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The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit
Midrash
The Laws of Shabbat Yeshivat Har Etzion
Shiur #10: The Status of Pouring From a Keli
Rishon
By HaRav Baruch Gigi
Translated by David Silverberg
The term iruy in Halakha refers to pouring hot liquid from a
keli rishon (the original pot in which it was cooked) onto food in a
keli sheni.
We find no explicit discussion in the Talmud Bavli regarding the status
of iruy with respect to bishul. Later, we will explain how the
Rishonim tried to infer the status of iruy from various sources in
the Bavli. The Yerushalmi, by
contrast, addresses this issue explicitly, but the Rishonim disagree in
identifying the sugya's conclusion.
We will therefore begin with the discussions among the Rishonim,
and then proceed to the Yerushalmi.
The Mishna in Masekhet Shabbat (42a) permits adding spices to food in a
keli sheni, but forbids doing so in a keli rishon. The Rishonim noted that no
conclusions can be reached on the basis of this Mishna with regard to the status
of iruy. The halakha
allowing adding spices in a keli sheni implies the iruy from a
keli rishon is forbidden, but the halakha forbidding adding spices
in a keli rishon would suggest that pouring from a keli rishon is
permissible. Nevertheless, some
Rishonim claimed that the Rashbam inferred from this Mishna that
iruy from a keli rishon has the same status as a keli
sheni, since the Mishna forbids only adding spices to a keli rishon,
and not pouring from a keli rishon onto food.[1]
Another sugya relevant to this discussion appears in Masekhet
Pesachim (76a):
It was
stated: [Pouring] hot [food] into hot [food] – is forbidden according to all
opinions. Cold into cold – is
permissible according to all opinions.
Hot into cold, or cold into hot: Rav says, the top [food] triumphs, and
Shemuel says, the bottom [food] triumphs.
The Gemara
here addresses a situation of a permissible food and forbidden food one of which
falls into the other. Since the
transfer of forbidden taste from one piece to another can occur only through
heat, the question arises as to whether it occurs if only one of the two pieces
is hot. Rav and Shemuel disagree as
to whether the piece on top determines the transfer of taste, such that if the
top piece is cold there no transfer can occur, or if this is determined by the
bottom piece. Halakha follows the
view that the temperature of the bottom piece is the determining factor. At first glance, this halakha
seems to accommodate the position equating iruy with a keli sheni,
since the food in the keli sheni, into which liquid is poured from a
keli rishon, is the determining factor. Thus, the Rishonim who afford
iruy the status of a keli rishon must deal with this
sugya's implication to the contrary.
A third sugya addressed by the Rishonim in this context is
a Gemara in Masekhet Zevachim (95b), which deals with utensils used for cooking
sacrificial meat, which require hag'ala (immersion in boiling water) to
rid them of the absorbed taste of sacrificial meat. The Gemara explicitly establishes, based
on an inference from a verse, that a utensil requires hag'ala even if
sacrificial meat was not cooked in it, but was rather poured into it from its
original utensil. This would appear
to prove that iruy has the status of a keli rishon.
We might, however, dismiss this proof based on the continuation of the
Gemara's discussion:
Rami
Bar Chama asked: What if one suspended it in the airspace of an oven? Did the Torah require [hag'ala]
only with regard to cooking and absorption [of taste], or [even] with regard to
cooking without absorption [of taste]?
Rava said: Let us hear [the answer from the following source]: "Whether
he cooked in it or if he poured boiling [sacrificial meat] into it." [The Gemara responds:] We did not ask
concerning absorption [of taste] without cooking; we asked about cooking without
absorption [of taste].
The Gemara
appears to classify iruy as a situation where taste is absorbed without
the process of bishul. We
might therefore conclude that iruy has the status of a keli rishon
only with respect to the absorption of taste of forbidden food, but not for
purposes of the prohibition of bishul on Shabbat. Thus, this sugya might actually
prove that as far as bishul is concerned, we should treat iruy
like a keli sheni, and so those who consider iruy equivalent to a
keli rishon must address this sugya, as well.
