The Israel Koschitzky
Virtual Beit MidrashThe Israel Koschitzky
Virtual Beit Midrash
Surf A Little Torah
Yeshivat
Har Etzion
PARASHAT TAZRIA
By Rav David Silverberg
Parashat Tazria deals mainly with the topic of tzara'at, the
various forms of discoloration that surface on people or garments and render
them tamei (ritually impure).
The Gemara (Arakhin 16b) famously teaches that these phenomena generally
occur as punishment for certain forms of wrongdoing, particularly for lashon ha-ra – negative speech about other people. On this basis, the Gemara explains the
halakha requiring a person stricken with bodily
tzara'at to live in isolation outside his city until
the discoloration is cured: "He separated between husband and wife and between a
man and his fellow; the Torah therefore said (13:46), 'He shall dwell in
isolation…'"
A person who speaks lashon
ha-ra draws the listener's
attention to the negative qualities of the subject. Even if he inserts the lashon ha-ra amidst a complimentary evaluation ("He's a
nice person who does great things, but…"), the mention of the person's less
admirable characteristics immediately arouses interest and a critical or
resentful reaction on the part of the listener towards the person in
question. Thus, as the Gemara
notes, it has the effect of "separating between husband and wife and between man
and his fellow." A close
relationship, such as between spouses or friends, requires the parties to
respect each other's virtues while forgivingly accepting their
shortcomings. When lashon ha-ra is spoken to one member of a relationship
about the other, the foundation of the relationship is threatened. The derogatory report shines the
spotlight onto specifically the aspects of the individual's character that his
fellow must be willing to dismiss as a brief footnote, a peripheral issue that
assumes little significance in his overall admirable assessment of his beloved
friend. The gossiper threatens to
break relationships because he highlights the information that ought to be
consigned to the margins, and brings to the fore unfortunate events that should
be forgotten and forgiven.
"The Torah therefore said, 'He shall dwell in isolation…'" A person who finds it necessary to focus
his attention – and draw other people's attention – onto specifically the less
admirable qualities of his peers is condemned to live in solitude. Besides issuing a punishment against the
talebearer, the Torah perhaps also indicates that almost by definition, a
habitual gossiper will find himself alone, in a state of "isolation" of one sort
or another. Unless he is able to
overlook the flaws and foibles of the people around him, he will be unable to
establish stable and fulfilling friendships. Emphasizing the faults of others thus
results in a life "outside the camp," without the support and companionship of
loving friends and relatives.
*******
The first section of Parashat Tazria discusses the laws relevant to a
yoledet, a woman who had given birth, particularly
as they affect her status with regard to entering the area of the
Mishkan. The Torah
assigns a period after childbirth within which a mother may not enter the
Mishkan, and then requires that upon the completion of this period she
brings a sacrifice "to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to the
kohen." Torat
Kohanim, implicitly questioning the Torah's verbosity of this phrase,
explains that it alludes to a halakha requiring "she-hi mitapelet bahem" – literally, "that she deals with them
[the animals]."
We find among the commentaries two approaches taken in explaining this
remark. The Rash Mi-Shantz explains
that the woman bears the obligation to cover the costs for bringing the animals
to the
The Malbim
notes that Torat Kohanim already made this comment regarding a person who
brings a voluntary ola offering (Vayikra 1:3). There, too, Torat Kohanim
establishes a requirement for the individual to "deal" with the animal, which
the Malbim understands to mean that he must personally accompany the animal to
the
We might suggest extracting a meaningful lesson from the Malbim's discussion of the Torat Kohanim's comment. Namely, a person's inability to proceed "into the Mikdash," to reach the highest desired levels of achievement in Torah and mitzvot, should not deter him from reaching as close to those levels as he can. Just as a yoledet's status of impurity bars her from entering the Temple courtyard until after the offering of her sacrifice, similarly, we all possess "impurities" of one kind or another that prevent us from achieving greatness. As the Malbim remarked, these obstacles might lead one to question the value in journeying to the Mikdash altogether, and to instead leave this pilgrimage to other, "purer" individuals. This halakha should perhaps remind us to strive to achieve to very best of our ability, and not feel discouraged or disheartened if we are unable to proceed all the way into the "Mikdash."
