S.A.L.T. PARASHAT METZORA

By Rav David Silverberg

Motzaei Shabbat

            Parashat Metzora begins by outlining the procedure for the purification of a metzora after his tzara’at infection has been cured.  The first stage in this process is a visit by a kohen who confirms that the infection has disappeared: “The kohen shall go outside the camp [where the metzora has been residing], and the kohen sees that, indeed, the tzara’at infection has been cured…” (14:3).

Commenting on this verse, Torat Kohanim notes that it might appear, at first glance, that the kohen who performs the purification ritual must have previously been inside the camp.  After all, if the Torah requires that “the kohen shall go outside the camp,” the clear implication is that the kohen had been inside the camp before approaching the metzora.  In truth, however, this is not correct.  Torat Kohanim writes that when the Torah speaks of the kohen leaving outside the camp to visit the metzora, it means that the kohen must be in a state of eligibility to live inside the camp.  Meaning, the kohen must not be himself a metzora, who is required to live outside the camp.  The phrase “the kohen shall go outside the camp” implies that the kohen must be in a position in which he is permitted inside the camp.  It does not mean that he must have been inside the camp in order to perform the purification rituals of a metzora.

Symbolically, this halakha perhaps offers instruction concerning suitability for the role of “purification,” how we determine who is qualified to “purify” those suffering from spiritual “infections.”  At first glance, one might assume that the only ones qualified for this task are those who have always remained “inside the camp,” who make their permanent residence in the pure environs of Torah and service of God, without venturing outside.  Only they, one might think, are qualified to treat the ailing souls of the nation and bring “purification” to those in a state of “impurity.”  Halakha instructs, however, that this is no so, that even a kohen who – in Torat Kohanim’s words – has been “in the seas, the rivers or the deserts” is qualified to purify a metzora.  Even those whose occupations bring them to remote and distant realms “outside the camp” are capable of bringing “purification” and assisting those “outside the camp” who wish to find their way back in.

However, this comes with one important condition: “A kohen who is able to enter inside the camp can purify a metzora, but a metzora cannot purify a metzora.”  The “purifier” must be a person who – even if he has ventured or relocated outside the pure environs of the “camp” – is still “eligible” to reenter, who still finds his place in the beit midrash, who is still rooted in the sacred domain of pure avodat Hashem.  Experiencing the “seas, rivers and deserts” does not qualify a person from teaching, instructing, guiding and leading, but only on the condition that he can still “enter the camp,” that he is has not lost his connection to the inner sanctum, that his mind and heart are still very closely bound to the realm of kedusha.  As long as this connection exists, he is capable of “curing” the “metzora,” of serving as a spiritual guide to help bring his “impure” brethren back “inside the camp.”

Sunday

            The Midrash (Vayikra Rabba 16) notes that the word “torat” appears five times in the section in Sefer Vayikra dealing with tzara’at (13:59, 14:2, 14:32, 14:54, 14:57).  This number, the Midrash suggests, alludes to the five books of the Chumash, and the word “Torah” is used five times in this section to indicate that one who engages in lashon ha-ra – the transgression with which lashon ha-ra is commonly associated – in effect transgresses all five books of the Torah.

            Rav Yehuda Leib Ginsburg, in his Yalkut Yehuda, offers the following explanation of the Midrash’s comment:

The Almighty does not accept the mitzvot that a person performs unless he conducts himself in a humane fashion.  But somebody who is a speaker of lashon ha-ra – the Almighty is not interested in him or his mitzvot, and He considers his good deeds worthless.

For a person’s mitzvot to be valuable, he must first achieve a basic, elementary standard of ethical and decent conduct.  If one does not conduct himself with common decency, then his mitzvot are “worthless,” and God has no interest in them.  One cannot achieve spiritual greatness and establish a close relationship with the Almighty as long as he is mired in the childish pettiness, competition and one-upmanship that normally lead to gossip and negative speech about other people.    Our pursuit of religious excellence cannot begin before we first achieve religious adequacy, which we accomplish by living as basically moral and decent people.  A habitual gossiper has failed to achieve the elementary standard of conduct that is required before one can begin his pursuit of loftier goals, and therefore the Almighty “considers his good deeds worthless,” and he is thus considered as having failed to observe any of the mitzvot in the Torah.