As mentioned, the Rishonim disagree in explaining the relevant
sugyot, and thus reach different conclusions regarding the status of
iruy. Let us now present the
main positions among the Rishonim.
1) The
Rashbam rules that iruy has the status of a keli sheni, drawing
support primarily from the aforementioned sugyot in Zevachim and
Pesachim. And even though the
Gemara in Pesachim qualifies the principle of "tata'a gavar" ("the bottom
one triumphs") by claiming, "until the bottom [piece] cools [the top piece], it
absorbs one layer's-worth," this applies only to the issue of absorbing taste,
but not to the process of bishul.
As far as the laws of Shabbat are concerned, therefore, iruy is
equivalent to a keli sheni.
We find a similar position – at least in the direction of chumra –
to yield a stringent ruling – in the comments of Rabbenu Yona:
It is a
terrible mistake made by some people who cover a kettle of hot water [to retain
its heat] so that they can place [the water] into a pot on Shabbat when the food
begins to dry. At times one is not
at the point of yad soledet bo and the other is at the point of yad
soledet bo, and they cook together, such that cooking is done on
Shabbat. And even if they are
both at the point of yad soledet bo, there is a view in the Yerushalmi
that poured [liquid] does not have the same status as [liquid in] a keli
rishon. Thus, when one pours
the water, the moment it leaves the utensil – even if it is still boiling – its
level of boiling no longer has the capacity to cook, just like a keli
sheni, which cannot cook, and it is therefore cooked inside the keli
rishon. And water that has been
cooked is [nevertheless] subject to bishul if it stopped boiling.
Rabbenu Yona
does not definitively rule that iruy is equivalent to a keli
sheni, but he insists on satisfying this view in situations where it would
yield a chumra. His main
point is that the halakha equating iruy with a keli rishon
does not result from the principle of tata'a gavar, which would dictate
that the poured liquid attains the status of the food on the bottom, in the
keli sheni. Rather, in
Rabbenu Yona's view, even when one pours liquid into a keli rishon it has
the status of a keli sheni, because the liquid stops boiling immediately
upon leaving the walls of the utensil, thus becoming like a keli sheni in
terms of its ability to cook other foods.
2. Rabbenu
Tam maintains that iruy must be treated as a keli rishon, and he
must therefore deal with the sugyot in Pesachim and Zevachim. The Rishonim refute the proof
from the halakha of tata'a gavar in several ways:
A) Many
Rishonim distinguish between situations of a direct, unbroken flow from a
keli rishon, in which case we would equate iruy with a keli
rishon, and instances where the flow is interrupted, where we may consider
the liquid equivalent to a keli sheni. The sugya in Masekhet Pesachim
which establishes the rule of tata'a gavar would thus be referring to an
interrupted flow of liquid. (See
end of Tosefot in Zevachim 95b, and Ramban and Ran towards the end of Masekhet
Avoda Zara, among other sources.)
On the basis of his view, Rabbenu Tam allowed performing hag'ala
by pouring hot water on the utensil; see his comments in Tosefot, Avoda Zara 74b
(s.v. darash Rava) and the aforementioned Rishonim, who
disagree.
B) The
Ra'avan (21) distinguished between pouring from a boiling hot keli
rishon, which would have the status of a keli rishon, and pouring
from a hot keli sheni, which we would treat as a keli sheni. His intention, I believe, is that only
pouring from a pot whose contents are still boiling has the capacity to cook the
food onto which it falls.[2] And
when the Gemara in Zevachim describes a situation of iruy from a keli
rishon as effectuating beli'a (absorption of taste) but not
bishul, it means that the cooking process and heat occurred not by this
utensil's independent force, but rather by force of another utensil. Even this Gemara would concede, however,
that iruy has the capacity to effect bishul. (See Tosefot Ha-Rosh, Shabbat 42a
s.v. ha-ilfas, and Tosefot, Zevachim 95b s.v. ira.)
