Surf A Little Torah
Yeshivat Har Etzion

Parashat Beshalach tells of the splitting of the sea for Benei Yisrael and the drowning of the pursuing Egyptian army, followed by the "shirat ha-yam" – Benei Yisrael's song of praise to the Almighty. In this song they proclaim, "This is my God – and I shall glorify Him!" (15:2). A famous passage in the Mekhilta, cited as well in several places in the Talmud (e.g. Shabbat 133b), derives from this verse the obligation known as "hiddur mitzva" – the beautification of mitzvot. The berayta states: "'This is my God, and I shall glorify Him' – be glorified before Him in mitzvot; make before Him a beautiful sukka, a beautiful lulav, a beautiful shofar, beautiful tzitzit, and a beautiful Sefer Torah, written for His Name, with beautiful ink… " The question has been asked, why does this berayta include in its list of examples the requirement that a Sefer Torah be written "li-shmo" – literally, "for His Name"? There already exists a halakha that a Sefer Torah is suitable only if all instances of the Name of God were written with the specific intent of kedushat Sefer Torah. Why, then, does the berayta include this requirement under the category of hiddur mitzva? How does the obligation to write the Sefer Torah with the proper intent relate to the rule of hiddur mitzva – requiring the beautification of mitzvot?

Rav Shlomo Ha-kohen of Vilna, in his work of responsa, "Binyan Shelomo" (7), explains that this berayta does not at all refer to the familiar requirement of proper intent when writing a Sefer Torah. After all, the term used for that requirement throughout the Talmud is "li-shma" – for its sake, meaning, with the specific intent for the sanctity of the Sefer Torah. Here, however, the berayta employs the masculine term: "li-shmo." This, Rav Shlomo of Vilna suggests, means "for God's Name." The berayta does not refer to any specific, halakhic requirement regarding the writing of a Sefer Torah, but adds a general rule concerning hiddur mitzva: it must be done sincerely, for God's sake. When Halakha requires beauty and grandeur in the performance of mitzvot, the danger exists that people might misuse this obligation as a means of impressing others and ostentatiously displaying their wealth. This berayta therefore adds a word – "li-shmo" – to emphasize that the beautification of mitzvot must be done sincerely and in good taste, out a genuine desire to give honor to the Almighty, rather than with the interest of giving honor to oneself.

******

Yesterday, we discussed the concept of "hiddur mitzva," the beautification of mitzvot, which the Mekhilta extracts from a verse in Parashat Beshalach ("Zeh Keli ve-anvehu" - 15:2). We cited the berayta as it appears in the Talmud, in Masekhet Shabbat (133b), which applies the obligation to the writing of a Sefer Torah. The Gemara requires not only having a Sefer Torah written by an experienced scribe, with beautiful ink and high-quality parchment, but also using "kulmus na'eh" – a beautiful quill. This requirement appears as well in the corresponding berayta in Masekhet Sofrim (3:13). The obvious question arises, why would the obligation of "hiddur mitzva" require the use of a fancy quill? The physical appearance of the quill obviously leaves no lasting effect on the Sefer Torah; no one using this scroll will ever have any idea of what the quill looked like. How does one beautify a Sefer Torah by using a beautiful quill when writing it?

Indeed, several versions of the berayta omit this requirement (Nazir 2b; Yerushalmi, Pei'a 1:1). It is particularly revealing that Rashi, in his comments to Masekhet Yoma (70a), cites the berayta as it appears in Masekhet Shabbat almost verbatim, omitting only the point concerning the quill. Some have concluded on this basis that according to Rashi, "hiddur mitzva" does not, in fact, require the use of a pleasant-looking quill.

How can we explain the version of the berayta in Masekhet Shabbat and Masekhet Sofrim?

The inclusion of the quill in the berayta's list seems to reflect the fact that "hiddur mitzva" relates not to the objects used in mitzva performance, but rather to the actual performance. "Hiddur mitzva" requires beautification not of objects, but of actions; one must perform mitzvot in a manner expressing beauty and grandeur. When the berayta speaks of a beautiful sukka, lulav, etc., it means that one performs the mitzva in a beautiful manner by using beautiful objects, but not that hiddur mitzva focuses on the objects.