*******
Yesterday, we discussed a comment of Torat Kohanim relevant to the
sacrifice that a yoledet – a woman after childbirth – must bring as part
of her process of purification from her state of tum'a.
Torat Kohanim remarked "she-hi mitapelet bahem," which literally means that the yoledet must "deal" with the animals she brings as
a sacrifice. The Rash Mi-Shantz, in
his commentary to Torat
Kohanim, explains this passage as
requiring simply that the woman cover the cost of transporting the sacrificial
animals to
We also noted that Torat Kohanim makes this same comment earlier, in the context of a person bringing a voluntary sacrifice (Vayikra 1:3), indicating that this halakha is not unique to the case of a yoledet. Whenever a person brings a sacrifice, it appears, he must "deal with" the animal, which, as we saw, means either covering the cost of its transportation or personally bringing it to the Mikdash.
The question naturally arises as to why the Torah (as explained by
Torat Kohanim) would make reference to this halakha in the specific context of yoledet once it has been established with regard to
other sacrifices. If the Torah
already introduced a general rule that applies to all people who bring a
sacrifice, why does it make particular mention of this rule here, regarding the
yoledet?
The Malbim, as we saw yesterday, noted that since a yoledet remains in a state of tum'a until after the offering of her sacrifice,
she may not enter the
Of course, this explanation presumes the view that Torat Kohanim
requires one to personally bring the sacrifice to the
It should be noted that there may exist a third view, one which
distinguishes between in this regard between different kinds of sacrifices. Discussing the case of a voluntary
offering, the Ra'avad, in his commentary to Torat Kohanim, follows the
view of the Rash Mi-Shantz that Torat Kohanim refers to the obligation to
cover the transportation costs. The
Ra'avad then adds that the individual cannot transfer this responsibility to the
kohanim "because this is a voluntary [offering], and is not an obligation
upon him; he is thus obligated to bring it." According to the Ra'avad, it is the
voluntary nature of the sacrifice that requires the individual to cover the cost
of the animal's transportation.
Since he volunteered to bring the offering, he must accept full
responsibility for this undertaking.
The clear implication of the Ra'avad's comment is that in cases of an
obligatory offering, one can indeed cast the responsibility upon the
kohanim or the
If so, then we must ask why Torat Kohanim mentions this halakha even in the context of a yoledet, who is obligated to bring an offering to
the
*******
The first section of Parashat Tazria discusses the laws of tum'at yoledet, the status of tum'a (ritual impurity) that applies to a woman
after childbirth, and the process of tahara (purification) from this status, which
requires the offering of a sacrifice.
The standard sacrifice required of a yoledet is a sheep and a bird (a pigeon or
turtledove – 12:6), but the Torah makes a special dispensation for a woman who
cannot afford a sheep: "If she cannot afford enough for a sheep, then she shall
take two pigeons or two turtledoves…" (12:7). In such a case, the woman is
allowed to bring the less costly offering of two birds, rather than a sheep and
a bird.
Torat Kohanim comments that this halakha applies even to a woman who can afford to purchase a sheep, but cannot afford tzorekhin – literally "the needs." Even in such a case, the woman is allowed to bring the less expensive sacrifice, despite the fact that she can afford a sheep, since she is unable to afford "tzorekhin." Torat Kohanim makes a similar comment earlier in Sefer Vayikra, with respect to the parallel halakha of the korban oleh ve-yoreid sacrifice. This sacrifice, which one must bring on the occasion of certain transgressions (as detailed in Vayikra 5:1-4), is brought in accordance with his financial status. There, too, the Torah writes that if somebody cannot afford a sheep he may bring instead two birds as his offering (5:7), and the Torat Kohanim comments that this applies even if the individual can afford a sheep but cannot afford tzerakhav – "his [or 'its'] needs."