Monday

            The Torah in Parashat Metzora outlines the procedure of the metzora’s purification, which begins with the metzora appearing before a kohen – “ve-huva el ha-kohen” (“he shall be brought to the kohen” – 14:2).  In the very next words, however, the Torah instructs that the officiating kohen must go to see the metzora – “The kohen shall go outside the camp and he sees that, indeed, the tzara’at infection has been cured…”  Several commentators noted these seemingly contradictory verses, the first instructing the metzora to go to the kohen, with the second commanding the kohen to go to the metzora.

            Seforno explains, “‘He shall be brought to the kohen’ – to a place outside the camp that is near, so the kohen can go see him with respect and without too much trouble.”  (See also Chizkuni and Rabbenu Yosef Bekhor Shor.)  According to Seforno, the kohen and the metzora go to meet each other just outside the camp.  The metzora is not permitted inside the camp until the completion of his purification process, and so he cannot go to the kohen inside the camp, but this does not mean that he can stay put and expect the kohen to go to his temporary residence outside the camp.  The metzora owes it to the kohen to minimize his inconvenience and show him respect by meeting him near the border of the camp.

            This arrangement is perhaps symbolic of the bilateral effort that is required in the process of “purification” in the broader sense of the term.  Certainly, the “kohen” – the teachers, rabbis, and other religious leaders – cannot sit back comfortably and wait for the people to come to them for guidance and instruction.  They must “go outside the camp,” make a proactive effort to bring the Torah to the people and “purify” the ills of their constituents.  This does not mean, however, that the people can sit back and wait for the “kohen” to come to them, without any effort or initiative on their part.  They cannot demand or expect that the “kohen” cure their “infections” without doing their share, without investing time and energy of their own.

There is a limit to how much we can expect the religious leaders to work and initiate to solve the nation’s spiritual problems.  We, like the “metzora,” must exhibit a willingness to take part in this process of curing the “tzara’at,” of addressing the many troubling issues that plague Am Yisrael.  The teacher must make an effort to educate and inspire the student, but the success of this effort depends also on the student’s receptiveness and willingness to participate in the process.  Am Yisrael’s “purification” requires the cooperation of both the leadership and the masses, their willingness to work together to eliminate our nation’s “infections” and bring ourselves back “inside the camp.”

Tuesday

            The haftara for Parashat Metzora, taken from Sefer Melakhim II (chapter 7), tells the story of the siege mounted by the nation of Aram against the city of Shomron, capital of the Northern Kingdom of Israel.  The siege resulted in deadly starvation, to the point where mothers were killing their own children to eat their flesh (6:28-29).  The Israelite king (identified by Chazal as Yehoram, the son of Achav – Ta’anit 14b) blamed the prophet Elisha for the catastrophic conditions, and when he sent his guards to arrest Elisha, the prophet announced that already the next day there would be a surplus of food in Shomron.

            This prophecy was fulfilled through an astonishing discovery made by four metzora’im – people stricken with tzara’at who resided outside the city walls.  Facing starvation and thus figuring they had nothing to lose by surrendering to the enemy forces, the four ventured into the Aramean camp, only to find that it had been abandoned, with all the soldiers’ provisions intact.  The text informs us that God had created the sound of horses and chariots to mislead the Aramean soldiers into thinking that the Israelites had summoned foreign militias to help lift the siege.  The entire force fled, leaving behind their provisions.  The four metzora’im ate, drank, and began collecting riches, until it occurred to them that they were being selfish: “What we are doing is not proper.  This is a day of tidings, and if we remain silent and wait until the morning light, we will be guilty of sin” (7:9).  The men thus decided to inform the city of what they found, and the lives of the city’s residents were spared.

            The metzora’im’s recognition of their duty to inform the city’s residents of their discovery is perhaps remarkable in light of Chazal’s identification of these four men as Geichazi and his three sons (Sanhedrin 107b).  Geichazi was a close disciple of the prophet, Elisha, and he contracted tzara’at after the incident of Na’aman, the chief commander of Aram.  As we read several chapters earlier (5), Elisha was called upon to cure Na’aman’s tzara’at infection, after which the general offered to grant the prophet a gift.  Elisha politely declined, despite Na’aman’s persistent offers.  After Na’aman left, Geichazi went to Na’aman and falsely claimed that Elisha changed his mind, and decided to accept the gift.  When Geichazi returned, Elisha cursed him that the tzara’at disease which Na’aman had suffered should befall him and his offspring.  According to the Gemara, Geichazi and his three sons, who were stricken with tzara’at, were the four metzora’im outside the city of Shomron who discovered the riches of the Aramean army.

