Midrashim (Mekhilta De-Rashbi, Midrash Ha-gadol) similarly comment that Pharaoh urged Moshe and Aharon to take his and his officers’ cattle as sacrifices on the night of the Exodus, implying that Benei Yisrael accepted these animals.  These sources, which are consistent with the Gemara’s comments in Masekhet Avoda Zara, are in contrast to the Ramban’s view, that Moshe never even considered accepting the Egyptians’ animals as sacrifices.

Sunday

            Yesterday, we noted the Gemara’s brief discussion in Masekhet Avoda Zara (24a) concerning a verse in Parashat Bo in which Moshe predicts to Pharaoh, “Even you will hand over to us sacrifices and burnt-offerings for us to make for the Lord our God, and our own cattle, too, will go with us – not a single hoof shall remain…” (10:26).  Moshe’s willingness to accept animals from the Egyptians to use as sacrifices indicates that animals received or purchased from gentiles are suitable as sacrifices.  The Gemara thus cites this verse as proof against the view of Rabbi Eliezer, who held that animals that had been owned by gentiles are disqualified for use as sacrificial offerings.  The Gemara then immediately refutes this proof by noting that the standards that applied before Matan Torah did not necessarily conform to halakhic norms that were established once the Torah was given at Sinai.

            Rav Shaul Moshe of Warsaw (cited in Rav Tzvi Zarkowski’s Beit Shemuel to Masekhet Avoda Zara) raised the question of how the Gemara sought to draw proof from Moshe’s comment, even leaving aside the point that these comments were made before Matan Torah.  The reason why Rabbi Eliezer disqualified animals that had been owned by gentiles, as the Gemara explains, is the possibility that these animals had been used for intimate relations.  Bestiality was, apparently, rampant among ancient peoples, and since Halakha forbids offering as a sacrifice an animal that had been involved in intimate relations with a human, Rabbi Eliezer held that animals taken from a non-Jew may not be used as a sacrifice.  Rav Shaul Moshe of Warsaw noted that Rabbi Eliezer’s blanket disqualification of animals that had been owned by gentiles seems to apply only on the level of mi-de’Rabbanan – Rabbinic enactment.  True, the famous halakhic principle of “safeik de-Orayta le-chumra” establishes that in a situation of doubt which results in halakhic uncertainty – such as whether a given food is permissible of forbidden – Halakha requires one to act stringently and refrain from eating the food in question.  Assuming that there is a Torah prohibition at stake, one must follow the stricter possibility rather than risk violating a Torah law.  However, the Rambam, in several contexts in his Mishneh Torah, claims that this halakha was enacted by Chazal.  As far as Torah law is concerned, one is not required to refrain from performing an act unless we know for certainty that it is forbidden.  If there is some question as to whether or not it is forbidden, then, according to Torah law, one may perform the act.  It was the Sages, the Rambam writes, who enacted that we must refrain from an activity if there is some question regarding its halakhic permissibility.

            It thus seemingly emerges that when Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies as a sacrifice an animal received from a gentile, this must apply only on the level of Rabbinic enactment.  After all, the person who wishes to offer such an animal as a sacrifice does not know for a fact that it had been used for bestiality.  Rabbi Eliezer forbids offering the animal as a sacrifice only because of the possibility that it had previously been used for bestiality, and therefore, according to the Rambam, this disqualification must apply only mi-de’Rabbanan.  The question thus arises as to how the Gemara sought to disprove Rabbi Eliezer’s view from a Biblical source.  Since this disqualification was enacted by the Sages, there is no reason to assume that it was followed during the times of the Torah!

            Rav Shaul Moshe suggests a clever answer to explain the Gemara’s question.  The Maharit (cited in the opening chapter of the Shev Shemateta) claimed that the Rambam’s view concerning safeik de-Orayta le-chumra hinges on a debate recorded in the Talmud.  The Torah in Sefer Vayikra (5:17-19) establishes the law of asham talui, which requires bringing a special atonement sacrifice if one might have committed a transgression punishable by karet, but is unsure of whether he indeed committed the violation.  According to the accepted view in the Gemara (as codified by the Rambam in Hilkhot Shegagot 8:2), this halakha applies only in a case of “ikba isura,” meaning, where a prohibited item was definitely involved.  The classic example is “chatikha achat mi-shetei chatikhot” – a person had two pieces of meat, one permissible and one forbidden, and he does not remember which of the two he ate.  Since a forbidden food item was certainly involved, the individual must bring an asham talui.  However, in a case of chatikha achat – where a person had but one piece of meat, but was unsure whether it was permissible or forbidden – he does not bring a sacrifice. 

