S.A.L.T. - PARASHOT BEHAR - BECHUKOTAI

By Rav David Silverberg

Motzaei

            Parashat Behar begins by presenting the laws of shemita and yovel (25:1-24), and then proceeds to presents a series of laws relevant to situations of people who fall upon financial hardship (25:25 until the end of the parasha).  In this second half of the parasha, the Torah discusses laws governing the “redemption” of property that a person was forced to sell due to financial straits, lending, and people who were forced to sell themselves as servants, either to a fellow Jew or to a gentile.

            The connection between the two basic units in this parasha – the laws of shemita and yovel, and the laws governing proper treatment of the poor – exists on several levels.  Firstly, and most obviously, the basic laws presented in the second unit are a natural outgrowth of the first, specifically the law of the jubilee.  The Torah instructs that with the onset of the yovel year, all purchased lands return to their original owners, and all indentured servants regain their freedom.  Thus, when a person sells his land, or when a person is sold as a servant, the price must be set in consideration of the number of years remaining until the yovel.  On one level, then, the laws of selling lands and servants are presented here because they flow directly from the institution of yovel which the Torah presents earlier in the parasha.

            Additionally, however, these two units share the common theme of recognizing God’s ownership over the earth and its inhabitants.  The agricultural restrictions that apply during shemita and yovel are intended (at least in part) to remind the farmer that he is not the true owner of his land.  Likewise, the return of sold properties and the freedom of servants on the jubilee remind the “owners” that they are not truly owners, that God is the master over Eretz Yisrael and all its inhabitants are His servants.  The second half of the parasha, which emphasizes the obligation to assist those who have been compelled to sell their lands or themselves, extends this theme even further.  Since God is ultimately the owner over the land and its resources, the wealthy are required to share their belongings with the poor.  The Almighty owns the land, and wants all Benei Yisrael to live upon it comfortably and securely.  Therefore, when people fall upon hard times, it is the responsibility of the rest of the nation to support them, assist them, and share their resources with them.

            There is yet a third point of connection between the two sections of Parashat Behar.  In a certain sense, the first section of Parashat Behar, which presents the laws of shemita and yovel, continues the Torah’s discussion in the previous parasha, Parashat Emor, of Shabbat and the holidays.  There in Parashat Emor, the Torah speaks of the special occasions that are observed each year, and here, in Parashat Behar, the Torah describes the special occasions that are observed every seven and fifty years.  Parashat Emor discusses the annual calendar cycle, and Parashat Behar discusses the septennial and jubilee cycles.

            The second half of Parashat Behar continues this topic by addressing a different, perhaps more sobering, “cycle,” namely, the cycle of wealth and poverty.  Chazal describe financial hardship as a “galgal ha-chozer ba-olam,” a wheel that constantly turns.  Just as the pages of the calendar turn from Rosh Hashanah, to Sukkot, then ahead to Pesach, and eventually back to Rosh Hashanah, and the years follow the halakhic cycle of shemita and yovel, similarly, wealth follows a “cycle.”  The “events” described in the second half of Parashat Behar do not have fixed times or intervals like the events of Parashat Emor and the first half of Parashat Behar, but they, too, follow a “cycle” of sorts.  It is not a fixed cycle, but it is a cycle nonetheless, a cycle of wealth followed by poverty followed by wealth.

            Thus, when viewed in the context of the laws of the mo’adim, shemita and yovel, the second half of Parashat Behar reminds us that wealth and poverty are also “occasions” that take place along a constant cycle, as people’s fortunes are always subject to change.

(Based on Rav Yehuda Brandes’ Torat Imekha, Parashat Behar)

Sunday

            The Torah in the beginning of Parashat Behar presents the laws of shemita, which apply to agricultural lands in Eretz Yisrael every seventh year, during the shemita year.  The land’s produce during the shemita year, the Torah instructs, shall be “le-okhla” (“for eating” – 25:6), which Chazal understood as restricting the use of shemita produce.  The produce may be used only for consumption, and not for any other purpose.  Furthermore, as the Gemara comments in Masekhet Pesachim (52b), the Torah’s insistence on “le-okhla” also means that one may not destroy or otherwise ruin shemita produce.  Since this produce is designated for consumption, it is forbidden to render any shemita produce inedible by spoiling or destroying it.