            Although Geichazi was, by nature, a greedy and selfish man, he and his sons recognized while amassing the spoils of Aram that this wealth must be shared with the rest of the people.  He was prepared to lie and betray his revered mentor in order to avail himself of the Aramean general’s wealth, but not to keep for himself and his children the spoils of the Aramean soldiers.  Rav Yehuda Leib Ginsburg, in his Musar Ha-nevi’im, notes that this episode perhaps highlights the particular gravity afforded to crimes committed against Am Yisrael as a nation.  Even a greedy, selfish swindler like Geichazi limited his crooked schemes to individuals, such as Na’aman.  He was prepared to cheat individuals out of their wealth, but would not go so far as to indulge at the expense of the kelal, of Am Yisrael as a community.  Even when he was given the opportunity to amass great wealth for himself and his children, he abstained, knowing that this would be a crime against his people.  This story thus demonstrates the special importance of concern for the general welfare of Am Yisrael, to the point where this value was instilled even within those who had no compunctions about cheating individuals, who still showed respect and regard for the public welfare.

Wednesday

            Yesterday, we discussed the story told in Sefer Melakhim II (chapter 7) about the siege of the city Shomron, and the discovery made by four metzora’im who were residing outside the city.  Realizing that they would soon die of starvation, the four men decided to surrender to the enemy Aramean forces, who would perhaps feed them and allow them to live.  The metzora’im approached the enemy camp and found it abandoned, with all the soldiers’ food and other provisions intact.

            The Gemara in Masekhet Avoda Zara (27b) views this episode as establishing a halakhic precedent for cases where a difficult decision must be made regarding an ill patient.  The case under discussion is a gravely ill patient who would definitely die from his illness if he does not receive treatment.  However, the only available physician is a hostile pagan who would, in all likelihood, kill Jewish patients.  Noting the precedent of the four metzora’im outside Shomron, the Gemara rules that a patient may seek treatment from the pagan physician in such a case.  The four metzora’im, the Gemara notes, were in the identical situation.  By staying where they were, or going inside the besieged city, they would certainly die, whereas by venturing into the enemy camp, although they might be killed, there was also the possibility that they would be kept alive by the Arameans.  The metzora’im’s decision to go to the enemy camp demonstrates that a person who will anyway die may put himself into a situation of mortal danger that also offers the possibility of saving his life.  Even though that situation threatens to end his life sooner than inaction, he is entitled to put himself at risk in the hope of saving his life, since he would otherwise certainly die, albeit not immediately.

            Rav Yaakov Reischer (1670-1733), in his Shevut Yaakov (3:75), applies the Gemara’s ruling to the situation of a gravely ill patient whose only hopes of recovery lie in a dangerous medical procedure.  Based upon the Gemara’s ruling, the Shevut Yaakov writes that the patient may undergo a dangerous procedure that has the potential to restore his health, even if it also poses an immediate risk to his life.  Although he will be putting himself at risk of dying earlier than he would by avoiding the procedure, the possibility of the restoration of his health justifies this risk.

This ruling is approvingly cited and upheld by Rav Chaim Ozer Grodzynsky, in his work Achiezer (vol. 2, Y.D. 16).  Rav Chaim Ozer also cites a discussion in the work Mishnat Chakhamim surrounding the question of how likely the prospect of recovery must be to allow undergoing the risky procedure.  The Mishnat Chakhamim proposed that the procedure must offer at least the same chances of success as failure.  If the operation is more likely to result in the patient’s immediate death than in his recovery, then it may not be performed, even though the patient will otherwise definitely die from his illness.  Rav Chaim Ozer, however, disagrees, noting the Gemara’s formulation in presenting this halakha – “le-chayei sha’a lo chayshinan,” which literally means, “we pay no attention to ‘temporary life’.”  Meaning, in situations such as these, the brief period of life that the patient risks losing by undergoing dangerous treatment is of no halakhic consequence.  Therefore, the procedure is permitted even if its chances of success are minimal.

This is also the ruling of Rav Moshe Feinstein, in his Iggerot Moshe (Y.D. 2:58), who notes Rashi’s comments to the Gemara’s discussion.  Rashi explained the Gemara as referring to a case where the pagan physician would certainly kill a Jewish patient, and the Gemara nevertheless allows seeking his treatment given the small likelihood that he will treat the patient properly.  Transferring the Gemara’s ruling to the parallel case of a risky medical procedure, then, it would be permissible to undergo the procedure even if the chances of success are minimal, and far less than the chances of immediate death.  Rav Moshe also notes that in the case of the four metzora’im, the chances of their survival in the enemy camp were minimal, and yet they were allowed to go there given the small chance that this would enable them to survive.

