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PARASHAT SHEMINI
By Rav David Silverberg
Among the many intriguing features of the narrative in Megilat Ester is the seeming disconnect between the king,
Achashverosh, and the events that transpire in his kingdom. Twice in the Megila, the king gives his signet ring to a
trusted official, empowering him to enact any legislation he wishes and lend it
royal authority with a stamp of the ring.
Towards the beginning of the narrative, Achashverosh gives his ring to
Haman (3:10), and towards the end of the story, to Mordechai (8:2). In both instances, the king in effect
grants full control over the kingdom to the given official. It is as if he has no interest in
concerning himself with the practical, day-to-day affairs of the empire; he
tells Haman, or Mordechai, "Here do you what you want and leave me
alone." He prefers remaining
blissfully aware of what transpires, leaving this responsibility to his loyal
servant.
This is particularly evident in the case of Haman, who had requested the
destruction of an entire people living in the kingdom and the confiscation of
their property. Achashverosh
replies simply, "The money is yours; as for the people do with them whatever
pleases you" (3:11). The king
appears to give no thought to the magnitude or repercussions of Haman's plan,
and it even seems that he does not want to bother with it at all. Rather than sit and discuss the idea
with Haman, Achashverosh just gives him the signet ring and tells him to do what
he wants and leave the king out of it.
Indeed, the Megila depicts the king as proactive only in the context of his personal affairs. He hosts two feasts in his palace at the beginning of the Megila, he is involved in the selection of a new queen, and he sentences Haman to execution upon learning that his plan included his queen. One is left with the impression that Achashverosh delegates authority over the practical affairs of the kingdom to Haman (and later to Mordechai), leaving his mind free to focus on his personal interests and indulgence.
If so, then the portrayal of Achashverosh likely corresponds to the perception of God among many pagan peoples, who believed that He indeed created the world, but then delegated authority over it to certain natural forces. This belief depicts God as a kind of "Achashverosh" a king who has no interest in the practical concerns of the kingdom, who is too preoccupied with his own affairs to personally address the country's needs. Instead, he assigns this responsibility to one of his subjects who in exchange receives great wealth, honor and prestige. Similarly, according to this belief, God is too exalted to concern himself with the affairs on earth. He therefore remains distant from the earth and delegates power and authority to the natural forces and the like, who govern the world on his behalf.
The message of the Megila, then, is that even though it often appears
that God is distant, and allows the world to run under the authority of the
"Haman's" of the earth, in truth, He is directly involved at all times. Despite the impression of a
disinterested Ruler, who remains aloof and blissfully unaware of the difficult,
complex realities of His "kingdom," it is in fact He who, behind the mask of
world events, governs human affairs and never allows the "Haman's" of the earth
to triumph.
******
Parashat Shemini tells of the tragic death of Aharon's two older sons, Nadav and Avihu, who were consumed by fire when they brought an unwarranted incense offering in the Mishkan. We read that after their death, Moshe summoned his two cousins, Mishael and Eltzafan, and instructed them to bring Nadav and Avihu's remains from the Mishkan (10:4).
The question arises as to why this was not done by the grieving
relatives, namely, Aharon's two surviving sons (Elazar and Itamar). Although they were kohanim, who
generally may not come in contact with tum'at meit (ritual impurity that
results from a dead body), the Torah explicitly permits kohanim to
handle the remains of immediate relatives (Vayikra 21:2-3). What more, the Gemara establishes in
Masekhet Zevachim (100) that if a kohen refuses to become tamei
for the purpose of burying a relative, he is forced to do so against his
will. And according to the Rashba
(responsum 27), this halakha
applies even if other people are available to tend to the relative's
remains. Why, then, didn't Aharon's
other two sons tend to the remains of Nadav and Avihu? (Aharon himself was a kohen gadol, who is not permitted to come in contact
with tum'a even in the case of a deceased family
member, so the question relates only to his two surviving
sons.)