            Shemita produce in this sense resembles teruma, produce given as the annual gift to a kohen, which also features a prohibition against hefsed (wasting, or ruining).  Like shemita produce, teruma food may not be tampered with in a manner that renders it inedible.

            However, while these two prohibitions – hefsed of teruma and hefsed of shemita produce – are similar, they may not be identical.  The Mishna in Masekhet Sukka (33b) establishes that one may not use an etrog of teruma for the mitzva of arba minim on Sukkot.  According to one view cited in the Gemara (35b), the reason for this halakha is the concern of hefsed teruma.  Handling the etrog has the effect of soiling its outer layer, and this thus violates the prohibition of ruining teruma.  Nowhere, however, do we find any indication that an etrog from shemita may not be used for the mitzva on Sukkot.  In fact, later in Masekhet Sukka (39a), the Mishna explicitly allows using an etrog of shemita for the mitzva of arba minim, and explains the proper procedure for selling and purchasing an etrog of shemita without violating the prohibition against using shemita produce for commercial purposes.  It thus emerges that while using an etrog of teruma for the mitzva would (at least according to one view) violate the prohibition of hefsed, no such violation would be entailed (according to all views) in using an etrog of shemita.

            Rav Shlomo Wahrman addresses this distinction in his work She’eirit Yosef (vol. 1, siman 28), where he suggests that the prohibition of hefsed is defined differently with regard to teruma and shemita.  The prohibition against wasting teruma produce is derived from the Torah’s description of teruma as “mishmeret terumotai” (Bamidbar 18:8), which implies that teruma must be “guarded.”  When it comes to teruma, then, there is obligation to actively “protect” the produce from being wasted.  Shemita produce, by contrast, may not be wasted because it is designated for consumption.  The Torah does not obligate us to “guard” the produce, but rather requires that we use it for eating, and wasting the produce undermines the realization of this purpose.

            Accordingly, we should not be surprised to find different standards for teruma and shemita with regard to the prohibition of hefsed.  As teruma must be “guarded,” it stands to reason that Halakha will impose stricter limits on handling teruma than it does with regard to shemita produce.  Possibly, using the etrog for arba minim does not constitute direct, immediate hefsed, and is thus permitted in the case of shemita, but the possible long-term effects of such use might suffice to violate the stricter standards required when dealing with teruma.  For this reason, perhaps, using an etrog for the mitzva would constitute “hefsed” with respect to teruma, but not with regard to shemita.

Monday

            Parashat Bechukotai begins by describing the blessings of peace and prosperity that God promises to bestow upon Benei Yisrael in reward for their compliance with His laws.  In the first verse, God establishes the conditions upon which these promises hinge: “If you follow My statutes and observe My commands and perform them…”

            The first phrase – “Im be-chukotai teileikhu” – speaks of Benei Yisrael “walking” (“teileikhu”) in accordance with the Almighty’s “statutes” (“chukotai”).  The term “chok” (“statute”) is one of several terms used by the Torah to refer to God’s commands, with “mishpat” (“law”) and “mitzva” (“command”) being the other common expressions.  Interestingly, the verb “h.l.kh.” (“walk”) is never used in reference to these others terms.  The Torah speaks of “walking” in accordance with God’s “chukim,” but never do we find such an expression in reference to “mishpatim” or “mitzvot.”  The concept of “walking” in association with “chukim” also appears in the opposite context, when the Torah forbids following the practices of the pagans.  In a famous verse in Parashat Acharei-Mot, for example, the Torah warns, “u-ve’chukoteihem lo teileikhu” (“and do not follow their statutes” – 18:3).  Likewise, in Parashat Kedoshim (20:23), the Torah warns, “ve-lo teilkhu be-chukot ha-goi” (“And do not follow the statutes of the gentiles”).

            How might we explain the usage of this verb in association with the term “chok,” as opposed to the other expressions that refer to the mitzvot, with which we never find this verb used?

            Rav Eliezer Lipman Lichtenstein, in his Shem Olam commentary to Sefer Vayikra (Warsaw, 1877), suggests an explanation based on the conventional understanding of the term “chok,” as referring specifically to those mitzvot for which we cannot identify the underlying reason.  These mitzvot are observed out of strict, blind obedience to God’s authority, and not because we readily understand how exactly they benefit us or the world.  When the Torah speaks of “walking” in accordance with “chukim,” it perhaps means “following” these laws, like a person who does not know the way to his destination blindly follows his fellow.  He does not know exactly why he is turning right or left at any point, but he knows with confidence that his friend leads him in the direction he needs to go.  This is how we are expected to approach the Torah’s “chukim.”  We are not to simply observe or practice the “chukim”; we are to “follow” them, with firm belief and conviction that they lead us in the direction we need to go.  Even though we do not immediately understand the reason underlying these laws, we nevertheless “follow” them because they reflect the will of the Almighty.