By contrast, Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv reportedly ruled that a patient in this situation may not undergo a dangerous medical procedure if it offers only a slight chance of success (Moriya, 22:1-2).  He notes that the Ran, commenting on the Gemara’s discussion, explains that the Gemara addresses a situation where the pagan doctor might kill the patient, and not that this is the near certain outcome.  Rav Elyashiv goes so far as to say that since the Ran generally follows Rashi’s commentary, it stands to reason that he had a different text of Rashi’s commentary to this passage.  According to this understanding of the Gemara, it is only when there is a reasonable chance of success that a medical procedure would be allowed under these circumstances.

(Click link to see Rav Uriel Benner’s article on the subject.)

Thursday

            Yesterday, we noted a halakha established by the Gemara in Masekhet Avoda Zara (27b) on the basis of the story of the “arba’a metzora’im” which is read as the haftara for Parashat Metzora.  The story, related in Sefer Melakhim II (chapter 7), tells of four metzora’im who were outside the city of Shomron during a siege on the city.  Realizing that they would soon die of starvation, the four men decided to venture into the enemy camp, which offered at least a glimmer of hope of survival.  The Gemara deduced from this incident that if a patient will definitely die of his illness without treatment, he may seek treatment from the only available physician even if that physician is a hostile pagan who would likely kill him.  As in the case of the “arba’a metzora’im,” this patient faces certain death, and is therefore allowed to undergo risky treatment given the possibility that it could save his life.  We saw that several halakhic authorities, including Rav Chayim Ozer Grodzynsky and Rav Moshe Feinstein, applied this principle to allow a patient to undergo a dangerous medical procedure that could save his life, even though it could also end his life sooner than the illness would.

            In one of his essays on this topic (Iggerot Moshe – Y.D. 3:36), Rav Moshe Feinstein raises the question of how the Gemara could establish normative halakhic protocol on the basis of this incident of the “arba’a metzora’im.”  The Gemara in Masekhet Sanhedrin (107b) identifies these four men as Geichazi – a disciple of the prophet Elisha – and his three sons.  Earlier in Sefer Melakhim (chapter 5), we read of Geichazi’s greed and dishonesty, and the Mishna (Sanhedrin 90) lists him among the Biblical figures who have no share in the next world.  The question thus arises as to why the Gemara assumed that Geichazi, who was hardly a pious figure, followed halakhic guidelines in determining his course of action during the siege on Shomron, such that we could infer halakhic protocol from his decision.

            Rav Moshe answers by positing an exceptionally bold and novel reading of the Gemara’s discussion.  He claims that the Torah law in such cases depends upon the patient’s personal preference.  According to Rav Moshe, the Gemara here does not establish a halakhic obligation to undergo a dangerous procedure that could potentially save one’s life even if it poses the risk of immediate death.  Rather, it establishes that this is a legitimate option that is considered within the range of acceptable human preference.  The precedent of the four metzora’im demonstrates that it is normal for a person to risk the short period of life that he could live for the possibility of curing his illness and living for many more years.  It does not, however, establish a formal halakhic ruling.  As such, Rav Moshe rules, although one is generally required to seek proper medical attention when necessary, in such a case, a patient has the option whether or not to undergo the risky procedure.  As Geichazi is looked upon by tradition as a wicked character, his decision cannot serve as the source of a normative halakhic policy.  Rather, it demonstrates that the decision to undertake risky measures that could save one’s life is within the range of normal human preference.

     The Nishmat Avraham (Y.D. 155, in a footnote) cites Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach as resolving this question differently: “It would seem that since there is no indication that they acted improperly, and also that Geichazi’s name is not mentioned, and it is mentioned only that salvation came as a result of these metzora’im – we may, indeed, learn from them.”  Rav Shlomo Zalman points to several different factors that allowed Chazal to establish normative halakhic protocol from this incident, despite the fact that the individual involved was not necessarily committed to Halakha.  First, he notes that the text gives no indication that the metzora’im acted improperly.  Geichazi was, indeed, a sinful person, but the text does not seem to disapprove of his decision, and this implicit approval gives us license to draw halakhic conclusions from what he and his sons did.