We find two approaches taken in explaining this term. Some writers explain that Torat Kohanim refers here to the "needs" of the person, meaning, to a situation where the individual in question can afford to purchase a sheep, but only if he foregoes on some of his regular expenses. Chazal here establish that we do not demand that the sinner – or the woman after childbirth – skimp on his basic necessities in order to allocate money for the purchase of an expensive offering. Rather, he may continue buying and consuming as he normally does, and bring the less costly sacrifice. Others, however, explain differently, claming that Torat Kohanim refers to the "needs" of the animal. Rabbenu Hillel, for example, maintains that Chazal speak here of a case where the individual can afford a sheep but not the secondary expenses, such as transportation and food for the animal. In such a case, Chazal establish that the person can bring the less expensive offering, despite his being able to afford a sheep.
Interestingly enough, the Or Ha-chayim, in his commentary to Parashat Vayikra (5:7), maintains that Torat Kohanim refers to different cases in the two different contexts. In reference to the korban oleh ve-yoreid, he follows the first interpretation, whereby Chazal speak of a person who could afford a sheep only by reallocating funds needed for his basic necessities. With regard to the yoledet (woman after childbirth), however, the Or Ha-chayim claims that Torat Kohanim refers to the "needs" of the sacrifice, namely, the accompanying nesakhim (wine libation). He notes that unlike in the case of a korban oleh ve-yoreid, the sacrifice of a yoledet entails both a chatat (sin-offering) as well as an ola (burnt-offering). Under normal circumstances, a yoledet brings a sheep as an ola and a bird as a chatat, while if the woman cannot afford a sheep, she brings a bird as a chatat and another as an ola. As we know from later in the Torah (Bamidbar 15:1-16), whenever one offers a sheep (or bull) as an ola offering he must bring nesakhim along with the animal. Hence, in the standard case of a yoledet, where she brings a sheep and a bird, she must include nesakhim with her offering, whereas an underprivileged yoledet, who brings two birds, does not include nesakhim, since nesakhim are not required when bringing a bird offering. Accordingly, the Or Ha-chayim writes, when Torat Kohanim speaks of the "needs" of the offering in the context of a yoledet, it refers to the accompanying nesakhim. That is, Chazal here address a case of a woman who can afford a sheep but cannot afford the accompanying wine libation, and Halakha allows this woman to bring the less expensive offering of two birds. Even though she can afford to bring a sheep, her inability to purchase the accompanying nesakhim allows her to bring the expensive offering.
This also appears to have been the position taken by the Chafetz Chayim, in his commentary to Torat Kohanim. In the context of korban oleh ve-yoreid, he explains the term "tzorekhav" as referring to the sinner's personal necessities, whereas with regard to the yoledet he explains that Torat Kohanim refers to the wine libations that accompany the sheep ola sacrifice.
*******
Parashat Tazria discusses many of the laws concerning nega'im,
discolorations that would surface on a person's body or possessions that, in
some instances, rendered the individual, his garment or his home tamei
(ritually impure). As the Torah
emphasizes throughout this discussion, the determination of tum'a
(impurity) was made only by a kohen, who would inspect the discoloration
and, based on the laws of this area of Halakha, would declare the person
or object as either tamei or tahor (pure).
Commenting on the words ve-ra'ahu ha-kohein ("The kohen shall look at it" – 13:5), Torat Kohanim writes, "Kulo ke-achat" – "All of it
simultaneously." Meaning, if the
discoloration covers an area that cannot be seen all at once, it does not render
the individual tamei.
Torat Kohanim establishes on this basis that a discoloration on
one of the body's rashei eivarim ("primary limbs"), such as fingers and
toes, does not cause a state of tum'a, since the discoloration cannot be seen all
at once. A discoloration that
extends around a finger, for example, does not render the person tamei because the kohen can only
see one side of the discoloration at a time. The Tosefta (Negaim 2:5) qualifies this
halakha, noting that even on
these limbs a discoloration results in tum'a if "mekoman yosheiv ke-geris."