Tuesday

            Parashat Behar discusses a number of halakhot relevant to the poor, particularly laws involving the reclamation of properties that were sold in times of financial pressure, and laws regarding the eved ivri, one who was compelled to sell himself as a servant.  In addition, we find in this section one of several instances where the Torah issues the prohibition against lending on interest (25:35).

            The Rama, in the chapter of the Shulchan Arukh that deals with the special severity of this prohibition (Y.D. 160:1), notes that this law applies to both rich and poor.  Even if one is lending money to a wealthy man (such as if his assets are locked up in investments and he needs cash), whose financial condition would not be ruined by interest payments, the loan may not be given on interest.  The likely source of this halakha (as noted by Rav Yehuda Leib Ginsburg, in his Yalkut Yehuda) is a verse in Sefer Devarim (23:20), where the Torah forbids lending on interest without making specific reference to a situation of a person in need.  Although here in Parashat Behar the Torah deals with a case of a poor person in need of a loan (as is the case in Sefer Shemot 22:24), in Sefer Devarim, the Torah forbids lending on interest “le-achikha” (“to your brother”), without specifying his financial condition.  Thus, even if the borrower is wealthy, it is forbidden to issue a loan on interest.

            One might wonder, in light of this halakha, why the Torah here in Parashat Behar (and in Sefer Shemot) chose to present the prohibition of interest specifically in the context of a poverty-stricken borrower, if in truth this halakha applies regardless of the borrower’s condition.  Why would the Torah “mislead” us into thinking that this prohibition applies only when lending to the poor?

            One simple answer, perhaps, is that the Torah here addresses the more common situation.  Lending to the poor was a far more frequent occurrence than lending to the wealthy, and for this reason, perhaps, the Torah chose to present the prohibition of ribit (interest) in this context.

            Furthermore, we might suggest that the Torah specified this situation because one may have otherwise assumed that to the contrary, the ribit prohibition applies only when lending to a wealthy borrower, who could have sold property instead of taking a loan.  When lending to a poor person in desperate need of funds, one feels a sense of pride and gratification over the assistance given.  The lender credits himself with rescuing the borrower from financial ruin, and jumpstarting his economic future by extending the loan.  He might therefore feel justified in charging interest.  Since he was kind enough to lend money, to provide the impoverished borrower with the means to purchase his immediate needs and perhaps invest in his future, he might feel entitled to remuneration in the form of interest.  Therefore, specifically in the context of a loan granted to the poor, the Torah found it necessary to emphasize the prohibition of ribit.

            It occasionally happens that doing a good deed leaves a person with a sense of entitlement.  People do not want to feel taken advantage of; we have an instinctive fear of giving without receiving, doing without getting something in return.  And thus when we perform an act of magnanimity, it is natural to begin thinking of ways to “cash it in,” of the privileges we can claim in exchange for our generosity.  The prohibition of ribit perhaps reminds us of the importance of kindness for the sake of kindness, of acting generously out of a sense of responsibility, and not with the expectation of kickbacks.  We should not demand or expect special treatment after doing something special.  We should not look for privileges in exchange for our noble deeds – because performing a noble deed is itself a privilege.  Rather than feel a sense of entitlement, we should instead feel privileged to have been able to contribute to and help the world – a feeling which is itself one of the greatest rewards we could ask for.

Wednesday

            The Torah in Parashat Behar (25:36) mentions the prohibition against lending to another Jew on interest.  This prohibition applies to both parties: it is forbidden for the lender to charge interest, and it is similarly forbidden for the borrower to pay interest, even if he is willing to do so.