C) A third
distinction is suggested by Tosefot (in Zevachim), who wrote that liquid poured
from a keli rishon has the status of a keli rishon, whereas when a solid food item is poured
onto another solid food, we apply the principle of tata'a gavar, and cooking occurs only kedei kelipa (through one layer's-worth of the
food).
3) Some Rishonim understood Rabbenu Tam as saying that
iruy cooks only kedei kelipa.
The sugya in Pesachim thus poses no difficulty,
because it says explicitly that even if tata'a gavar, taste is absorbed in such a case only
kedei kelipa, and we might apply this to the process of
cooking, as well, which would occur under these circumstances only to the extent
of kedei kelipa.
(See Tosefot in Zevachim, and the Rosh in Masekhet Shabbat
3:16.)
The Sugya in the Yerushalmi
Let us now address the discussion in the Yerushalmi, Shabbat
3:5:
Is it permissible to place spices on the
bottom and pour over them from the top?
Rabbi Yona says, this is forbidden; iruy is equivalent to a keli rishon.
Rabbi Yona's proof is from here: "Whether he cooked in it or if he
poured boiling [sacrificial meat] into it." Rabbi Yossi said, there, an earthenware
utensil absorbs [taste even through iruy]; but spices are not cooked [in
this fashion, and it is therefore permissible]. Rabbi Yossi challenged [this view] in
the house of Rabbi Bon: Does it not state, "This is true even in a copper
utensil"? You must therefore say
that a copper utensil absorbs [taste].
Is it permissible to pour from a continuous flow? Rabbi Chananya the son of Rabbi Hillel
said, [this is subject to the] dispute between Rabbi Yona and Rabbi Yossi. Rabbi Yitzchak Bar Gufta asked in the
presence of Rabbi Mana: If one did this on Shabbat, is he liable for cooking [on
Shabbat]? If he did this with meat
and milk, is he liable for cooking [meat with milk]? He said to him: This is as Rabbi Ze'eira
said: What is clearly chalut [wheat stirred in hot water which is subject
to the obligation of chala] – anything under which fire burns. Here, too – what is clearly a cooked
food – anything under which
fire burns.
The
Yerushalmi addresses two questions.
The first concerns the status of pouring from a keli rishon onto
spices in a keli sheni, which is the classic question of
iruy. The Yerushalmi's
second question, however, is far from clear.[3]
Rabbi Yona claims that iruy has the status of a keli
rishon, and draws proof to his position from the sugya in Zevachim
which requires hag'ala for utensils used for cooking sacrificial meat as
well as utensils into which sacrificial meat was poured. Rabbi Yossi dismisses this proof,
arguing that the issue there hinges on the absorption of taste in the utensil,
not the occurrence of bishul.
Rabbi Yona counters that earthenware utensils, which absorb taste very
easily, can perhaps absorb taste even without the occurrence of bishul,
but this cannot be said of copper utensils. We must therefore conclude that
iruy effects bishul just like a keli rishon.
The Yerushalmi does not record Rabbi Yossi's response to Rabbi Yona's
argument. According to Tosefot
(Shabbat 42b s.v. aval), Rabbi Yossi's silence proves that the accepted
position is that of Rabbi Yona, that iruy has the status of a keli
rishon. By contrast, the Rashba
(Shabbat 42b) and the Ran (Avoda Zara, 38b in the Rif) inferred from the closing
comments to this sugya – "what is clearly a cooked food – anything under which fire burns" –
that in conclusion the Yerushalmi considers iruy equivalent to a keli
sheni, and it cannot accomplish bishul. Only with respect to absorption of
forbidden taste does iruy function as a keli rishon.