The Ramban (commenting to 10:6) explains that a hora'at sha'a an exceptional, temporary measure was
in effect that accorded to the remaining sons the status of kohen gadol (high priest). In verse 6, we read that Moshe
instructed the surviving brothers not to observe any mourning practices, because
they were to conduct themselves as a kohen gadol, who does not observe mourning upon the
death of a family member.
Similarly, the Ramban explains, the remaining brothers were forbidden to
become tamei (impure) by handling the remains of Nadav
and Avihu, as though they were kohanim gedolim.
Torat Kohanim, however, appears to have understood
differently. Commenting on this
verse (4), Torat Kohanim writes, "On this basis they [the Sages]
said that kohanim may not become impure by dead bodies." Torat Kohanim clearly
viewed this incident as a precedent for the general prohibition forbidding kohanim from contacting tum'at meit.
The question thus returns, how do we reconcile this prohibition with the
halakha explicitly introduced
later, allowing and even obligating kohanim to become tamei in the case of a family member's
death?
The Malbim explains this passage in Torat Kohanim on the basis of a comment of Tosefot in
Masekhet Sanhedrin (52a). Tosefot
address the question of whether Nadav and Avihu's remains rendered tum'a at all, given that according to one view
in the Talmud their bodies were entirely burnt. If all that remained was ashes, then it
would seem that there is no tum'a of which to speak. Tosefot suggested that perhaps the
bodies were burnt but the ashes remained in a skeletal shape. The Gemara in Masekhet Nidda (27b)
explicitly writes that tum'a
is indeed transmitted through contact with ashes of a human body if the form of
the body is retained, and thus Nadav and Avihu's remains generated
tum'a. According to Tosefot,
the Malbim explained, we can easily understand why the surviving kohanim were not permitted to remove Nadav and
Avihu's remains. The Gemara
establishes in Masekhet Nazir (43b) that kohanim may contract tum'a in the case of a family member's death only
if the corpse is intact. Where the
corpse is chaseir "deficient," or missing something then
a kohen is not permitted to come in contact with
it, even in the case of a deceased family member. This halakha is codified in the Shulchan Arukh (Y.D. 373:9).
Understandably, then, it was forbidden for Nadav and Avihu's brothers to
come in contact with the remains, which, as we saw, consisted of only ashes, and
which would thus certainly fall under the category of chaseir.
******
In Parashat Shemini the Torah introduces a prohibition forbidding the kohanim from entering the Mikdash in a state of intoxication. The Torah speaks in this context of "yayin ve-sheikhar" (10:9), which is generally translated as "wine and other intoxicating beverages." Rashi, however, interprets this phrase to mean "wine [drunk] in an intoxicating manner" ("yayin derekh shikhruto"). As the Ramban and Chizkuni explain, Rashi understands the word sheikhar in this phrase not as including other intoxicating beverages under this prohibition, but rather as qualifying the prohibition. Namely, it applies only if one drank a quantity and in a manner that could cause intoxication. If a kohen drank less than this quantity, or if he drank sporadically, such that he is not inebriated, he may enter the Sanctuary and perform the avoda (service).
It thus emerges that according to Rashi, a kohen is forbidden to
enter the Mikdash only after drinking wine, but not after
drinking other beverages. Since the
term ve-sheikhar comes to qualify the prohibition against
wine, rather than to expand the scope of the prohibition to include other
beverages, the prohibition relates specifically to intoxication obtained through
drinking wine. This is the position
taken by the Ramban, as well.
The Rambam, however, in Hilkhot Bi'at Mikdash (1:2), accepts the
straightforward reading of this phrase, whereby it refers to both wine and other
inebriating agents. In his view, a
kohen who drinks any intoxicating beverage may
not enter the Mikdash during his state of
inebriation.
Already the Tur, in his Torah commentary (Peirush Ha-Tur),
raises the question as to why Rashi and the Ramban would distinguish between
wine and other alcoholic drinks in this regard. If the Torah forbids kohanim from entering the Sanctuary under
intoxication, what difference does it make whether they had drunk wine or other
drinks?