Among the many issues that the authorities have debated with regard to this prohibition involves the case of shelichut – paying interest through a third party.  The Mordekhai (to Bava Metzia 71) cites a responsum written by Rashi allowing the payment of ribit (interest) in such a situation.  Rashi addresses the case of a borrower who commissions somebody to borrow money from a lender with a commitment to pay interest, and he then later sends the repayment – plus the interest – with the third party to the lender.  According to Rashi, the involvement of a third party renders the arrangement permissible.  Rashi invokes here the halakhic principle of “ein shali’ach li-dvar aveira,” which means that when a person assigns somebody else as his agent to perform an action forbidden by the Torah, the action is not attributed to the dispatcher.  For example, in the case of a hired assassin, the assassin, who committed the act of murder, is held liable for the crime, and not the person who hired him. Similarly, Rashi contends, if one asks or hires somebody to pay interest to his debtor, the ribit prohibition is not violated, since the act is being done by a third party.

One approach to understanding Rashi’s view is to claim that Rashi limited the ribit prohibition to interest paid directly from the borrower to the lender.  Meaning, in his view, the Torah forbade only direct payment of interest; the Torah did not forbid an arrangement whereby the interest is paid through a third party.  And although the halakhic concept of shelichut generally assigns to agents the same status as the person whom they represent, in which case payment through a third party should be no different than direct payment, this is not the case when dealing with paying ribit.  Since paying interest constitutes a Torah violation, the rule of “ein shali’ach li-dvar aveira” has the effect of dissociating the borrower from the interest payment made by his messenger.  Hence, the borrower is not considered to have made a direct payment of interest, and has only paid indirectly, which does not, in Rashi’s view, violate this prohibition.  (And the messenger himself cannot be in violation of ribit, since he is not paying interest on his loan.)

            This, indeed, appears to be Rashi’s intent, at least according to the citation that appears in the Mordekhai:

It is permissible for a Jew to say to his fellow Jew, ‘Go borrow for me money from so-and-so…on interest, and also bring him the interest, for the Torah only forbade interest paid from the borrower’s hand to the lender’s hand… And if [we would consider holding the borrower liable] because a person’s messenger is like himself, it is an established rule that there is no ‘messenger’ for a matter of sin…”

According to this account of Rashi’s position, he held that the ribit prohibition does not apply to indirect interest payment.  And, the institution of shelichut does not equate an indirect interest payment with a direct interest payment, because shelichut is ineffective when dealing with a forbidden act.  Hence, a lender and borrower may enter into an arrangement whereby interest will be paid via a third party.

            Tomorrow we will iy”H present a different approach to explaining Rashi’s ruling.

Thursday

            Yesterday, we discussed a controversial ruling cited in the name of Rashi concerning the prohibition of ribit (lending and borrowing on interest), which the Torah introduces in Parashat Behar (25:36).  As the Mordekhai cites in Masekhet Bava Metzia, Rashi allowed borrowing money on interest if the funds are transferred indirectly, through a third party.  From the Mordekhai’s citation of Rashi’s ruling, as we noted yesterday, it appears that Rashi understood the Torah’s prohibition against ribit as limited to the direct payment of interest from the borrower to the lender.  Indirect payment of interest, by contrast, would not fall under the Torah prohibition of ribit.

            It appears, however, that the Rama understood Rashi’s ruling differently.  The Rama records Rashi’s position in his glosses to the Shulchan Arukh (Y.D. 160:16), but adds that this applies only if the borrower had received the loan initially from the third party.  If, however, the loan was given directly to the borrower, then the payment of interest is forbidden even if it is made through a third party.

            According to this version of Rashi’s view, the involvement of a third party in the interest payment does not render the arrangement permissible.  The ribit prohibition is circumvented not by the third party’s involvement in the interest payment, but rather by his involvement in the initial rendering of the loan.  What might be the rationale underlying this ruling?

            It seems that according to the Rama’s understanding, if a person commissions a shali’ach (agent) to borrow money for him on interest, the shelichut (“agency”) is, ipso facto, null and void.  As mentioned yesterday, the rule of ein shali’ach li-dvar aveira establishes that although a shali’ach is generally given the legal status of the person who appointed him, he does not assume this status if he was sent to commit a Torah prohibition.  For example, a hired assassin is liable to execution for committing an act of murder, despite the fact that he committed the crime on behalf of the person who paid him.  When it comes to acts of sin, people are held personally accountable even if somebody else commissioned the act in question.  According to one view among the Acharonim (see Noda Bi-yehuda – Mahadura Kama, E.H. 75-77), this means that when a person commissions somebody else to commit a forbidden act on his behalf, the agent does not assume the halakhic status of shali’ach at all.  Not only is the dispatcher absolved of liability for the act committed by the person he commissioned, but he is not even considered the “dispatcher” in the first place.  Since he had commissioned the agent to commit a forbidden act, Halakha does not (according to this view) recognize any legal relationship whatsoever between the two individuals.  The Noda Bi-yehuda notes that this is, indeed, the implication of the phrase, “ein shali’ach li-dvar aveira” (literally, “there is no messenger for a matter of sin”).  This expression indicates not only that the sender is not accountable for the shali’ach’s offense, but rather than the shali’ach is not even considered his agent in the first place.