This view, however, requires some explanation. The Yerushalmi said merely that the
Torah prohibition of bishul applies only when the cooking occurs over
fire; this does not preclude the possibility of a rabbinic enactment forbidding
iruy from a keli rishon, just as cooking in a keli rishon
itself constitutes – according to the Yerushalmi – a rabbinic violation.[4] We might explain that since Rabbi Yona
drew proof from the verse which the Gemara understood as requiring
hag'ala for a utensil used through iruy, and the Yerushalmi
clearly denies the occurrence of Torah-level bishul through iruy,
the prohibition indicated in the verse is necessarily rooted in beli'a
(absorption of taste), rather than bishul. Clearly, then, as far as bishul
on Shabbat is concerned, iruy is not deemed capable of cooking.
The Ramban (end of Masekhet Avoda Zara) likewise inferred from the
Yerushalmi's concluding remarks that the issue remains subject to the debate
between Rabbi Yona and Rabbi Yossi.
He even claimed that the Yerushalmi's second question was asked only
within the view that iruy does not have the status of a keli
rishon. This second question,
which in the Ramban's text reads, "Is it permissible to pour with the flow," is
as follows: Generally, the liquid poured from a keli rishon comes in
contact with the spices or food into which it is poured in the keli
sheni. The Yerushalmi's second
question relates to a case where the poured liquid met the spices as it fell,
before it landed in the keli sheni.
Accordingly, the Ramban claimed that this question applies only within
the view that permits standard iruy, and it asks whether this view would
be stringent if the contact occurred as the liquid flowed from the keli
rishon. But since the
Yerushalmi applied the debate between Rabbi Yona and Rabbi Yossi even to this
case, we have no indication of the Yerushalmi's conclusion.
The Final
Halakha
The Shulchan Arukh (318:10) writes, "It is forbidden to place
spices in a bowl and pour over them from a keli rishon." The Mishna Berura comments, "For
although spices cannot be cooked in a keli sheni, nevertheless, we follow
the view that pouring from a keli rishon cooks to the extent of a
layer's-worth if one poured directly over them such that the flow was
unbroken." The Acharonim
establish that if the flow was disrupted before landing in the keli
sheni, then its status is that of a keli sheni, and it does not
accomplish bishul.
The Acharonim (see Taz 318:16) write that we accept the position
equating iruy with a keli rishon only where it yields a stringent
ruling, out of concern for this view.
One may not, however, rely on this view to yield a lenient ruling, such
as to permit hag'ala through pouring from a keli rishon. We might add that in light of the
Mishna Berura's comment, that iruy has the capacity to cook only
to the extent of kedei kelipa, it certainly would not suffice for
hag'ala.
Rabbi Akiva Eiger (chiddushim, 318:10) writes that the prohibition
against iruy applies only when one pours directly onto the given food
item; if one pours onto a different side of the utensil and the liquid then
comes in contact with the food, this resembles cooking in a keli sheni
and is permissible.
The Mishna Berura writes that if, ex post facto, one did
pour liquid onto food from a keli rishon, one must assume that a
layer's-worth of the food was cooked and is thus forbidden for consumption by
virtue of the law of ma'aseh Shabbat (the prohibition against partaking
of food cooked on Shabbat). This
ruling appears difficult in light of the rule that when an issue is subject to a
debate among the poskim, we do not forbid be-di'avad (after the
fact), as we may rely on the lenient position. And here, the Rashbam permits pouring
from a keli rishon, and one should therefore be allowed to partake of the
food cooked in this fashion be-di'avad.[5] The answer, perhaps, is that the
accepted view represents a middle position in between the two extreme views
(that iruy cooks completely, like a keli rishon, and that it does
not cook at all, like a keli sheni). Halakha accepts the view that
iruy cooks a layer's-worth, and we therefore cannot act leniently against
this position, even be-di'avad.
Clearly, however, this matter requires further elucidation.
The Shevitat Ha-Shabbat (Mevashel section, Be'er
Rechovot 58) writes that if one cooks through iruy inadvertently, or
thought that it was permissible, one may partake of the food
be-di'avad.