Rav Yaakov Kopel Schwartz, in his work Yekev Efrayim
(
******
We read in Parashat Shemini of an exchange between Moshe and Aharon that
took place in the aftermath of the tragic death of Aharon's two sons, Nadav and
Avihu. Moshe reprimanded Aharon's
two surviving sons, Elazar and Itamar, for failing to partake of the meat of the
se'ir ha-chatat the goat brought that day as a
sin-offering (10:16-18). Aharon
then explained to Moshe that partaking of the meat would have been inappropriate
given the tragedy that had just befallen the family: "Had I eaten a sin-offering
today would it have been pleasing in the eyes of the Lord?"
(10:19).
Rashi, based on Chazal, explains that this discussion surrounded
the sin-offering brought as part of the Rosh Chodesh musaf
sacrifice. As the Torah instructs
in Sefer Bamidbar (28:15), the special offering brought on Rosh Chodesh included
a goat as a sin-offering. The day
of Nadav and Avihu's death, Rashi explains, which occurred on the eighth and
final day of the milu'im process whereby the kohanim
were formally consecrated, was Rosh Chodesh Nissan. This was a particularly eventful day on
which no fewer than three sin-offerings were brought upon the altar: the
offering for Rosh Chodesh, the special offering required for the milu'im
procedure (see 9:3), and the offering brought by Nachshon, the tribal leader of
Yehuda, who on this day began a series of special gifts in honor of the Mishkan's inauguration (see Bamidbar
7:12-17).
As Rashi explains, the controversy that arose pertained to the question
of whether the Rosh Chodesh sin-offering was to be treated differently on this
day. The other two sin-offerings
were brought especially in honor of the occasion of the Mishkan's inauguration, and thus did not
follow the standard rules governing sacrificial meat. As such, it was clear that despite the
death of Nadav and Avihu, which ordinarily would make it forbidden for their
immediate relatives to partake of sacrificial meat that day, the surviving
kohanim were nevertheless required to eat the special offerings. The Rosh Chodesh offering, by contrast,
was an ordinary sacrifice that was required irrespective of the special occasion
of the completion of the milu'im.
As such, the kohanim decided that the standard rules, which
forbid the consumption of sacrificial meat on the day of a family member's
passing, applied to the Rosh Chodesh sacrifice. They therefore refrained from eating
this meat, and Moshe ultimately accepted their reasoning
(10:20).
Shadal, in his commentary, explains this episode differently. For one thing, he maintains that only one sin-offering was brought on this day, as suggested by the plain reference to the offering in question as "se'ir ha-chatat" ("the sin-offering"). Shadal follows the position of Ibn Ezra (9:1), that the eight-day milu'im procedure began rather than culminated on Rosh Chodesh Nissan, and thus the eighth day was the eighth of Nissan, rather than Rosh Chodesh Nissan. There was thus no Rosh Chodesh offering of which to speak. Furthermore, Shadal held that the tribal leaders began offering their gifts only after the completion of the milu'im process, and thus Nachshon's sin-offering was not brought on this day, either. Hence, the only sin-offering brought on this day was the special milu'im sacrifice mentioned earlier in the parasha (9:3).
According to Shadal, then, Aharon and his surviving sons chose not to partake of this meat for an entirely different reason. As Moshe himself remarked in his initial criticism of Aharon's sons, the kohanim's consumption of the sin-offering was an indispensable means of earning atonement on behalf of the people. Aharon and his sons felt that the tragedy that had just occurred reflected a degree of culpability, that the family was perhaps not entirely worthy of their stature. They thus felt that it would amount to sheer arrogance to partake of the sacrificial meat, and to endeavor to earn atonement for the nation while they are in Shadal's words "rejected by the Almighty." They felt it hypocritical for them to serve as the people's representatives in their quest for expiation immediately following the death of Nadav and Avihu, which, in their eyes, demonstrated their unworthiness in God's eyes.
******
As discussed earlier this week, Parashat Shemini introduces the
prohibition that forbids a kohen from performing the avoda (ritual service in the
Rav Yaakov Kaminetzky, in his Emet Le-Yaakov, observes that the construction of this
phrase "bein
u-vein" differs from the corresponding form used
by Chazal.