            According to the Maharit, this view, which, as mentioned, is accepted by Halakha, reflects the Rambam’s theory concerning safeik de-Orayta le-chumra.  Since the Torah’s laws do not apply in situations of doubt (before the Sages’ enactment), there should, seemingly, be no reason for a person to bring a sin-offering in a case of an uncertain transgression.  It is only in the exceptional case of ikba isura, when a prohibited substance was certainly involved, that a person is required to consider the possibility that he committed a transgression and thus bring a sacrifice.  Otherwise, since the Torah generally allows one to rely on the “lenient” possibility in situations of doubt, a sacrifice is not required.

            However, there is a view recorded in the Gemara (Keritut 17b and elsewhere) requiring one to bring an asham talui in any situation of a possible karet violation.  According to the Maharit, this opinion – which is not accepted as halakha – reflects the view that the law of safeik de-Orayta le-chumra applies even on the level of Torah law.  As opposed to the Rambam’s view, this position maintains that the Torah itself requires one to assume the “stringent” possibility in any situation of uncertainty.

            Now the Gemara (Keritut 16b), amidst its discussion of this subject, establishes that Rabbi Eliezer followed the view requiring an asham talui in all situations of a possible karet violation.  It thus emerges, according to the Maharit, that Rabbi Eliezer held the view that safeik de-Orayta le-chumra applies even on the level of Torah obligation, and not merely by force of Rabbinic enactment.  Rav Shaul Moshe of Warsaw suggests that this sheds light on Rabbi Eliezer’s view concerning animals obtained from gentiles.  Since there is a reasonable possibility that such animals had been used for bestiality, they are disqualified as sacrifices even on the level of Torah obligation.  Hence, the Gemara was justified in drawing proof against his view from a verse in the Torah.  Since he rendered such animals disqualified even on the level of Torah law, we may question his ruling on the basis of a Biblical source indicating that such animals are acceptable as sacrifices.

Monday

            We read in Parashat Bo of Moshe’s warning to Pharaoh and his subjects about the impending tenth and final plague – the plague of the firstborn, which struck at midnight on the fifteenth of Nissan.

            Rashi (11:4) famously cites the Gemara’s observation in Masekhet Berakhot (4a) that Moshe did not predict that the plague would strike precisely at midnight – even though that is, in fact, when the firstborn died (“Va-yehi ba-chatzi ha-layla” – 12:29).  Moshe instead warned that the plague would strike “ka-chatzot ha-layla,” at around midnight.  The Gemara explains that Moshe did not want to specify the precise moment of midnight because the Egyptian astrologers likely followed an imprecise calculation in determining this moment.  The plague indeed struck precisely at midnight, but if Moshe would have made such a prediction, and the astrologers calculated midnight as occurring several moments earlier, they would have ridiculed Moshe.  Rather than acknowledging Moshe as the messenger of the one, true God, they would continue to dismiss him as a charlatan.

            One simple lesson that emerges from the Gemara’s discussion is the extent of people’s stubborn refusal to change their attitudes and beliefs.  Logically, it would be hard to question Moshe’s status even if the plague occurred several minutes after the moment he predicted.  Would this have made the plague any less devastating, or any less compelling in its demonstration of the power of God who has come to make a reckoning for the Egyptian empire’s treatment of Benei Yisrael?  In principle, the answer would be in the negative, but for the Egyptian astrologers who firmly denied the existence of God, the answer was in the affirmative.  When people are convinced of a certain idea, or have certain lifelong assumptions deeply entrenched within their mindset, they will remain steadfast in those assumptions and cling to any possible refutation of even the clearest pieces of evidence.