Several other proofs may be drawn to support this thesis. For one thing, the berayta lists shofar as one of the objects requiring beautification. According to one view in the Rishonim, the mitzva of shofar is to hear the sound, not to blow the shofar. Accordingly, many Acharonim maintain that a shofar does not have the formal status as a "cheftza shel mitzva" – a mitzva object, since it merely produces the sound which one must hear. (This indeed appears to be the view of the Rambam, who famously ruled that one fulfills the mitzva of shofar even if he blows a stolen shofar.) If the shofar is the means of performance rather than the actual mitzva object, then the application of "hiddur mitzva" to shofar would indeed demonstrate that "hiddur mitzva" relates to performance, rather than objects.

This theory appears to emerge as well from the Rambam's comments at the end of Hilkhot Isurei Mizbei'ach (7:11), where he discusses the obligation to use high-quality oil when bringing sacrifices. In this context, the Rambam adds:

Interestingly enough, the Rambam here does not bring the examples of "hiddur mitzva" given in the berayta. Why does he bring his own examples, rather than citing those in the Gemara? This led some Acharonim to distinguish between the obligation described here by the Rambam and the halakha of "hiddur mitzva." The Rambam here speaks of objects designated "for the sake of the good Lord." Naturally, these objects must be of the highest possible quality. "Hiddur mitzva," by contrast, means that one should perform mitzvot in a manner reflecting honor and beauty; as we discussed, this obligation relates not to objects, but rather to manner of performance.

Likewise, Tosefot, in a very brief comment to Masekhet Berakhot (21b), invoke "hiddur mitzva" as the basis for preferring personal recitation of kedusha rather than hearing it from the chazan. Although the principle of "shomei'a ke-oneh" dictates that (under certain circumstances) one can fulfill an obligation to recite a given text by listening to its recitation by another, personal recitation involves "hiddur mitzva." Clearly, according to Tosefot, "hiddur mitzva" involves quality of performance, rather than objects. Another example is Rashi's comment to Masekhet Pesachim (99b), to the effect that eating matza with a hearty appetite fulfills the obligation of "hiddur mitzva," as it is a higher standard of the mitzva to eat matza. This, too, shows that "hiddur mitzva" addresses the standard of performance, rather than the aesthetic quality of the mitzva object.

(Sources taken from Rav Elyakim Dvorkes, "Bi-shvilei Ha-parasha" to Parashat Beshalach)

******

In our previous two divrei Torah, we discussed the halakha known as "hiddur mitzva," which, as we mentioned, the Mekhilta and Gemara (Shabbat 133b and elsewhere) extract from a verse in Parashat Beshalach: "Zeh Keli ve-anvehu" ("This is my God, and I shall glorify Him" – 15:2). According to Chazal, "glorifying" the Almighty means that we must perform mitzvot on a high aesthetic st, such as by using a beautiful sukka, beautiful lulav, beautiful Sefer Torah, and so on.

The fact that Chazal deduce this obligation from a verse would suggest, at least at first glance, that this constitutes a Torah obligation. Alternatively, however, one could argue that the verse is cited merely as an "asmakhta" – an allusion in the Chumash to a rabbinically ordained obligation.

One possible source for resolving this question is the Rishonim's discussion surrounding a Gemara in Bava Kama (9b). The Gemara there establishes that one must pay as much as an additional one-third of the basic cost of an item to purchase a higher quality item for a mitzva. The Gemara is uncertain, however, how precisely we calculate this amount. Leaving aside the details of the different methods of calculation, it suffices for our purposes to note that the Gemara does not reach a definitive conclusion on this matter. The Rosh and Rabbenu Yerucham write that since the Gemara remains undecided, we may follow the lenient position and adopt the lower of the two amounts. Seemingly, this ruling is based on the famous principle, "safeik de-rabbanan le-kula" – when we are in doubt concerning an obligation instituted by Chazal, we may act leniently, whereas when it comes to Torah law, we must follow the more stringent possibility. Apparently, then, these Rishonim work on the assumption that hiddur mitzva is not a Torah obligation, but was rather established by Chazal, and therefore, in situations of doubt, we may rule leniently.