The Bei'ur Halakha comments that if one poured onto a baked or
roasted item, he may partake of the food be-di'avad. He explains that even though we
generally follow the Yerei'im's position forbidding cooking a previously
baked item, and thus one should not pour water from a keli rishon onto a
baked food, nevertheless, if one did pour, we may rely on the authorities who
hold that a baked food item is no longer subject to bishul.
Pouring Onto
a Thick Food Item
The Iglei Tal (Ha-ofeh, 14) writes:
One who
pours from a keli rishon onto thin items, that are no thicker than a
kedei kelipa, or onto spices that are made to extract flavor and enhance
a food – is liable [for bishul].
But [if one pours onto] items that are thicker than a kedei kelipa
– he is not liable even for the kedei kelipa that is cooked [through
pouring]… because at the moment of pouring it is cooked only to the point of
ma'akhal Ben Derusai [half or one-third cooked], and for anything that is
cooked on only one side to the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai – one is not
liable.
The Iglei
Tal's theory is based on the sugya in Masekhet Menachot (57b), which
establishes that cooking one side of a food item only to the point of
ma'akhal Ben Derusai does not constitute bishul. Bishul requires either that both
sides (meaning, the entire depth of the cooked item) reach the point of
ma'akhal Ben Derusai, or that at least one side is fully cooked. Iruy, the Iglei Tal
claims, cooks only one layer's-worth, and only to the point of ma'akhal Ben
Derusai, and thus if the item is thicker than one layer, it would not
constitute a Torah violation of bishul.
However, the Acharonim debate whether one may le-khatechila
(initially) pour from a keli rishon onto thick food items, as the
Iglei Tal concludes, "what more – one may do so even
le-khatechila," or if this should be forbidden on the grounds of
chatzi shiur (a "partial violation"), regarding which Halakha follows
Rabbi Yochanan's position, the chatzi shiur is forbidden by Torah
law. (See Shevitat
Ha-Shabbat, ibid. 59).
The controversy surrounding this issue relates mainly to the nature of
the prohibition of chatzi shiur and its application to bishul on
Shabbat. The Shevitat Ha-Shabbat
discusses his disagreement with a "scholar from Jerusalem" as to why cooking
only one side of an item to the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai does not
constitute bishul. One
possibility claims that this does not qualify as bishul at all because
the food is simply not edible, as even Ben Derusai himself would not eat food in
such a condition. Alternatively,
one might explain that Chazal established a shiur (amount, or
degree) of cooking for an act to qualify as a significant occurrence of cooking,
and they therefore required that both sides be cooked to the point of
ma'akhal Ben Derusai.
According to the second approach, then since the cooked side is able to
combine with the other side to comprise a complete shiur – thus
satisfying the basic condition for applying the prohibition of chatzi
shiur ("chazi le-itzterufi") – the rule of chatzi shiur takes
effect, and forbids partaking of this food. Although in my opinion the first
approach seems more compelling, one should nevertheless act stringently in this
regard and follow the position of the Shevitat Ha-Shabbat.
Regarding very thin items, however, pouring from a keli rishon
clearly entails a potential Torah violation, even if pouring cooks only to the
point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai.
One therefore may not pour from a keli rishon onto tea. In light of what we discussed in the
previous shiur regarding kalei ha-bishul (items that cook more
easily), one should refrain from placing tea leaves in a keli sheni, as
well.[6]
A Repeated
Iruy
Consider a case of one who poured from a keli rishon onto a food
item before Shabbat. May he then
pour onto that food on Shabbat?
This question in essence consists of two separate issues:
1)
The initial iruy cooks only a layer's-worth,
and thus the second pouring might cook a layer's-worth from the second side,
which was unaffected by the initial iruy.
2)
Since, as we mentioned above, iruy cooks only
to the point of ma'akhal Ben Derusai, and we follow the position that one
violates bishul even by cooking a food that had already been cooked to
this point (so long as it has not been fully cooked), the second iruy
might therefore violate bishul in that it cooks the food item even
further.