            But there is also another lesson conveyed by the Gemara’s account, namely, that we must do what we can to avoid subjecting ourselves and our beliefs to ridicule and derision.  Although Moshe knew full well that his calculation was the correct one, and the astrologers’ was faulty, he wisely skirted the issue and remained vague in his prophecy.  When dealing with ideological adversaries, it is unwise to express our beliefs bluntly and explicitly when it can be anticipated that this will evoke more scorn and ridicule.  The fact that our beliefs are correct does not mean that they should be explicitly broadcast to all audiences.   Moshe’s prediction of the tenth plague shows that sometimes discretion and ambiguity is the preferred approach in order to avoid unnecessary cynicism and mockery.  The Torah’s omniscient “narrator” stated definitively that the plague struck precisely at midnight, but Moshe did not want to get into this when he spoke with the Egyptians.  Among ourselves, we must certainly learn and teach the Torah’s objective truths regardless of what outsiders think of them, but when we speak to those outsiders, careful discretion is needed to avoid subjecting ourselves and our faith to ridicule and contempt.

Tuesday

            The Torah in Parashat Bo presents the basic halakhot relevant to the preparation of consumption of the korban pesach.  It commands that the paschal lamb be slaughtered and then roasted “rosho al kera’av ve-al kirbo” (“its head along with its legs and innards” – 12:9).  Rashi explains this phrase to mean that the entire lamb was to be roasted as a single entity over the fire.  The animal’s innards were removed for rinsing, and then they were placed inside the animal’s mouth, along with the legs, so the entire lamb could be roasted altogether.

            In truth, the precise meaning of this phrase is subject to a debate among the Tanna’im, recorded in the beginning of the seventh chapter of Masekhet Pesachim (74a).  Rabbi Yossi Ha-gelili maintained that the animal’s legs and innards were thrust inside the mouth, and they were roasted inside the animal.  In this way, the entire lamb was roasted as a single piece of meat, as the Torah required.  This is the view that Rashi follows in his commentary to this verse.  Rabbi Akiva, however, maintained that this was not necessary, and that, moreover, this was improper.  He argued that if the legs and innards would be roasted inside the animal, they would be considered as baked or broiled inside a pot, rather than being roasted directly over a fire, as the Torah requires.  Rabbi Akiva therefore ruled that the legs and innards are roasted alongside the rest of the lamb, not inside the lamb.

            A number of scholars raised the question of why Rashi, in his Torah commentary, followed the view of Rabbi Yossi instead of that of Rabbi Akiva.  A famous halakhic principle establishes that “halakha ke-Rabbi Akiva mei-chaveirav” – we follow Rabbi Akiva’s view in his halakhic disputes against his colleagues.  Seemingly, then, we should accept Rabbi Akiva’s ruling that the legs and innards were roasted alongside, and not inside, the paschal lamb, and this is, indeed, how the Rambam rules in Hilkhot Korban Pesach (8:10).

            The simplest explanation, and perhaps the most obvious, is that Rashi’s Torah commentary aims at presenting the clearest and most straightforward reading of every verse, irrespective of halakhic conclusions.  Thus, even if Halakha indeed follows Rabbi Akiva’s view, Rashi apparently felt that Rabbi Yossi’s position best accommodates the plain meaning of the verse, which indicates that the lamb was slaughtered as a single entity.

            Nevertheless, several writers attempted to find a halakhic basis for Rashi’s decision to side with Rabbi Yossi’s reading of the verse.  The Arba’a Turei Even commentary to Masekhet Pesachim (cited in Pardes Yosef to Parashat Bo) suggests that the rule of “halakha ke-Rabbi Akiva mei-chaveirav” doesn’t apply to this debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yossi, because it involves other sages, as well.  This argument likely stems from the precise implication of the term “al” (“with”) in this verse.  The Torah requires roasting the lamb “with” the legs and innards, and Rabbi Yossi understood this to mean that the legs and innards must be “with” the rest of the animal in the most literal sense of the term – as part of a single entity.  Rabbi Akiva, however, interpreted the term “al” more liberally, as referring to placing these animal parts together with the lamb on the spit, but not inside the animal.