The Yam Shel Shelomo cites these comments of the Rosh and asks on what basis he permits following the lenient position when it comes to hiddur mitzva. The Yam Shel Shelomo answers with a somewhat ambiguous statement: "Perhaps he held that this is not de-orayta [from the Torah], because it is not a mitzvat asei, but rather a general mitzva to enhance the mitzva." The Sedei Chemed understands the Sedei Chemed to mean that hiddur mitzva is a rabbinic requirement, and is not mandated by the Torah itself. He proceeds to claim that the Chatam Sofer also read the Yam Shel Shelomo in this fashion. In one of his responsa (O.C. 184), the Chatam Sofer addresses the permissibility of taking in the middle of Sukkot an etrog that had been hanging in a sukka as decoration and using it for the mitzva of arba minim. The Chatam Sofer permits doing so, and writes, "And even though originally it served as decoration for a mitzva de-orayta and now [is used for] a mitzva de-rabbanan, it is still acceptable, for the Yam Shel Shelomo concluded in siman 4 that mitzva decoration is only de-rabbanan." In other words, transforming the etrog from a sukka decoration to one of the arba minim does not entail a lowering of its status (which would be forbidden). Although arba minim after the first day of Sukkot is only de-rabbanan, the etrog's initial function – as a sukka decoration – was also only de-rabbanan, since, as the Yam Shel Shelomo writes, beautifying mitzvot constitutes a rabbinic obligation.

As the Sedei Chemed notes, however, the Chatam Sofer appears to have made an error in his citation of the Yam Shel Shelomo: he cites this position from the Yam Shel Shelomo in siman 4, whereas in truth the Yam Shel Shelomo regarding hiddur mitzva appears in Masekhet Bava Kama, chapter 1, siman 24. The Sedei Chemed therefore claims that a printing error occurred, and the number "4" must be corrected to "24."

However, Rav Shemuel Barukh Deutsch, in his "Birkat Kohen" (Parashat Beshalach), suggests an entirely different approach in understanding the Yam Shel Shelomo, and hence the Chatam Sofer. The Yam Shel Shelomo, he claims, never meant to say that hiddur mitzva does not constitute a Torah obligation. Rather, he meant that it is not a specific, outright obligation. It rather establishes – on the level of Torah law – an overarching requirement to pursue, in a general sense, high aesthetic standards in the performance of mitzvot. The rule of "safeik de-orayta le-chumra," requiring that we act stringently when faced by a doubt concerning a Torah obligation, applies only to specific obligations. A mitzva that involves a general value, rather than requiring a specific action, is not subject to this rule. This is how the Yam Shel Shelomo explained the Rosh's position that we may follow the lenient side of the Gemara's doubt concerning hiddur mitzva.

But did not the Chatam Sofer explicitly cite the Yam Shel Shelomo as maintaining that hiddur mitzva constitutes but a rabbinic requirement? The Birkat Kohen writes that the Chatam Sofer wrote nothing of the sort. The Chatam Sofer does not refer here at all to the Yam Shel Shelomo in Masekhet Bava Kama siman 24; he was talking about a different passage in the Yam Shel Shelomo – in Masekhet Beitza, chapter 4 siman 4, and we therefore need not resort to a claim of a printing error. There in Masekhet Beitza, the Yam Shel Shelomo writes that the prohibition against making personal use of sukka decorations is not a Torah prohibition; it was enacted by Chazal. The Chatam Sofer in this passage invokes this view of the Yam Shel Shelomo to justify using an etrog that had served as a sukka decoration for the mitzva of arba minim. Although this etrog had been used for the mitzva de-orayta of sukka, and will now be used of the mitzva de-rabbanan of arba minim after the first day, we may nevertheless permit doing so since the prohibition against using sukka decorations in the first place is only de-rabbanan. This passage of the Chatam Sofer thus has nothing to do with the issue of whether hiddur mitzva originates from the Torah or from Chazal. (And, in fact, the Chatam Sofer never employs here the term "hiddur," but rather "noy" – decoration.)