The Peri
Megadim (Mishbetzot Zahav 318:15) permits pouring hot water on
tealeaves upon which one had already poured water before Shabbat. In Eishel Avraham (253:41),
however, the Peri Megadim writes that one should refrain from doing so,
out of concern that he might now pour on a different side, which had not been
cooked as a result of the initial pouring.
The Mishna Berura (318:39) writes that if one pours hot water on
tealeaves before Shabbat and stirs them thoroughly as he pours, we may consider
the leaves fully cooked on all sides, and thus permit pouring hot water on them
on Shabbat.
The Sha'ar Ha-tziyon (318:63) raises the concern that the initial
pouring perhaps did not fully cook the leaves, in which case we should forbid
pouring water on them during Shabbat.
He claims that we may rely on a sefeik-sefeika ("double doubt"):
perhaps Halakha follows the Rambam's position, that soaking a previously soaked
item does not constitute bishul, in which case here, too, repeating the
action does not have the capacity to accomplish bishul, and perhaps
Halakha follows the view that a food that had already reached the point of
ma'akhal Ben Derusai is no longer subject to bishul. In my opinion, we should add yet another
factor, namely, that tealeaves are very thin and are thus cooked in their
entirety as a result of iruy, given that they are no thicker than
kedei kelipa. Furthermore,
as the Peri Megadim appears to suggest, tealeaves are fully cooked
through the process of iruy.
This issue, however, requires further clarification.
Notes:
1.
See Tosefot Ha-Rosh, Shabbat 42a s.v.
ha-ilfas, and the comments of other Rishonim to that
sugya.
2.
It is unclear whether this would relate to the
position of the Ra'avya, a grandson of the Ra'avan, which we cited in a previous
shiur, that a keli rishon off the fire can cook only while its
contents are still boiling.
3.
Some commentaries explained the two questions as
relating to two types of iruy – iruy with a steady flow, and with
an interrupted flow. Others claimed
that the Yerushalmi questions whether a flow of liquid coming down a pot has the
status of iruy. See Penei
Moshe and Korban Ha-eida; their precise intent is not altogether
clear. Later we will bring the
Ramban's explanation.
4.
See our shiur on the topic of cooking in a
keli rishon. This difficulty
is especially pronounced in the comments of the Rashba, who claimed that
according to the Yerushalmi's conclusion iruy has the status of a keli
sheni and is permissible on Shabbat.
The Ramban (as we will soon discuss) deals only with the question of
hag'ala through iruy; he thus needs only to demonstrate from the
Yerushalmi that iruy does not constitute bishul on the level of
Torah law, thereby proving that hag'ala in this manner is ineffective if
the utensil had absorbed forbidden taste through cooking.
5.
The rule allowing one to rely on a lenient position
be-di'avad stems from the fact that the prohibition against making use of
an item produced through melakha on Shabbat originates from
Chazal, and is not a Torah prohibition (as we will discuss in a later
shiur). Therefore, in
situations subject to a dispute, we may rely on the lenient positions to permit
benefiting from or eating the item ex post facto. The source of the halakha cited
by the Mishna Berura is the Peri Megadim (Eishel Avraham,
318:10), and it appears that he himself held that the position permitting
iruy from a keli rishon is dismissed entirely, and thus does not
come under consideration at all. He
therefore does not rely on it even be-di'avad. Indeed, in Yoreh Dei'a, the
Peri Megadim (Mishbetzot Zahav 68:9, section 3) refused to accept
a sefeik-sefeika that takes into account the possibility that Halakha
follows the view equating iruy with a keli sheni. And he writes explicitly in Orach
Chayim (Eishel Avraham 318:14) that we do not consider this issue
subject to uncertainty at all.
6.
In a future shiur we will discuss the
preferred options for preparing tea on Shabbat.
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