When the Sages describe a distinction made between two entities, they
mention the word bein ("between") only once, as in the
berakha of havdala "bein kodesh le-chol
bein or
le-choshekh
" This is contrast
to the Biblical style, which adds an additional word bein "bein ha-kodesh u-vein ha-chol."
Other examples of the Biblical style can be found in the creation
narrative: "bein ha-or u-vein
ha-choshekh" (Bereishit 1:5);
"bein ha-mayim
u-vein
ha-mayim" (Bereishit 1:7).
Interestingly enough, however, as Rav Yaakov cites, in one context the
Shulchan Arukh appears to codify the Biblical style even
with regard to havdala.
Generally, the havdala text makes mention of four distinctions
drawn by the Almighty between the sacred and mundane, light and dark,
Rav Yaakov suggested that the Shulchan Arukh and Rema perhaps debated the question of whether the text of berakhot should follow the Biblical text, or the language used by the Sages. The standard text of havdala, which, as mentioned, makes reference to four "distinctions," was composed by the Sages themselves and has no Biblical source. But in the case described above, one mentions only the distinction between "sacred" and "mundane," which originates from this verse in Parashat Shemini le-havdil bein ha-kodesh u-vein ha-chol. Accordingly, the Shulchan Arukh maintained that one should recite the text used in the Torah "bein ha-kodesh u-vein ha-chol." The Rema, however, held that the text should follow the form used in Rabbinic literature "bein kodesh le-chol."
Rav Yaakov notes that there may likely be a precedent for such a debate
between the Shulchan Arukh and the Rema. In Yoreh Dei'a (328:1), the
Shulchan Arukh rules that when one separates chala (the portion of
dough one must set aside while baking), he recites the berakha "
ve-tzivanu le-hafrish teruma."
This reference to chala as teruma originates from the Torah's usage of the
term teruma in the context of chala (Bamidbar 15:19). The Rema, however, cites the view of the
Tur that one should recite "
ve-tzivanu le-hafrish chala," employing the term chala which is used in Rabbinic literature. Conceivably, then, the Shulchan Arukh and Rema were divided on this issue, of
whether the text of berakhot should follow the Biblical text or Rabbinic
jargon, a debate that may have affected their views concerning the proper text
in the ha-mavdil declaration, as discussed
above.
******
We read in Parashat Shemini of the tragic death of Aharon's two sons,
Nadav and Avihu, on the day of the Mishkan's consecration. After the tragedy Moshe tells his
grieving brother, "This is what the Lord said: 'I shall be sanctified through
those who are sacred to Me, and I shall be honored by the entire nation!'"
(10:3). Aharon accepted his
brother's consolation, as the Torah writes, "va-yidom Aharon" "Aharon was
silent."
The Ramban comments that the term va-yidom implies that Aharon had previously been
crying aloud in response to the devastating tragedy, and upon hearing Moshe's
words he was silent. Apparently,
the Ramban held that the word va-yidom, as opposed to other terms for "silence"
such as va-yishtok, denotes specifically the discontinuation
of speech, as opposed to maintaining a condition of silence. This theory is developed more clearly
and elaborately in the commentary of the Malbim.
Rav Yaakov Mecklenberg, in his Ha-ketav Ve-ha'kabbala, disputes the Ramban's view, arguing that to the contrary, va-yidom means "remained silent" and va-yishtok means "discontinued making sound." He cites as proof a verse from Sefer Tehillim (107:30) that describes the calming of turbulent ocean waters with the term yishtoku. In Sefer Yona, too, the end of a storm is referred to with the word yishtok (1:11,12). Rav Mecklenberg thus contends that va-yidom means a firm, resolute decision to remain silent. In his view, Aharon had not been weeping, but when he heard Moshe's words he found a degree of solace and made the decision not to weep over the tragic loss of his sons.