     Secondly, Rav Shlomo Zalman noted that the text in this narrative does not identify the metzora’im.  Notwithstanding the Gemara’s identification of these men as Geichazi and his sons, as the text gives no indication of their identity, we should not take their identity into account when determining the practical implications of this episode.  The absence of their identity in the narrative dictates that this information should be ignored when we assess the story and the lessons that it seeks to convey.

     Finally, Rav Shlomo Zalman draws our attention to the fact that God brought salvation to Am Yisrael through these four men.  While this does not necessarily reflect their pious character, it suggests – in Rav Shlomo Zalman’s view – that in this episode they acted correctly.  Thus, even if in general we would not draw any conclusions from decisions made by a sinful character such as Geichazi, we have reason to assume that his conduct in this context was acceptable, thus allowing Chazal to infer normative halakhic procedures from his decisions.

(Click link to see Rav Uriel Benner’s article on the subject.)

Friday

            As we’ve discussed in our last several installments, the haftara for Parashat Metzora (taken from Sefer Melakhim II, chapter 7) tells of the four metzora’im who resided outside the city of Shomron during a siege on that city.  The siege had resulted in a deadly food shortage, and these metzora’im, realizing that they would soon starve to death, decided to go into the camp of the enemy troops, who might keep them alive.  As we saw, the Gemara in Masekhet Avoda Zara (27b) infers from this incident that a person suffering from a fatal illness may undergo treatment under a hostile physician who might likely kill him, if no other option is available.

            The Gemara cites this incident of the four metzora’im in a different context, as well.  In Masekhet Bava Kama (60b), the Gemara comments, “Ra’av ba-ir, pazeir raglekha” – “If there is famine in the city, then scatter about.”  The Gemara here urges people who find themselves in a situation of “ra’av” (“hunger”) to leave their current situation in order to secure adequate sustenance.  One of the Biblical sources cited as the basis for this exhortation is the decision of the four metzora’im to leave their position outside the walls of Shomron in order to seek food.  The other source cited by the Gemara is the precedent of Avraham Avinu, who left Canaan when a drought struck the region to temporarily settle in Egypt (Bereishit 12:10).  The Gemara explains that the example of the four metzora’im is necessary to instruct that one should “scatter about” in search of food even if this entails a degree of danger, as in the case of the metzora’im outside Shomron.

Many questions arise concerning this comment of the Gemara, several of which have been raised (in various forms) by the Acharonim (such as the Maharsha and the Penei Yehoshua).  Why does the Gemara view the situation of the four metzora’im as a precedent demonstrating the importance of escaping situations of economic hardship?  The metzora’im said explicitly that if they remain in their place they would certainly die (Melakhim II 7:4).  Is it not obvious that under such circumstances one should leave and pursue any possible means of finding food?  For that matter, why must the Gemara instruct us “Ra’av ba-ir, pazeir raglekha” at all?  Do we need the great Sages of the Talmud to teach us to leave a famine-ravaged city?

We addressed this second question in our S.A.L.T. series to Parashat Lekh-Lekha earlier this year.  The answer we suggested is that Chazal here warn against the common phenomenon of feeling “stuck” in adverse situations.  People who find themselves in difficult or unpleasant conditions often lazily resign themselves to those conditions, rather than taking the initiative to improve them.  We do not need the great Sages to tell us that we need to secure a livelihood, but we perhaps can use an occasional reminder to be flexible when problems arise, to be open to new and innovative solutions to the complex questions that we confront over the course of life.

On this basis, we can perhaps explain the particular significance of the precedent of the four metzora’im.  As the Gemara mentions, this source instructs that the message of “pazeir raglekha” applies even if this entails danger.  Just as the four metzora’im exposed themselves to danger in their quest for food, similarly, a person in a situation of “ra’av ba-ir” should be proactive in securing food even if this entails a degree of risk.  The Gemara perhaps refers here to the natural inhibition to change that often prevents people from leaving the “city,” from escaping trouble-ridden conditions.  The situation of the four metzora’im might be symbolic of people in an adverse position who justifiably fear leaving that position to a new, unfamiliar reality.  The Gemara draws our attention to the heroic decision of the four metzora’im to overcome their fears and take a bold measure to improve their plight, and we are urged to follow this example.  The comfort and security of familiar surroundings and experiences often inhibit us from making necessary changes to improve ourselves and our communities.  We are bidden to overcome this natural inhibition and be prepared to make significant changes when the situation demands them.  Rather than remain in a condition of “ra’av ba-ir,” we must “scatter about” in search of proper alternatives.