            As the Arba’a Turei Even notes, this debate concerning the halakhic implication of the word “al” arises in other contexts, as well.  Earlier in Masekhet Pesachim (63b), for example, we find a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish concerning the verse, “Lo tizbach al chametz dam zivchi” (Shemot 23:18 and elsewhere), which forbids slaughtering the korban pesach “with” chametz, meaning, while chametz is in one’s possession.  Halakha applies this prohibition to offering the paschal sacrifice while somebody in the chabura – the group of people registered for that sacrifice – has chametz in his possession.  According to Reish Lakish, however, one violates this prohibition only if the individual who owns chametz is in the Temple courtyard at the time when the sacrifice is offered.  Only in this fashion, Reish Lakish maintains, is the slaughterer considered to have offered the sacrifice “with” chametz.  Rabbi Yochanan, however, interprets “al” more liberally, and therefore applies the prohibition even in a case of a member of the group who has chametz in his possession but is not currently present in the Mikdash.

            Clearly, then, the issued debated by Rabbi Yossi and Rabbi Akiva surrounding the precise meaning of the word “al” in the context of the legs and entrails of the paschal lamb is debated by other Talmudic sages, as well.  Rashi was therefore entitled to follow Rabbi Yossi’s opinion on this subject, despite the general rule of “halakha ke-Rabbi Akiva mei-chaveirav.”

            The Nachalat Yaakov (cited in Siftei Chakhamim) suggests a much different possibility.  He notes that Rashi, in his commentary to the verse, mentions that the innards were thrust inside the animal’s mouth, but makes no mention of the legs, as Rabbi Yossi does in the Mishna.  The Nachalat Yaakov thus theorizes that Rashi in fact followed Rabbi Akiva’s view, and that Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yossi argued only about the lamb’s legs.  Rabbi Akiva agreed that the entrails were placed inside the lamb, but argued that the legs were roasted alongside the animal.  Thus, Rashi’s comments are consistent with Rabbi Akiva’s ruling, which is considered the accepted position.

            The Or Chadash commentary to Masekhet Pesachim, however, notes that on several occasions in his Talmud commentary (Beitza 22b, Pesachim 76a), Rashi explicitly speaks of the innards being roasted alongside the lamb, in direct contradistinction to the theory proposed by the Nachalat Yaakov.

Wednesday

            Yesterday, we discussed the verse in Parashat Bo which discusses the preparation of the korban pesach, and requires that the paschal lamb be roasted “rosho al kera’av ve-al kirbo” (“its head along with its legs and innards” – 12:9).  Rashi, as we saw, interprets this phrase to mean that the legs and innards are rinsed and then thrust inside the animal through its mouth, at which point the animal is roasted as a single entity.  This reading follows the view of Rabbi Yossi Ha-gelili recorded in the Mishna in Masekhet Pesachim (74a).  But the Mishna also records the view of Rabbi Akiva, who argued that the lamb should not be roasted in this fashion.  If the legs and internal organs are placed inside the animal and then roasted, they will be cooked in a manner resembling boiling in a pot of water, which the Torah forbids.  Rabbi Akiva therefore maintains that the entrails and legs should be rinsed and then roasted on the spit with the rest of the animal, but not inside the animal.

            As we saw, a number of writers wondered why Rashi followed Rabbi Yossi’s position, given the halakhic principle of “halakha ke-Rabbi Akiva mei-chaveirav,” which establishes that we follow Rabbi Akiva’s rulings in his disputes with his colleagues.  The Rambam, for example, indeed codifies Rabbi Akiva’s manner of roasting the paschal lamb (Hilkhot Korban Pesach 8:10), and several writers sought to explain why Rashi followed Rabbi Yossi’s view.

            The Tzelach (Talmud commentary by Rav Yechezkel Landau of Prague, author of Noda Bi-yehuda), in Masekhet Pesachim, suggests an answer by offering a novel explanation of Rabbi Akiva’s view.  Rabbi Akiva rejects Rabbi Yossi’s opinion because, in his words, “ke-ein bishul hu zeh” (“this resembles boiling”).  The conventional understanding of this phrase, as we explained above, is that Rabbi Akiva deemed Rabbi Yossi’s method a violation of the Torah requirement that the paschal lamb be roasted over an open flame, and not boiled in a pot of water.  But the Tzelach insightfully notes that roasting the animal with the legs and innards thrust inside its mouth would not be akin to boiling them in a pot.  Earlier in Masekhet Pesachim (41a), the Gemara discusses the situation of “tzeli keidar,” meat that is broiled in a pan directly over a fire, without any liquid.  According to the majority view, this kind of broiling satisfies the Torah’s requirement that the korban pesach be roasted over an open flame.  Seemingly, the situation of the animal’s legs and innards thrust inside its body should be no different than tzeli keidar, and it thus seems difficult to understand why Rabbi Akiva disqualified this method.