Thus, according to the Birkat Kohen, the Yam Shel Shelomo maintains that hiddur mitzva is, indeed, a Torah obligation, as opposed to the understanding of the Sedei Chemed.

******

After the splitting of the Yam Suf and Benei Yisrael's singing of "Az Yashir," the Torah relates in Parashat Beshalach, "Vayasa Moshe et Yisrael mi-Yam Suf" – "Moshe caused Israel to set out from the Sea of Reeds" (15:22). Rashi cites the well-known Midrash that notes the apparent peculiarity in this phrase. Benei Yisrael didn't simply set out from the sea; Moshe had to "cause them" to proceed onward. Chazal explain that Moshe had to drag the people away from the beach, where they were busy collecting the spoils of the Egyptians that had washed up ashore. The verse emphasizes that Benei Yisrael were unwilling, or at least reluctant, to leave the seashore on their own, until Moshe pulled them away against their will.

Rav Yehuda Leib Ginsburg, in his "Yalkut Yehuda," comments that Chazal here resolve more than merely the textual difficulty in this verse. In effect, they explain the entire sequence of events in Parashat Vayishlach. Upon reading this parasha, one must wonder how the same nation about whom the Torah writes, "They believed in the Lord, and in Moshe, His servant" (14:31), and who sang the prophetic "Az Yashir" through divine inspiration, could fall so drastically. In the second half of the parasha, we find these same people making comments such as, "If only we had died by the hand of the Lord in the land of Egypt, when we sat by the fleshpots" (16:3; according to the Mekhilta of Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai, this was an outright lie – Benei Yisrael were never given meat in Egypt!). By the time we reach the end of the parasha, Benei Yisrael have begun wondering, "Is the Lord present among us or not?" (17:7), for which they are punished by the assault of Amalek.

How did this happen? How did a nation of prophets deteriorate within just a few weeks to a nation of whiny, ungrateful grumblers?

According to Rav Ginsburg, it is this very question Chazal address in the aforementioned Midrash. The problem did not begin in Mara, where Benei Yisrael could not find fresh drinking water. Rather, the problem began at the shores of the Yam Suf, where the nation shifted its attention from prophecy and the revelation of the Shekhina to the gold and silver that washed ashore. Once they focusedtheir minds excessively on material gain and wealth, they understandably fall apart when they encounter difficult conditions in the wilderness. Had they retained their concentration on the prophecy and revelation they had just experienced, they could have perhaps tolerated temporary hardships during travel. But the moment physical and material comfort move too close to the center of their attention, Benei Yisrael lose their ability to cope with the challenges that await them in the wilderness, and they express their preference for their former lives as slaves in Egypt.

Thus, the need for Moshe to drag Benei Yisrael away from shores of the Yam Suf sets the stage for the unfortunate incidents that unfold in the chapters that follow.

*******

The opening verses of Parashat Beshalach read, "When Pharaoh let the people go, God did not lead them by way of the land of Pelishtim, for it was nearer; for God said, 'The people may have a change of heart when they see war, and return to Egypt.' So God led the people roundabout, by way of the wilderness at the Sea of Reeds." The commentators offer varying interpretations of these verses, but the most common explanation is that God led Benei Yisrael along a much less direct, more convoluted route than was necessary, so as to ensure that Benei Yisrael would not return to Egypt the moment they confront warfare.

Commenting on the phrase, "Va-yasev Elokim et ha-am" ("God led the people roundabout"), the Midrash (Shemot Rabba 20:18) writes, "From here they said: Even a poor man in Israel may not eat [on Pesach night] until he reclines." Somehow, the Sages extracted from this verse the obligation for even poor people to recline at the Pesach seder. Clearly, the association between this halakha and the verse stems from the word "va-yasev," which relates to the word "heseiba" – reclining. But many later writers were nevertheless troubled by this Midrash. Where in this verse did Chazal find a reference to this halakha?