The Vilna Gaon (in his commentary to the Tosefta) explains this to mean
that a spot on these limbs can generate tum'a if the size of a geris (a certain type of bean, roughly the size
of an American penny) is visible at one moment. People with fleshy hands, for example,
might have thick enough fingers for a geris-sized mark to appear on one side of the
finger. In such a case, the
individual can be declared tamei even if the discoloration extends around
the finger. Since there is a
geris-worth of discoloration that the kohen can see in a single instant, the individual
is a candidate for tum'at
tzara'at despite the fact that the
entire mark cannot be inspected at the same time.
Some writers raised the question as to the relationship between this halakha and a comment found earlier in Torat Kohanim, regarding the verse, "The kohen shall look at the infection in the skin of the flesh" (13:3). Torat Kohanim, somewhat ambiguously, interprets this to mean that the kohen "shall see all the flesh with it, all at once." The Ra'avad explains this comment as entirely unrelated to the previous discussion. In his view, it means that the discoloration must be surrounded on all sides by skin, and not be situated just next to the hairline or beard. The process of determining tzara'at includes a waiting period (hesger) after which the kohen inspects the infection to see if it expanded. As such, tzara'at is possible only if the initial discoloration does not appear immediately next to the hairline, in order to ensure the possibility of identifying its expansion.
Rabbenu
Hillel, however, explains this comment differently, seemingly along the lines of
the halakha discussed above.
In his view, this passage, too, establishes the condition that the entire
infection is visible at the same time, to the exclusion of marks that extend to
two sides of limbs such as fingers and toes. This interpretation of course gives rise
to the question as to why Torat Kohanim would present this halakha twice, in the context of two different
verses.
An answer to this question appears in the collection of notes published anonymously as an appendix to Rav Shechna Koliditzky's edition of Rabbenu Hillel's commentary (Jerusalem, 1961), notes that have been since identified as the work of Rav Yitzchak Hutner. (See Rav Menachem Kasher's introduction to volume 25 of Torah Sheleima, note 3.) Rav Hutner suggested that even according to Rabbenu Hillel, these two passages in Torat Kohanim address two distinct issues. From the verse, "The kohen shall look at the infection in the skin of the flesh," Torat Kohanim infers a halakha requiring that at least part of the infection be simultaneously visible with healthy skin. In order for a discoloration to render a person tamei, the kohen must be able to view part of the infection together with non-discolored skin. This condition will affect the case of a person with a geris-sized discoloration on one side of a finger or toe, which, as we saw in the Tosefta, qualifies as a tzara'at infection since a geris-worth of discoloration is visible at one time. However, if the infection covers the entire side of the finger, and does not extend to the other side, it cannot qualify as a tzara'at infection, since it cannot be seen simultaneously with healthy, normal-colored skin. Thus, these two passages in Torat Kohanim establish two different conditions for a discoloration on one of the roshei eivarim to qualify as a tzara'at infection: at least a geris-worth is visible at once, and some healthy skin is visible together with at least some part of the infection.
*******
The final section of Parashat Tazria addresses the topic of tzara'at ha-beged, discolorations that appear on woolen or linen garments rendering them tamei (impure). If such a discoloration is determined to indeed constitute a tzara'at "infection" in the garment, the garment must be burned.
The Tosefta (Nega'im 7:14) writes that a garment determined to be
afflicted with tzara'at must be brought outside the city, rather than be
burned within the city limits.
Furthermore, the Tosefta adds, with regard to this halakha the manifestation of tzara'at in garments is more severe than its
manifestation on human skin. A
person suffering from a tzara'at infection on his skin is banned only from
walled cities; he may continue residing in open cities. Infected garments, by contrast, must be
brought outside all cities, even those without a surrounding wall. The Rambam codifies this halakha in Hilkhot Tum'at Tzara'at (13:15):
"Infected garments are sent outside the city – whether it was surrounded by a
wall or not surrounded by a wall; in this respect garments [with tzara'at] are treated more stringently than people
[with tzara'at]."