The Tzelach therefore claims that Rabbi Akiva objected to Rabbi Yossi’s method for an entirely different reason, namely, because of the blood in the innards.  Since the korban pesach is not salted, and the blood is drawn from it through the process of roasting, the innards – part of which contains large amounts of blood – must, according to Rabbi Akiva, be roasted via direct exposure to fire.  The issue here is not the requirement that the korban pesach be specifically roasted, but rather the general prohibition against partaking of blood.  In order for the blood of the animal’s innards to be entirely eliminated, they must, in Rabbi Akiva’s view, be exposed directly to the flame.

            If so, the Tzelach claims, then we can perhaps understand why Rashi follows Rabbi Yossi’s view in interpreting this verse.  Halakha indeed accepts Rabbi Akiva’s position, but before Matan Torah, when the prohibition against ingesting blood had yet to be issued, there was no requirement to roast the innards over an open flame.  Therefore, even though after Matan Torah we follow Rabbi Akiva’s view, at the time of the Exodus, when the Torah had not yet been given, it was acceptable to roast the korban pesach with the internal organs thrust inside the animal after rinsing.  Hence, from the perspective of Benei Yisrael in Egypt – to whom Moshe presented these instructions – the correct reading of the verse is that of Rabbi Yossi, and not that of Rabbi Akiva.

Thursday

The Gemara (Pesachim 74a), in an ambiguous passage, relates that Rabbi Yishmael would refer to the korban pesach with the term “tokh tokh” (literally, “inside, inside”), whereas Rabbi Tarfon would call the sacrifice a “gedi mekulas.” Rashi writes that these two monikers reflect the two opinions regarding the roasting of the korban pesach (as we’ve discussed in our last two editions of “S.A.L.T.”). Rabbi Tarfon, Rashi writes, followed the view of Rabbi Akiva, who maintained that the animal’s innards and legs were roasted alongside the korban pesach, near its head. As they hung on the spit near the animal’s head, the organs appeared like a helmet covering the head, and Rabbi Tarfon therefore referred to the paschal lamb with the term “gedi mekulas,” which means “helmeted goat.” Rabbi Yishmael, by contrast, followed Rabbi Yossi’s view, that the innards and legs were thrust inside the animal through its mouth, and then the animal was roasted altogether. He therefore called the korban pesach “tokh tokh,” referring to the sounds heard from the animal’s inside as it roasted, which resembled the simmering of a pot over the fire. Rashi then cites a different text, according to which Rabbi Yishmael called the sacrifice “tokhbar,” a combination of the words “tokh” (“interior”) and “bar” (“exterior”), referring to the fact that the organs thrust inside the animal could be seen protruding from the outside.

A much different account of the different nicknames given to the korban pesach appears in the Mekhilta, in Parashat Bo (to 12:9). There, we read that Rabbi Akiva himself would call the sacrifice “tokh u-bar,” while Rabbi Yehuda Ha-nasi would call it “mekulas.” The description “tokh u-bar” appears to be a variation of the term “tokhbar” used by Rabbi Yishmael in reference to the paschal lamb (according to Rashi’s second version). Yet, according to the Mekhilta, the title was given by Rabbi Akiva, who held that the legs and innards were roasted outside the lamb – despite the fact that “tokhbar” was a description of the legs and innards protruding from inside the lamb.

The Mekhilta’s version perhaps provides support to the interpretation of the Gemara offered by the Meiri, who explains this passage much differently than Rashi. In his view, Rabbi Yishmael’s term, “tokhbar,” actually reflects Rabbi Akiva’s position, as it refers to the fact that parts which had been “tokh” – inside the animal – are now “bar” – outside the animal. It signifies that the lamb’s internal organs are now being hung on the spit and roasted outside the animal.