            Rav Natan Gestetner, in his Lehorot Natan (Parashat Behar), applies this reasoning to the case of an agent commissioned to borrow money on interest on behalf of his client.  Since borrowing on interest is forbidden by the Torah, Rashi (as understood by the Rama) maintained that the shelichut in this case is never created; the agent is not considered the legal shali’ach of the borrower.  As such, interestingly enough, Halakha does not treat this arrangement as a loan at all.  The agent is not halakhically viewed as the borrower’s representative, but neither can he be considered the borrower, since he does not receive the money as a lender and does not accept any responsibility whatsoever to repay the money.  Therefore, although the lender gave money to the agent, this is not a “loan” in the formal halakhic sense of the term.  Rather, the “lender” simply gives a sum of money to the “agent,” who happens to transfer the funds to the “borrower.”  Since this is not a halakhic loan, the prohibition of ribit does not apply, and there is thus no prohibition involved whatsoever in the payment of interest.

            It should be noted that many halakhic authorities disputed Rashi’s ruling.  In fact, the Beit Yosef (Y.D. 160), after citing Rashi’s position, claims that not a single other halakhic authority subscribed to such a notion, and he even speculates that this ruling was misattributed to Rashi.  The Taz and Vilna Gaon similarly disputed this ruling, and even the Rama allowed relying on this leniency only in situations of great necessity.  (Acharonim who accepted the Rama’s ruling include the Bach, the Shakh and the Derisha.)

Friday

            In Parashat Behar, the Torah presents the prohibition against lending to the poor on interest, and then adds, “ve-chei achikha imakh” (“and your brother shall live together with you” – 25:36).  The simplest explanation of this phrase, it would seem, is that lending to the poor without interest helps to sustain them and extricate them from poverty, whereas lending on interest – though assisting them in the short-term – ultimately only exacerbates their harsh condition.  The Torah adds this phrase to emphasize that our goal in the face of poverty is to assist the needy and lend them a hand, rather than manipulate their hardship for our own profit.

            Rav Mordechai Gifter, in Pirkei Torah, suggests another explanation of this phrase.  One might have wondered why the Torah takes such a strong stand against lending on interest (to one’s fellow Jew; lending to gentiles on interest is permissible).  After all, why should capital be any different than other assets, which one is certainly allowed to charge others to use?  Halakha explicitly sanctions renting property or possessions, charging money for the use of one’s animals, tools, vehicles or residences.  Seemingly, lending on interest is precisely the same concept – charging someone to use one’s possession, in this case, money.  Why does the Torah permit leasing other possessions, but not cash?

            The Torah answers this question, Rav Gifter suggests, by adding, “ve-chei achikha imakh.”  We must look upon and treat our fellow Jews in need as “imakh,” as though they live with us, as part of our household.  We spend our available cash to provide the needs of those who are dependent on us, to buy them food and clothing and care for their other necessities.  When it comes to the members of our family, we treat our money not as “capital,” an asset that can be used and invested for profit, but rather as funds we need to provide for them.  The Torah therefore admonishes in the context of the prohibition against interest, “ve-chei achikha imakh.”  The poor must be treated as our own “brethren,” as members of our household, whom we care for with our assets without charging any fees.

            This also explains the distinction between Jews and gentiles with regard to the ribit prohibition.  The permission granted to charge interest from gentiles does not mean that the Torah sanctions taking unfair advantage of non-Jews.  Undoubtedly, we must act ethically and sensitively to all people.  But charging interest is not unethical or insensitive.  As mentioned, it is a perfectly acceptable financial practice, whereby one allows others to use his property for a fee.  The Torah forbids charging interest to other Jews not because it is unfair, but because we are to treat our fellow Jews as family members.  And just as we bear responsibility to support our family members, so must we take responsibility for the financial well-being of our fellow Jews in need, and assist them during their time of hardship.  (See also Ramban to Devarim 23:20.)