The Minchat
Chinukh (172) notes that according
to this view, we must conclude that the laws of tzara'at ha-beged apply even outside the
The Tosefot Yom
Tov, in his commentary to Masekhet
Keilim (1:7), appears to have taken a different view. According to the Tosefot Yom Tov, non-walled cities are different from other
areas in Eretz Yisrael in that stones from homes afflicted with
tzara'at must be sent away from cities. He thus indeed questions why the Mishna
makes no mention of a distinction between non-walled cities and the rest of
Eretz Yisrael in its list of the different gradations of
kedusha.
The Tosefot Yom
Tov answers that the Mishnayot list only the statuses that result in the
barred entry of certain groups of people – as opposed to inanimate objects –
into the given region. The fact
that stones from an infected home are sent away from cities thus did not warrant
inclusion in the hierarchy presented by the Mishna. Clearly, the Tosefot Yom Tov acknowledged the special
status of cities over other regions in Eretz Yisrael, and he attributed
the omission of this status from the Mishnayot to a mere formality. This is thus in contrast to the view of
the Minchat Chinukh, who held that the laws of tzara'at as they pertain to non-walled cities apply
throughout the world, and therefore do not reflect any status of kedusha that is unique to cities in Eretz Yisrael as opposed to other areas in Eretz Yisrael.
*******
The Gemara in Masekhet Bava Metzia (86a) tells a famous story relevant to the laws of tzara'at, the topic that occupies most of Parashat Tazria. The story relates specifically to the halakha (established in the Mishna, Nega'im 4:11) that a skin discoloration qualifies as tzara'at only if the skin changed color prior to the discoloration of the hair situated on that spot on the skin. If the hair turned white before the skin, the individual is not considered afflicted with tzara'at, even if the discoloration meets all the other qualifications. The Sages in the Mishna (ibid.) debate the question of whether a person is considered tamei if he is unsure whether or not the skin turned white before the hair.
The Gemara records that this issue was debated as well in the metivta de-reki'a – the "heavenly academy." The students in the academy ruled that such an individual is indeed considered tamei, whereas the Almighty Himself, as it were, held that a person retains his presumed status of tahara unless he knows for sure that the skin had changed color first. The academy summoned the expertise of Rabba Bar Nachmani, a scholar was at the time was fleeing from the Roman authorities. As he breathed his final breath of life, Rabba uttered the word "tahor," siding with God's decision that a person in such a case is deemed ritually pure.
Interestingly enough, however, the Rambam, in Hilkhot Tum'at Tzara'at (2:9), disregards this story and sides with the majority view recorded in the Mishna, which maintains that a person in such a case is in fact tamei. Apparently, the Rambam felt that the discussion in the "heavenly academy" has no bearing on the halakhic conclusions relevant for life on earth. We are bound by the standard principles of halakhic decision-making, which mandate following the majority view among the scholars, and the corresponding process of halakhic deliberation in the "heavenly academy," however one chooses to explain this concept, has no practical relevance to the final halakha on earth.
Rav Yehuda Leib Ginsburg, in his Yalkut Yehuda, adds that symbolically underlying this tension between the "heavenly" and "earthly" decisions on this issue there might perhaps be a fundamental distinction between these two perspectives. As discussed, the case in question involves a person who cannot ascertain whether the skin first changed color, in which case he is deemed tamei, or if the hair first changed, in which case he retains his status of purity. This halakha might allude to the fact that when a person feels uncertain about his status, if he cannot definitively determine whether or not he has acted wrongly, he is advised to accept the less favorable judgment. Just as Halakha in the case of tzara'at requires the individual to consider himself tamei, despite his uncertainty on the issue, so should we be exacting and uncompromising in our self-evaluation, and take note of even the questionable and marginal flaws that we identify. God, however, of course knows the truth of a person's thoughts and conduct, and can judge based upon this absolute truth. So while the Almighty can render a person in such a case tahor, free of guilt, we, for our part, must judge ourselves with rigorous scrutiny and self-criticism such that even questionable "tum'a" is recognized and thoroughly addressed.