The Ketav Sofer suggests that this Midrash is based upon a homiletic reading of the parasha's opening verses. Rather than taking Benei Yisrael along the more natural route, God led them to the Yam Suf, meaning, He orchestrated the entire incident recorded in this parasha, luring the Egyptians to the sea and then drowning them. He did this to ensure for all time that Benei Yisrael will never have a "change of heart," that they will never become discouraged when they confront hardships and challenges. The nation's situation at Yam Suf represents the peak of hopelessness; they had no chance for survival or any means of escape. God specifically wanted Benei Yisrael to enter and survive such a situation to ensure that they would never lose hope in the future, regardless of what difficulties they confront or hardships they must endure.

We now understand, writes the Ketav Sofer, how from this verse we learn the halakha requiring even the poor to recline at the seder. After all, one might ask, why should he recline? What reason does he have do celebrate freedom and royalty if he cannot even afford his basic needs and depends on charitable donations for survival? The answer is Parashat Vayishlach, the sequence of events arranged by the Almighty specifically for that poor person who might wonder whether or not he has reason to celebrate freedom. If God saved Benei Yisrael from the Egyptians at the shores of the Yam Suf, then He can intervene in any situation and extricate us from any crisis. Even the impoverished, therefore, have every reason to conduct themselves with royalty as we celebrate the Exodus.

******

Yesterday, we saw the comment of the Midrash in Shemot Rabba (20:18) associating the obligation of "heseiba" – to recline at the Pesach seder - with the second verse in Parashat Beshalach, which tells how God "led Benei Yisrael roundabout" ("va-yasev") as they left Egypt. Commenting on this verse, the Midrash remarks, "From here they said: Even a poor man in Israel may not eat [on Pesach night] until he reclines." Today we will consider other explanations for the connection drawn by the Midrash between this verse and the obligation of heseiba.

At first glance, one might explain based on the comments of the Sefer Ha-manhig in Hilkhot Pesach (54), who cites this verse and writes, "This teaches that he had them sit in a reclining position like princes." In other words, according to the Sefer Ha-manhig, the word "va-yasev" means that God ensured Benei Yisrael's physical comfort as they made their way out of Egypt. Understandably, then, this verse prompted Chazal to institute the obligation of heseiba at the seder, to commemorate the unique conditions God provided for Benei Yisrael when they departed from Egypt.

However, Shemot Rabba itself gives a different explanation of the word "va-yasev," namely, that God "surrounded" Benei Yisrael to protect them as they traveled. Our question thus returns: how does this "surrounding" have anything to do with the obligation of heseiba?

Rav Benzion Fendler, in his work, "Gei Chizayon" (Tel-Aviv, 1962), suggests that when the Midrash translates "va-yasev" as "He surrounded," it refers to the "ananei ha-kavod" – the "clouds of glory" which, as we know, surrounded Benei Yisrael throughout their sojourn in the wilderness. Why do Chazal use the term "ananei ha-kavod" to describe these clouds? To whom did they bring "glory," and to what kind of "glory" does this refer? Rav Fendler suggests that the "ananei ha-kavod" brought glory and pride to Benei Yisrael. God's special protection achieved more than security and defense. It served as a display of honor to Benei Yisrael, demonstrating to them the Almighty's unique affection towards them. The clouds were more than a shield; they served as a symbol of the nation's special stature and relationship with God.

From this verse, therefore, Chazal deduce that even a poor person must conduct himself with pride and honor at the Pesach seder. For God gave "glory" to all of Benei Yisrael, regardless of their rank; at the Exodus, they all became His special people deserving of honor and glory. We must all, therefore, celebrate this unique display of honor by reclining and acting like kings at the seder, commemorating the pride and glory shown to us by the Almighty at the time of Yetziat Mitzrayim.

This shiur is provided courtesy of the Virtual Beit Midrash, the premier source of online courses on Torah and Judaism - 14 different courses on all levels, for all backgrounds.

Make Jewish learning part of your week on a regular basis - enroll in the
Virtual Beit Midrash

Yeshivat Har Etzion
Alon Shvut, Israel, 90433
office@etzion.org.il