Rashi perhaps had a different version of the text of the Mekhilta. As Rav Menachem Kasher noted in his Torah Sheleima (to Shemot 12:9, note221), there is an alternate text of this passage in the Mekhilta, according to which Rabbi Eliezer called the korban pesach “tokh u-bar,” whereas Rabbi Akiva referred to it with the term “mekulas.” According to this version, the name “mekulas” is clearly associated with Rabbi Akiva’s view, and it therefore stands to reason that the opposing view, that the lamb should be called “tokhu-bar,” represents the position of Rabbi Yossi, as Rashi explained. It would therefore seem that Rashi saw this alternate version of the text of the Mekhilta.

Friday

            We read in Parashat Bo that after Moshe and Aharon warned Pharaoh of the impending plague of locusts, the king, at his servants’ behest, offered to allow Benei Yisrael to leave.  However, when Moshe and Aharon informed Pharaoh that their intention was for the entire nation to go worship God in the wilderness, including the men, women and children, Pharaoh rescinded his offer.  He ridiculed Moshe and Aharon, sarcastically joking, “May the Lord be with you when I send you and your children” (10:10).  Pharaoh then added an ambiguous comment in which, it seems, he tried to explain his refusal to allow the children to leave: “see that evil awaits you” (“re’u ki ra’a neged peneikhem” – literally, “see that there is evil in front of your faces”).

            Rashi, commenting on this verse, first writes, “Ke-targumo,” indicating his approval of Targum Onkelos’ translation of this phrase.  Onkelos’ translation is itself unclear, prompting the Ramban to bemoan Rashi’s brevity in this context, denying us a clear explanation of Onkelos’ intent.  (The Ramban notes the textual discrepancy between different versions of Onkelos’ translation of this verse.)  The Ramban then proceeds to suggest that according to Onkelos, Pharaoh meant that Moshe and Aharon’s “evil” intentions are apparent.  The fact that they seek to take even the children, who are not ordinarily included in ritual festivities, indicates that their plan is to leave Egypt permanently, and not merely make a brief trip to offer sacrifices to the Almighty.  This is the interpretation given by several commentators (including Saadia Gaon, the Rashbam and Chizkuni), and it also appears in the Midrash (Shemot Rabba 13:5).

            The Ramban then suggests (according to a different version of the text of Onekelos’ translation) a slightly different explanation, namely, that Pharaoh warned Moshe and Aharon of the trouble they bring on themselves through their demands.  Their “maximalist” demands were going to come around and hurt them, as the kingdom would never accede to them.  Pharaoh essentially attempted to intimidate Moshe and Aharon by saying, “You’re ruining your chances by being so demanding, and insisting that everyone should leave.”

            Rashi cites a much different interpretation of this verse from the Midrash.  (In his commentary to Sefer Yehoshua 5:9, Rashi cites this interpretation in the name of Rabbi Moshe Ha-darshan.)  The term “ra’a” refers to a certain star, or constellation.  Pharaoh saw through astrology that Benei Yisrael’s trip to the wilderness would end in bloodshed, and on this basis he sought to discourage Moshe from persisting with his demands.  The Egyptian monarch did not realize that the blood he saw was the blood that was shed when Benei Yisrael underwent circumcision upon crossing into Canaan.

            A particularly insightful explanation to this verse is offered by Rav Zalman Sorotzkin, in his Oznayim Le-Torah.  (This interpretation was also suggested by Rav Menachem Bentzion Zaks, in his Menachem Tziyon.)  He claims that Pharaoh, suddenly donning the cloak of compassion and sensitivity, noted the dangers of embarking into the searing desert with young children.  Essentially, Pharaoh here says, “You don’t really think I would allow young, tender children and infants to be taken out into the desert, do you?”  The same Pharaoh who had ordered the execution of every male newborn now defends his position by supposedly rescuing the fragile, precious Israelite children from the harsh elements to which their careless parents now wish to subject them.  He tells Moshe and Aharon, “See, there is evil ahead of you” – as if to say, “You’re out of your minds if you plan to bring your children out into the harsh desert!”  This verse thus demonstrates the extent of Pharaoh’s hypocrisy, how the ruthless tyrant who drowned untold numbers of innocent newborns tried to present himself as a heroic humanitarian in rejecting Moshe and Aharon’s demands that he release Benei Yisrael.