Rav Yaakov Kopel Schwartz, in his work Yekev Efrayim, responds to Rav Mecklenberg's challenge, in defense of the Ramban, noting the famous verse in Sefer Yehoshua that tells of Yehoshua's plea that the sun stay in place: "Shemesh be-Givon dom" ("May the sun stop in Givon!" Yehoshua 10:12). The subsequent verse reads, "Va-yidom ha-shemesh" "The sun stopped" employing the very same term (va-yidom) used to describe Aharon's reaction to his brother's words of consolation. Quite clearly, this term indeed is used to describe the discontinuation of an act in progress, and not the extended state of silence.
Seemingly, then, there is no substantive difference between va-yidom and va-yishtok, as both refer to the discontinuation of a process. Rav Mecklenberg demonstrated that va-yishtok appears in reference to the silencing of stormy seas, and Rav Schwartz noted the use of va-yidom in the context of the sun's pause in its course across the sky. It thus appears that both terms refer to similar phenomena.
If we wish to distinguish between the terms, we might suggest that va-yishtok describes the cessation of an unusual process, whereas va-yidom is used in reference to the discontinuation of a normal, natural course of action. Thus, in the context of raging ocean waters, which takes place on only rare occasions, the verses in Tehillim and Yona employ the term va-yishtok. The halting of the sun's progression, by contrast, obviously signified a break from its natural course of action, and is thus described with the word va-yidom. We should also note that the aforementioned chapter of Tehillim (verse 29) speaks of God turning a storm into demama ("calm"). A storm is, by definition, turbulent, and thus its sudden transformation into stillness marks the discontinuation of its natural progression, and is therefore spoken of with the word demama.
In the case of Aharon's silence, then, the Torah employs the term va-yidom because he discontinued his natural course. A father's weeping upon the sudden death of his children is akin to the sudden halt of the sun's movement in the sky; it requires an extraordinary suspension of a natural process. The Torah thus describes Aharon's reaction with the term va-yidom, the same term used in reference to the sun's pause in Yehoshua's time.
******
The opening section of Parashat Shemini describes the events that took place on the eighth and final day of the Mishkan's consecration, culminating with the descent of a heavenly fire that consumed the offerings on the altar. Moshe assembled the nation in area near the entrance to the Mishkan and informed them of the rituals that were required that day. He declared, "This is the procedure that the Lord commanded that you do, that the glory of the Lord shall appear to you" (9:6).
While the straightforward reading of the verse suggests that Moshe refers here to the special sacrifices offered on the nation's behalf, Torat Kohanim explains differently: "Moshe said to Israel: You shall eliminate that evil inclination from your hearts, and you shall all be united in fear [of God] and in the intention to serve before the Almighty." Targum Yonatan ben Uziel similarly explains this verse to mean, "This is the thing that you shall do: eliminate the evil inclination from your heart, and the glory of the divine presence will immediately be revealed to you."
To explain this Midrashic reading of the verse, Rav Moshe Rosen, in his
Ohel Moshe, suggests that this reading refers to the application of this
verse to the post-Temple period.
According to the plain reading, Moshe here declares that the people can
bring the divine presence into their midst, and behold "the glory of the Lord,"
by meticulously observing the commands regarding the sacrificial procedures in
the Mikdash. Chazal
here unearth for us the relevance of this declaration to the time when Am
Yisrael find themselves without a Beit Ha-mikdash and are thus left
wondering how they can bring the Almighty into their midst. The answer is that they must "eliminate
that evil inclination from your hearts."
If we cannot bring sacrificial offerings upon the altar, we can at very
least sacrifice our own will and desires in deference to the divine will. The "sacrifice" that we offer to God in
the absence of a
According to this reading of the Torat Kohanim's comment, it closely resembles the interpretation given by the Midrash Tanchuma (Acharei Mot, 10) to this verse:
The
Almighty foresaw that the
The Midrash Tanchuma, too, explains this verse as alluding to
the means whereby we can achieve the goals of the sacrificial offerings even
after the destruction of the Mikdash.
Despite the discontinuation of the